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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common argument in law and economics that divided ownership can
create or exacerbate strategic behavior. For instance, when several persons own
the land designated for a proposed stadium, individual sellers may "hold out"
for a disproportionate share of the gains from trade.' Alternatively, when
building a public library would benefit multiple residents, individual buyers
may "free ride" on the willingness of others to pay for its construction.2 Such
transaction costs of collective action fall under a variety of analytic rubrics,
including the "tragedy of the commons" and the theory of "public goods."'
Nonetheless, each example of market failure shares a common attribute: The
division of a single legal entitlement, or of rivalrous entitlements, 4 among joint
sellers or joint buyers may prevent socially efficient transactions, particularly
when the parties possess private information about their preferences.5
This Article explores a different way of dividing an entitlement. Rather
than analyzing divisions among buyers or among sellers, we consider the
effects of splitting an entitlement between the two groups. Our core insight is
Solomonic in character: Dividing a legal entitlement between rivalrous users
can facilitate efficient trade.6 More specifically, we show that when two
I. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN. LAW AND ECONOMICS 192-93 (1988). RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 48-49. 55 (3d ed. 1986); George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite.
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Man. Agents. 57 REv EcoN. ST D 351 (1990)
2. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1. at 109; POSNER. supra note I. at 55
3. The contributions to this literature are far too dense and numerous to be mentioned here For general
overviews, however, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S BLINDER. ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
309-33 (6th ed. 1994); COOTER & ULEN. supra note 1. at 88-122: POSNER. supra note I. at 29-77
4. While it is arbitrary to characterize a particular set of claims either as the di'. ision of an ndi'.idual
entitlement or of rivalrous entitlements, we seek to explore nvalnes that either part) can end by
successfully purchasing the other party's claim. For example, an easement and a fee simple subject to an
easement might be thought of as separate entitlements or a, a division of a single entitletnit See Robert
C. Ellickson. Property in Land. 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). But regardless of their characterization. these
claims might be rivalrous if an individual could develop the land more profitably by acquinng ownership
of both claims.
5. In his seminal article. Ronald Coase argued that. in the absence of transaction costs. pr'.ate
bargaining will lead to efficient outcomes. See Ronald H Coase. The Probleni of Soctl Cost. 3 1 L &
ECON. I (1960).
6. The title of this Article is. of course, an allusion to the much-repeated biblical account of King
Solomon deciding which of two women claiming parentage of a child was the actual mother Unable to
deduce the truth from claims that the two women made. Solomon requested a sword so that he might slice
the baby into two equal pieces, giving half to each party. When only one of the women offered to drop her
claim for custody if Solomon spared the child's life. Solomon immediately awarded her custody See I
Kings 3:16-28. This biblical account is suggestive of our results, especially in that Solomon's threat to split
the baby induced the revelation of private information, leading ultimately to complete custody by the true
mother. Nonetheless, the success of his decision rule is inconsistent with the assumption that both parties
know the rules of the legal game (an assumption that we make in this Article) If both w omen had known
what Solomon would do. then it would have been a dominant strategy for each woman to offer to surrender
her claim.
Jon Elster has used the Solomonic analog) to argue that divided (probabilistic) entitlements can
produce more effective child custody decisions in situations w,here negotiated settlement i' unlikely JoN
ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 123-74 11989) For a
discussion of the differences between Elster's probabilistic model and ours. sc infra note 141
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parties have private information about how much they value an entitlement,
endowing each party with a partial claim to the entitlement can reduce the
incentive to behave strategically during bargaining, thereby enhancing
economic efficiency.
Private information is a particularly pernicious form of transaction cost,
especially in legal contexts where, for procedural or other reasons, parties must
negotiate within "thin" markets.7 In such contexts, self-interested bargainers
have a strong incentive to misrepresent their private valuations so as to capture
a larger share of the bargaining "pie." These incentives often lead to
predictable opportunistic strategies: Sellers tend to overstate the value they
place on the bargained-for item, while buyers tend to understate their desire to
purchase it. As a result of such strategic behavior, the parties may fail to detect
and exploit a mutually beneficial trade, and even when they can it is usually
after considerable and costly delay.
In this Article, we argue that divided entitlements can facilitate trade by
inducing claim holders to reveal more information than they would under an
undivided entitlement regime. Owners of divided, or "Solomonic," entitlements
must bargain more forthrightly than owners of undivided entitlements, because
the entitlement division obscures the titular boundary between "buyer" and
"seller." More precisely, endowing each bargainer with a share of the
underlying entitlement creates the possibility of two different types of Coasean
trade: A bargainer might buy the other party's claim, or, alternatively, she
might sell her own. During negotiation, each party is likely to be uncertain
about whether she will ultimately emerge as a seller or a buyer. This strategic
"identity crisis" can strongly mitigate each party's incentive to misrepresent her
respective valuation; each party must balance countervailing interests in
shading up her valuation, as one would qua seller, and shading down her
valuation, as one would qua buyer. This form of rational ambivalence, we
argue, can lead the bargainers to represent their valuations more truthfully.8
To illustrate this identity crisis with a traditional type of property division,
consider a negotiation between Smith and Jones about who should develop
Blackacre as a mall. Assume it is commonly known that Blackacre's most
valuable use is as a mall, and that either Smith or Jones is the most efficient
developer. But assume also that the parties' private valuations make it unclear
who is the more efficient developer. Blackacre is divided so that Smith owns
Blackacre in fee simple, subject to an executory interest in Jones that becomes
7. See. e.g.. ERIC RASMUSEN. GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 227
(1989) (noting that in such thin markets, usual assumptions of efficient competitive markets break down).
8. Within principal-agent literature, this form of rational ambivalence is more often known as
"countervailing incentives." The notion of countervailing incentives was first examined in Tracy R. Lewis
& David E.M. Sappington, Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems, 49 J. ECON. THEORY 294 (1989);
see also William Samuelson, A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF
BARGAINING 321, 324-31 (Alvin Roth ed., 1985) (discussing problems of bargaining inefficiency resulting
from parties' self-interest and asymmetric information).
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possessory if Blackacre is ever used for any purpose other than a horse buggy
factory. Because of the low demand for horse buggies, Blackacre's value as
a buggy factory is negligible. Under these circumstances, the mall might only
be built if one of the parties agrees to sell her estate in the land to the other.9
Imagine what would go through Smith's mind in considering how much to
offer to purchase Jones' interest. Smith, as a buyer, would want to offer a low
price, but the possibility that Smith could become a seller complicates Smith's
decision. If Smith offers too low a price, Jones is liable to turn the tables by
suggesting that Smith should sell her own claim. In essence, Jones would be
saying: "Where did you get that price? If that's all you think Blackacre is
worth, I'll buy your claim." Thus, when ownership is so divided, a party's
explicit or implicit representation about the entitlement's value might be used
by the other side to propose the other type of transaction."0
This example illustrates how a particular type of division can facilitate
efficient trade. Throughout this Article, we compare bargaining in the shadow
of an absolute, undivided entitlement to bargaining in the shadow of a number
of such Solomonic divisions."1 Our analysis, however, revolves around two
broad axes of division. The first axis represents the degree of protection
accorded a given entitlement, and the second axis represents the explicit
ownership structure of the entitlement.
With respect to the first axis of division, the law may effect a Solomonic
division through the degree to which it protects one's ownership interest in the
underlying entitlement. Our discussion of this axis centers predominantly on
the distinction-first analyzed by Calabresi and Melamed'2-between
"liability rules" (i.e., remedies at law) and "property rules" (i.e., equitable
relief). Protecting an "owner" of an entitlement with a liability rule is a type
of Solomonic division, because a liability rule endows "nonowners" with an
option to take the entitlement nonconsensually and pay the damage amount."
9. Even though the value of Blackacre as a buggy factory is negligible. Smith will refuse to fulfill the
condition that triggers the executory interest so she can bargain for compensation from Jones
10. This countervailing effect, however, is not present when one party to the negotiation has an
undivided interest in the entitlement: For example. if Jones owns Blackacre in fee simple, then Smith (as
buyer) need not worry that Jones will use her low offer as the basis for a counteroffer to purchase Smith's
claims, for the simple reason that Smith has nothing to sell.
11. Robert Ellickson has recently characterized absolute entitlements as the "Blackstoman bundle.-
Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1362-63 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMME.%'TARIES * 18-19). see also
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, cOMMENTARIES *2 (describing nght of property as -sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
of any other individual in the universe"). Ellickson defines the Blackstoman bundle as ownership by a
single individual in perpetuity with absolute rights to exclude would-be entrants, with absolute pnvileges
to use and abuse the land, and with absolute powers to transfer the whole (or any part carved out by use.
space, or time). Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1362-63. While the fee simple estate is often referred to as if
it were such an absolute right, Ellickson stresses that fee simple is "'far more nuanced than the pure
Blackstonian package." Id. at 1363.
12. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Property Rules. Liability Rules and Inahenabthtv One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
13. For example, ifa farmer's ownership of spark-free land is protected by a -wcak" liability rule. then
an adjoining railroad would have the option to emit sparks (nonconsensually) onto the land and pay
1995] 1031
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Property protection, on the other hand, does not represent a division, since the
nonowner lacks power to appropriate the underlying entitlement nonconsen-
sually.
We show that liability rules possess an "inf6rmation-forcing" quality that
property rules do not. 4 Under a liability rule regime, a nominal entitlement
owner has an incentive to reveal truthfully whether her valuation is above or
below the damage amount. We demonstrate that the entitlement owner's choice
between two different kinds of Coasean transactions acts as a credible signal
whether she has a relatively high or relatively low valuation. This credible
signal of valuation decreases the aggregate amount of private information by
"partitioning" the entitlement holders into two discrete sets, thereby facilitating
more efficient trade. In contrast, property rule protections render such credible
signaling impossible. 15
Our argument that liability rules can catalyze consensual trade challenges
various common wisdoms in law and economics. Many scholars have argued
that clear property rights are appropriate when transaction costs are low,
because property rights encourage people to bargain. For example, Judge
Posner has captured the common wisdom by asserting that in "low-transaction-
cost settings ... the law should require the parties to transact in the market;
it can do this by making the present owner's property right absolute (or nearly
so), so that anyone who thinks the property is worth more has to negotiate
with the owner."'6 These scholars often assert that property rules are "market-
encouraging,"' 17 while liability rules are "market-mimicking."' 18 Although a
damages. The farmer's claims to the land would be partial or incomplete, because her ownership would
be subject to the railroad's option to take and pay damages.
A liability rule is usually defined to allow a "nonowner" to take an entitlement nonconsensually from
an owner and pay damages that are tailored to "approximat[e] ... the value of the object to the original
owner." Id. at 1125. Our analysis, however, focuses on untailored liability rules, which require the
nonowner to pay a fixed amount of damages upon a taking, regardless of the owner's showing of actual
loss. For a definition and discussion of tailoring, see Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring
of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. I (1993).
14. While this Article argues that liability rules have information-forcing qualities that can increase
efficiency, it does not argue that a randomly chosen liability rule will outperform the optimal property-like
assignment. In fact, others have shown that this assertion is demonstrably false. See Steven Shavell,
Property Rights and the Rule of Liability in a Simple Bargaining Model (1988) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors). We do assert, however, that it is possible to find a liability rule that will outperform
any type of property rule. See Eric L. Talley, Property Rights, Liability Rules and Coasean Bargaining
Under Incomplete Information (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 114)
(Stanford Law School, Aug. 1994) (formally demonstrating this assertion in mechanism design framework).
15. Even though the property rule itself does not give the parties a method of signaling valuation, other
aspects of the law, or prior agreements of the parties themselves, may allow the parties to mitigate the
allocational inefficiencies associated with private information. See generally Jennifer G. Brown & Ian
Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994) (discussing possibility that various
mandatory and voluntary mediation techniques might mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard).
16. POSNER, supra note 1, at 49 (emphasis added); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note I, at 100
("One well-confirmed result in the literature on bargaining is that bargainers are more likely to cooperate
when their rights are clear, and less likely to agree when their rights are ambiguous.").
17. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrizes,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 n.28 (1993); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 79-81
(1985).
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few strands of the law-and-economics literature-particularly the literature on
efficient breach of contract-have allowed for parties to bargain in the shadow
of liability rules as well as in the shadow of property rules,'" we are the first
to show that liability rules may induce both more contracting and more
efficient contracting than property rules.
Viewing liability rules as market catalysts, rather than substitutes, can also
lead to other contradictions of the accepted wisdom in law and economics. For
instance, the common assertion that liability rules are market-mimicking has
led numerous scholars to conclude that the best liability rules are the ones that
carefully "tailor" the damage amount to the plaintiff's valuation.' Only in
this way, many argue, can a court replicate the terms for which parties would
have bargained had they been able to negotiate.-' Because Calabresi and
Melamed were so successful in showing that tailored liability rules are
appropriate when parties do not have an opportunity to contract, subsequent
scholars have overlooked the possibility that untailored rules-which fix
damages at one size to fit all plaintiffs regardless of plaintiffs' actual
valuation-may promote trade when contracting is possible. And, in fact, we
find that when parties have the opportunity to contract, untailored liability rules
can be more effective in channeling bargainers toward consensual trade, where
the parties tailor the terms of trade themselves. Indeed, tailoring legal rules to
give parties private information about the consequences of nonconsensual
taking can severely undermine the incentives to trade consensually.22 When
dividing entitlements to facilitate trade, courts should therefore avoid tailoring
that creates additional informational asymmetries that amplify strategic
behavior. Untailored liability rules represent a largely missing category of
entitlement protection that may facilitate trade without the judicial costs of tailoring.'
18. David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraonhnan Legal Sanctons. 78
CAL. L. REV. I, 21 (1990) ("[lmitating a market is appropriate only slhen circumstances make it
unreasonable or unnecessary for the parties to rely on a market. In a propert) siolation case. efficient la%%
would not help mimic a missing exchange, but instead would encourage the principals facing other potential
exchanges to bargain.").
19. See Anthony T. Kronman. Specific Performance. 45 U. CIti L RiE 351. 353 n 12 t1978), A
Mitchell Polinsky, On the Choice Between Prpert Rules and /Dabl/ir Rule5. 18 Eco'N IQL RY 233
(1980).
20. E.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note I. at 318; A. MIttHELL POIuNSKY. A\ INTRODL (CTIO TO L.%%%
AND EcONOMIcS 20 (2d ed. 1989); cf POSNER. supra note 1. at 62 n 5 (discussing difficulty of tailoring
when damages cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy)
21. See Haddock et al.. supra note 18. at 13-17: Kronman. supra note 19. at 360-61
22. This result does not mean, however, that certain (non-probabilsttc) rules need to be superior to
uncertain rules in promoting Coasean trade. An uncertain Cmuddy") rule can promote information
revelation, and therefore trade, if the legal consequences of nonconsensual taking are equally uncertain to
all bargainers. Indeed, our model of fractional property entitlements shows that legal uncertainty can be
more efficient than a certain property rule if the uncertainty is commonly knou n. as in a coin flip See infra
notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Kronman. supra note 19. at 360 (suggesting that "'it ssould be ser) difficult and
expensive for a court to acquire the information necessary" to tailor damages) In Section B of Part II. sse
discuss several contexts in which the consequences of nonconsensual taking come closer to approxsimating
untailored rules that might, according to our thesis, facilitate trade
1995] 1033
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The second axis of division we analyze is the actual ownership structure
of an entitlement, focusing explicitly on the benefits of ownership that is
"fractional" in nature. Following Professor Ellickson's analysis of land
divisions, we show that the identity crisis can facilitate trade whenever an
entitlement is divided in any of the traditional ways-"by use, space or
time. As in the earlier Blackacre example, each of these species of division
can facilitate consensual trade by endowing the respective parties with a partial
claim to the underlying entitlement. Scholars have previously recognized that
blurring the consequences of decision making can mitigate strategic
inefficiencies when partners invoke a buy-sell agreement or when children
decide how to cut a cake?5 But we show that a similar countervailing
incentive can exist whenever parties bargain in the shadow of such fractional
ownership structures and hence are uncertain whether they might ultimately
buy or sell a Solomonic claim. 6
In addition to the traditional forms of divided ownership structure, we
examine one nontraditional division with similar benefits. Legal uncertainty or
ambiguity about who owns property can constitute a probabilistic division in
that more than one person has a contingent claim to the enjoyment of the
underlying right or privilege. Returning to our Blackacre example, if there is
a 50% chance that the court will award Blackacre in fee simple to Jones or
Smith, then each party has a probabilistic claim. Bargaining in the shadow of
this uncertainty might result again in two different types of transactions:
buying the other side's claim or selling one's own claim. Once again, the
Solomonic division can make it more difficult for either side to offer a price
that diverges from her private valuation: One can easily imagine a conversation
in which Smith offers to sell her probabilistic share (relinquish all rights to
Blackacre) for an inflated price, and Jones responds, "If you think a 50%
chance at Blackacre is worth that much, I'll relinquish my rights to you for
that price." Foreseeing the possibility of this response, Smith would inflate her
selling price by a lesser amount than if she had unambiguous ownership.
Accordingly, we predict that parties with private information may be able to
bargain more efficiently when property rights are uncertain. This finding
24. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1363. For example, we show that the identity crisis can produce more
efficient trade when:
(1) one party has a part of the acreage and the other party owns the remainder (spacial division).
(2) one party has a life estate and the other party has the remainder (temporal division); or
(3) one party has a right to pollute up to a certain level and the other party has a right to enjoin
pollution beyond that level (activity-level or use division).
Each of these examples produces a bargaining identity crisis because the entitlement division gives rise to
different types of Coasean transactions. See infra part III.B-C.
25. For a discussion of these examples, see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
26. Our result is reminiscent of Saul Levmore's idea that a property owner will speak more honestly
about her value if she is uncertain whether the valuation will be used as an offer to sell. Saul Levmore,
Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771 (1982) (discussing strengths
and weaknesses of relying on self-assessment to promote accuracy in property tax assessment, tort damage
determination, and corporate stock valuation).
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contradicts the accepted wisdom that unambiguous property rules encourage
contracting.2 Thus, while Robert Cooter and Tom Ulen merely restate the
consensus view in opining that "bargainers are more likely to cooperate when
their rights are clear, and less likely to agree when their rights are
ambiguous, 2 s we extend the seminal insights of Jason Scott Johnston to
show in a rigorous model how ambiguity can induce bargainers to act more
cooperatively.
29
This Article focuses on a specific type of transaction cost: private
information. When private information is the predominant form of market
failure that impairs the operation of the Coase theorem, Solomonic divisions
are likely to facilitate efficient allocations through trade." Consequently,
27. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holdemess. A Legal Foundation for Erchange. 14 J L tGAL Srt'D 321. 344
(1985) (arguing that "a unique definition and assignment [of property nghts] is esential to a svell-ordered
system [of social interactions]"); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass. Nuisance. and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13. 14 (1985) ("[W]hen the costs of transacting arc lo%, the legal
system will gravitate toward rules that determine entitlements at a low cost---such as the stnct liability rule
of trespass."); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law. 40 STAN. L RE', 577. 590 (1988)
(discussing several articles claiming that "precise entitlements facilitate the efficient allocation of goods.
they allow us to identify right-holders and to organize trades with them until all goods arive in the hands
of those who value them most"); see also Craswell, supra note 17. at 15. Lev.more. supra note 17. at 79-81
(explaining how denial of restitution to intervening providers encourages complex market of many actie
buyers and sellers).
28. COOTER & ULEN, supra note I, at 100. Cooter and Ulen cite to Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew
L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests. 25 J.L. & ECo" 73 (1982). and Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups.
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986). While these articles by Hoffman and Spitzer explore the effects of
bargaining after an entitlement is allocated (so that there is no legal ambiguity at the time of bargaining).
we explore the effects of bargaining before legal uncertainty is resolved.
29. Johnston was the first to see how uncertain ownership of an entitlement could improve bargaining
efficiency. See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards (June 28. 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Our analysis in Part Ill sho'. s more directly ho the parties'
uncertainty about who will be the buyer and who will be the seller causes this increased efficiency We also
show how the same type of identity crisis might Improve negotiations oser a number of other types of
divided entitlement allocations. See infra par Ill.
Our conclusion that legal uncertainty can promote more efficient negotiation also qualifies the
traditional view that adjudicators should strive for accuracy (as long as accurate decision making is not too
costly). See Louis Kaplow, Tie Value of Accuracy in Adjudicanoin: An E onomic Analssis, 23 J LEGAL
STUD. 307 (1994). We find that decision makers might eschew accuracy even if making accurate court
decisions were costless.
30. Private information is a major source of negotiation inefficiency- Buyers and sellers frequently
attempt to capitalize on private knowledge by misrepresenting their respectise %aluations or b) shading their
contractual offers.
31. The law does not ordinarily penalize strategic misrepresentations of %aluation Although the las%
of fraud traditionally regulates misrepresentations of fact. courts almost neser rescind contracts because
representations of the parties' own valuation were proven to be false. Courts often cannot %enfy private
knowledge of how one values a particular entitlement. Some jurisdictions hase treated such representations
as being beyond the purview of fraud law by finding as a matter of law that these facts are not "material"
See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller. "'I'll Sell It to You at Cost". Legal Methods To Promote Retail Markup
Disclosure, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1049-51 (1990) (stating various ways in ',hich courts have declined
to penalize sellers for misrepresenting their costs); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1983) ("Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or salue placed on the subject of
a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category ")
When sellers inflate their asking price or when buyers understate sshat they are svilling to pay. the
entitlement may not end up with the highest-valuing owner
The Yale Law Journal
Solomonic entitlements may not always facilitate trade if other transaction
costs are primarily responsible for Coasean inefficiency.32 In such cases,
Solomonic divisions may even exacerbate such inefficiencies by impeding
competition, exacerbating hold-up problems, or weakening investment
incentives. 33 These contraindications make clear why undivided property rules
are still efficient in many settings. And, in fact, an overarching "Coasean"
theme of our analysis is that the type of transaction cost matters: It is
inadequate to think of "transaction costs" as some sort of composite good
whose components imply similar policies. Nevertheless, this Article shows that
claims about the efficiency of property rules cannot be justified by the
common, unqualified assertion that property rules encourage trade.
The Article is divided into three parts. Part II describes the information-
forcing effect of liability rules and shows how conditioning either liability or
damages on private information can exacerbate the inefficiencies of bargaining
under asymmetric information. Part III explores the identity crisis that can be
created by other types of entitlement divisions, including probabilistic,
physical, temporal, and activity-level divisions. Part IV discusses some limiting
principles and examines the legal implications of our analysis.
II. THE INFORMATION-FORCING EFFECT OF
UNTAILORED LIABILITY RULES
More than twenty years ago, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed saw
that, as a descriptive matter, the legal system protects entitlements in two
qualitatively distinct manners. 34 In some contexts, the law attempts to impose
sanctions that are severe enough to deter all nonconsensual takings.3S The
protection of entitlements with such severe sanctions is what Calabresi and
Melamed called "property" rules. In other contexts, the law requires
nonconsensual takers to pay an amount of damages that is set not to deter all
32. For example, if there is a fixed cost of writing a contract (representing the only impediment to
transferring entitlements to their highest valuer), then Solomonic entitlements will not induce more efficient
contracting. See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note I, at 101 (providing useful typology of transaction
costs).
33. See infra part IW.A.
34. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1092.
35. Calabresi and Melamed did not focus on the mechanism of deterrence: "An entitlement is protected
by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the
seller." Id. While they did not dwell on what aspect of a legal rule would force the would-be taker to the
bargaining table, it is axiomatic that rational takers will be deterred from nonconsensual taking if the
sanction is greater than any possible benefit. Still, the authors did emphasize that nonlegal sanctions may
play an important part in deterring nonconsensual taking. Id. at 1093; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WrT-tJ LAW (1991). Subsequent authors, however, have explicitly seen that legal, and possibly
nonlegal, reactions to nonconsensual takings create a property rule. See Haddock et al., supra note 18, at
13 (defining property rule damages as amount that "would reduce to zero the expected gain available to
the defendant from the injurious activity, leaving no incentive for him to attempt the activity in the first
place").
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takings but rather to compensate the entitlement holder for the loss of the
entitlement.3 6 The protection of entitlements with these less severe sanctions
is what Calabresi and Melamed called "liability" rules. 7 Restraining orders.
specific performance clauses, and certain types of punitive sanctions represent
"property" protections, while expectation damages, the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and compulsory licenses are examples of "'liability"
protections.
This descriptive distinction between property rules and liability rules has
led some scholars to suggest that the normative choice of the appropriate form
of protection is really between contracting costs and litigation costs. The
"folklore" among law-and-economics academics is that property rules induce
negotiation and contracting, while liability rules induce nonconsensual taking,
subsequent litigation, and judicially determined prices. 9 The folklore instructs
efficiency-minded lawmakers to choose the form of protection that minimizes
these costs.
While this dichotomy between contracting costs and litigation costs has
considerable power,4" it ignores the fact that liability rules can themselves
36. A liability rule obtains "[wlhenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is %illhng
to pay an objectively determined value for it." Calabresi & Melamd. supra note 12. at 0 c, ee also d
at 1125 ("Liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the objcct to its onginal
owner .... ).
37. Id. at 1105-06. Calabresi and Melamed also analyzed "inalienability" rules Id at 1111- 15 The
precise definition of an "inalienable" right is somewhat murky, but common definitions focus on non-
salability, non-transferability, non-relinquishability, or non-losability. See Margaret J Radin. Market.
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849-50 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman. Inalienabiity and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). In this Article, we conline our attention to legal
rights that are readily "commodifiable" in that they are salable under legally valid contracts This is by no
means a complete description of legal rights; rather, it catalogues only the set of legal nghts that can be
readily subjected to economic analysis. For many other legal entitlements, there are frequently philosophical
problems with commensurability between individuals' nghts. See generall Cass R Sunstein.
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779. 780 (1994) (noting that "efforts to insist
on a single kind of valuation and to make goods commensurable, while designed to aid in human reasoning.
actually make such reasoning inferior to what it is when it is working well-)-
38. For a discussion of the distinction between property and liabilit rules in contract remedies, sec.
e.g., Kronman, supra note 19, at 352.
39. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note I. at 107 (explaining that injunctise relief is optimal %then
"bargaining is likely to be successful"); POUNSKY, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that under "'itenmediate"
levels of entitlement, in which entitlement holders are protected by liability amount, there is no
negotiation); POSNER, supra note I, at 55-56 (arguing that when bilateral monopoly problems exst. liability
rules are efficient because they prescribe terms of exchange); Calabresi & Melaned. supra note 12. at 1125
(noting that because liability rules force transactions at "approximate" pnccs, it is "obvious" that property
rules are often more desirable than liability rules); Craswell. supra note 17. at 8-9 tnoting that property
rules are more efficient when courts wish to "induce the parties to negotiate." because liability rules tend
to "select[] a price on behalf of the parties"); Haddock ct al.. supra note 18. at 16 (arguing that liability
rules allow potential defendants simply to take from potential plaintiffs and pay liability atnount rather than
negotiate with plaintiffs as they would do under property rules); Robert Merges. Intellectual Property Rights
and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Improvement Inventions and Blocking Patents 30-31 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing against compulsory hcenscs in "'nc% use"
patens-a type of liability rule---because such rules "allow[) courts, not the parties themselses, to set the
terms of exchange").
40. It is true, for example, that there should be no litigation for nonconsensual taking when
entitlements are protected by property rules, assuming rational decision making and no mistaken or
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induce a great deal of contracting." The vast majority of potential "disputes"
settle even before one of the parties files suit. Moreover, of those suits filed,
the lion's share settle before trial, even when the damages in tort or contract
serve a compensatory, rather than deterrent, purpose.42 Even when liability
rule damages are not sufficient to deter nonconsensual takings, the Coase
theorem predicts that the parties may still have incentives to engage in
consensual transactions. 3
This Part moves beyond the traditional argument that liability rules are
market-mimicking substitutes for consensual trade, arguing that liability rules
may actually facilitate trade by reducing the effective amount of private
information. Indeed, when an entitlement is protected by a liability rule, the
entitlement holder may wish to engage in two very different types of
consensual transactions: The entitlement holder may wish to (1) "bribe" a
potential taker not to take the entitlement; or (2) "sell" her entitlement at a
price less than the liability rule damage amount. 44 The fundamental insight
of this Part is that under a liability regime, only those entitlement holders who
value the entitlement more than the liability award will be interested in
entering the first type of bargain, and only those entitlement holders who value
the entitlement less than the liability award will be interested in the second
type of transaction.
accidental takings. The goal of minimizing the costs of protection would need to account for how the form
of protection affected incentives to create or develop the entitlement. Systematic undercompensation for
entitlement holders under a liability rule regime would undermine the entitlement holders' incentive to
create or develop the entitlement. We discuss these important forms of inefficiency infra part IV.A. I.
41. Oliver Williamson's monumental work on transaction cost economics underscores the notion that
it is insufficient simply to examine the initial allocation of entitlements to infer their ultimate allocation.
Consequently, he argues that the appropriate approach is to assume that bargaining is always possible, or
even likely, after allocation of initial property rights:
Transaction cost economics maintains that it is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant
bargaining action at the ex ante contracting stage. Instead, bargaining is pervasive-on which
account the institutions of private ordering and the study of contracting in its entirety take on
critical economic significance. The behavioral attributes of human agents, whereby conditions
of bounded rationality and opportunism are joined, and the complex attributes of
transactions ... are responsible for that condition.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 29 (1985). The law-and-economics
literature has addressed this issue only sporadically, predominantly in the literature on "efficient breach."
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 290; see also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
42. Among federal cases filed, less than five percent go to trial. See, e.g., H. LAURENCE Ross,
SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 217 (1970). Many
of these pretrial negotiations, however, occur after a taking, as in the run-of-the-mill tort case. But many
contractual entitlements to performance that are protected merely by a liability rule are renegotiated prior
to the promisor's taking of the entitlement through breach.
43. ROBERT E. SCOTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 98-103 (1988); see also
Johnston, supra note 29, at 6 (noting this phenomenon); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation,
Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1218-42 (1994) (noting
phenomenon within "mechanism design" framework, but without using explicit bargaining procedure);
Zvika Neeman, Property Rights and Efficiency in Public-Good Mechanisms Under Asymmetric Information
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
44. Contrary to intuition, the owner may be willing to sell her entitlement for less than the liability
amount, especially if the liability amount is sufficiently high so that the nominal owner believes that in the
absence of such a sale, the potential defendant will not be willing to take and pay the liability amount.
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Thus, despite the fact that strategic misrepresentations are normally
endemic to bargaining, the entitlement holder bargaining under a liability rule
does not act strategically when signaling her preferred type of transaction. We
show that:
Under a liability rule, the type of offer that an entitlement holder
makes credibly signals whether her valuation is above or below the
liability amount.
An offer to bribe signals that the entitlement holder's valuation is greater than
the damage amount, while an offer to sell signals that her valuation is less than
the damage amount. By simply listening to the type of offer, the potential taker
can infer the entitlement holder's relative valuation.
Ordinarily, bargainers can put little faith in the other side's representation
concerning valuation. The adage "talk is cheap" (meaning unreliable) seems
to apply. Here, however, liability rules induce entitlement holders to engage
in a credible form of "cheap talk" to communicate whether their valuations are
above or below the liability amount.45 Property rules, in contrast, allow for
only one type of Coasean bargain, and thus do not induce this type of
information revelation.
Using an instructive example in Section A and then an explicit game-
theoretic model in Section B, we begin by analyzing "untailored" liability
rules, which require payment of a fixed damage amount whenever an
entitlement is taken nonconsensually. Section C then explores how "tailoring"
the liability rule affects bargaining. We examine two particular types of
judicial tailoring: tailoring the amount of damages (usually to the plaintiff's
valuation) and tailoring the assessment of liability (usually to the defendant's
valuation). Somewhat surprisingly, we find that certain tailored liability rules
can significantly reduce parties' respective incentives to bargain truthfully.
A. Information Revelation in the Shadow of Liability and Property Rules
This Section examines how property and liability rules differentially affect
the parties' incentives to reveal information. To motivate the analysis, consider
the potential trade of an entitlement between two people: a potential "plaintiff,"
who ostensibly owns the original entitlement, and a potential "defendant," who
45. This argument is related to other results in the "cheap talk' bargaining literature. sshich note that
although bargaining parties formally "compete" with one another in captunng gains from trade. they often
have mutual incentives to signal to one another whether conditions are "good" or "bad" for trade to occur
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons. Cheap Talk Cani Matter in Bargaining. 48 J Ec' TIItORY
221 (1989) (discussing possible gains created by allowing bargaining parties to signal sshether they are
"keen" or "not keen" on reaching bargaining agreement): Jason Scott Johnston. Cheap Talk. Sunk Costs.
and Contractual Liability in Preliminary Negotiation (Apr. 1994) (unpublished manuscnpt. on file ssith
authors) (modeling role that "cheap talk" can play in facilitating negotiations)
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threatens to take the entitlement nonconsensually. 6 Suppose that the plaintiff
and the defendant each know their own private valuations of the entitlement
but not that of the other party. For concreteness, we assume that each party's
valuation can take on any value between $0 and $100. These assumptions
produce a canonical example of negotiation under asymmetric information.47
The parties' private information makes it unclear whether there are gains to
trade and if so, what would be a mutually agreeable price.
We begin by analyzing bargaining in the shadow of untailored rules, which
force a defendant who takes nonconsensually to pay a fixed, or untailored,
damage amount. Although courts often attempt to tailor damages to equal the
plaintiff's lost value (which we have assumed to vary between $0 and $100),
there are several contexts in which the damages are sufficiently
untailored-i.e., they sufficiently diverge from the plaintiff's actual
valuation-to give plaintiffs an incentive to signal whether their valuation is
above or below the expected court award.48
46. It is important to note here that the nominal identities of the parties are only of empirical, and not
theoretical, significance. In the paradigmatic civil suit, the plaintiff typically accuses the defendant of
appropriating her entitlement, and therefore seeks compensatory or injunctive relief. A popular example of
such an action pits plaintiff residents against a defendant smoke-billowing factory, as in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding plaintiffs property-like injunctive relief against
defendant cement company).
Nevertheless, there have been a number of cases in which the identities of the parties were reversed.
For instance, the equally popular case of Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d
700 (Ariz. 1972), established the right of a residential development to enjoin the operation of a stinky cattle
feedlot, but only if the development compensated the feedlot for lost profits. The holding in this case
arguably gives a plaintiff (e.g., the development) the option of appropriating a defendant's entitlement in
exchange for compensating the defendant (e.g., the feedlot) for reasonable damages pursuant to the taking.
This option is essentially a liability right. Similarly, in patent law, the paradigmatic case pits a patentee
plaintiff against an infringing (i.e., "taking") defendant. See infra part IV.C. I. It is just as frequent for a
potentially infringing user to bring suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), to
litigate the question of infringement; in these suits, the identities of the plaintiff and the defendant are the
opposite of those in the paradigmatic case.
47. The assumption of uniformly distributed valuations is consistent with a myriad of other analyses
that study bargaining under private information. See, e.g., Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson,
Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, 31 OPERATIONS RES. 835 (1983); John Kennan & Robert
Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (1993).
48. Such contexts include:
(1) Liquidated damages. The assumption of constant damages is reasonable if we want to
assess negotiation to modify a contract when there is a fixed liquidated damages amount.
In this context, the promisee would be the entitlement holder who would have an
incentive to say whether she valued performance more or less than the liquidated damages
amount.
(2) Unverifiable damages. If the plaintiff will not be able to prove to a court the exact amount
of harm (the damages are not ex post observable), the court will only be able to set
damages on the basis of verifiable evidence. The untailored assumption also captures a
class of cases that are observationally equivalent to the judge: where both sides know that
a certain amount of damages is provable, but both sides also know that plaintiff's
valuation may be more or less than this amount. For example, if damages for breach of
a promise to perform are limited to diminution of market value, it is possible that the
plaintiff has a subjective valuation that is greater or lower than the likely judicial award.
See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that damages for
using incorrect brand of pipe in building were equal to difference in market value).
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The magnitude of the untailored damages determines whether the
plaintiff's entitlement receives property or liability protection. Specifically, if
the damages are greater than $100 (the highest valuation of any potential
defendant), then the plaintiff's entitlement is "property-like" in nature: With
such relatively high damages, potential takers would be deterred from
nonconsensual takings, and the entitlement would be transferred only by
consensual agreement. Damages less than $100 would not, however, deter all
defendants from taking and would provide only a weaker form of liability
protection. Protecting the plaintiff's entitlement by a liability rule is an
example of dividing the possible claims to the entitlement between the parties.
Under a property rule, the plaintiff owns an undivided entitlement because
she has the only legally cognizable claims. In contrast, under a liability rule,
the defendant in effect has a "call option"-i.e., an option to buy the
entitlement for the damage amount.49 Under such a regime, the plaintiff owns
the entitlement subject to the defendant's decision whether to exercise this
liability call option.
Here, we explore the parties' incentives to disclose information when
negotiating under either a property rule of $100 damages or a liability rule of
$50 damages.5 It is well known that bargainers have an incentive to
This list is not exhaustive. Several other legal rules produce a similar effect. For example, the doctrine or
"conditional privilege" (or "incomplete privilege") creates an untailored liability rule, The pnidege allosqs
a shipowner, during a storm, to use someone else's dock nonconsensually and pay compensation equal to
the rental value of the dock, plus damages for any loss inflicted during the storm. See RICHARD A Es'siEIv,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 54-58 (1993) (discussing "conditional privilege" doctrine)
The copyright statute provides for compulsory licenses at specified royalties for musical recording-,
songs played on jukeboxes, certain cable television transmissions, and certain uses of copyrighted works
by public television. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules. Institutions Supporting
Transactions in Intellectual Property Rights 24-25 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
These compulsory licenses also represent classic untailored liability rules. Although it is safe to sa) that
most liability rules are at least partially tailored, one purpose of this Article is to suggest that lawmakers
and academics have not paid sufficient attention to untailored liability rules as a policy altematise But if
AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 223 (1991 ) (suggesting use of
relatively untailored schedule of damages in awards for pain and suffenng),
49. In finance, a "call option" is a right to purchase a financial instrument (such as a stock) at a
prespecified price (called the "strike price" or "exercise price") at some future date In this context. the
plaintiff holds a "long" position with regard to the entitlement, but a "short" position with regard to this
call option. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FiA,,cE 485
(4th ed. 1991).
50. Setting the liability amount at $50 corresponds not only to the mean valuation of all plaintiffs, but
also to the mean valuation of plaintiffs who go to trial in equilibrium. See infra text accompanying notes
137-53. We confine our attention to these two damage amounts for expositional purposes only The
Appendix shows the effect of other damage amounts on bargaining. See uifra app at pp 1104-13 Our
analysis supports Coleman and Kraus' claim that the type of protection determines the content (and value)
of each party's entitlement. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus. Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986).
We also assume that after a taking, or after contractual allocation of the entitlement, the ownership
is protected by a property rule. So, for example, if the defendant takes nonconsensually and pays the
plaintiff S50, we assume that the plaintiff does not have an option to retake the enttiement---or, more
precisely, that the legal consequences of such a retaking are so dire that plaintiffs would never retake This
assumption that the defendant's call option is protected by a property rule is not foreordained Ellickson
has suggested that in nuisance actions, defendants have an option to pollute and pay damages, but that this
option itself should be protected merely by a liability rule--.he plaintiff should have an option to take back
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misrepresent their valuations: Sellers tend to overstate their true valuation, and
buyers tend to understate their true valuation. When the plaintiff's entitlement
is protected by a property rule, the parties know that the plaintiff owns an
undivided claim and therefore must bargain as a seller, while the defendant
owns nothing and therefore must bargain as a buyer. Plaintiffs accordingly will
offer to sell the entitlement for some amount more than their valuation, and
defendants will offer to buy the entitlement for some amount less than their
valuation. The strategic inefficiency created by the parties' private information
is an example of what economists call "adverse selection."5
When the plaintiff's entitlement is protected by a liability rule, however,
the parties can enter into two different types of Coasean trade:
TABLE 1. Liability Rules Create Two Types of Coasean Transactions
Under the first Coasean bargain, the plaintiff buys the defendant's call
option. For example, as shown in Figure 1, a plaintiff (with a $90 valuation)
might pay a defendant (with a $60 valuation) $15 not to exercise his call
option and take nonconsensually. In the absence of the bargain, the defendant
would take; after a taking and payment of the $50 damages, the plaintiff and
defendant would end up with $50 and $10, respectively.5" But the $15
Coasean bribe not to take is Pareto-superior-increasing the plaintiff's and
defendant's payoffs to $75 and $15, respectively.53
the right to stop pollution nonconsensually by paying some prescribed amount. Robert C. Ellickson,
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. Rrv.
681, 738-48 (1973).
51. See Brown & Ayres, supra note 15, at 331-35; see also infra part V.A. I (discussing how attempts
to remedy adverse selection caused by private information may exacerbate problems of underinvestment).
52. The defendant would have a net payoff of $10, because she would own an undivided claim to the
entitlement, worth $60, but would have paid the damage amount of $50. Even though the plaintiff would
value an undivided claim to the entitlement at $90, she only owns a divided or partial claim, because her
ownership is subject to the defendant's call option.
53. The plaintiff gains an undivided interest in the entitlement, worth $90, but needs to pay $15. The
defendant gains the S15 bribe. The explicit numbers given in the text are only illustrative. The driving force
behind this example is that the parties' valuations are privately held. If the parties' information were part
of the public domain, then it would be common knowledge who should receive the entitlement, and the
only real decision for the parties would be how to divide the gains from trade. Assuming they can
"coordinate" on a division, the Coase theorem would hold. It is in this frictionless context that the system
of legal entitlement becomes "irrelevant" under the "perfect information" version of the Coase theorem.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note I, at 101 n.ll.
COASEAN The plaintiff bribes the defendant not to take
BARGAIN #1 the entitlement.
COASEAN The defendant buys the plaintiff's entitlement.
BARGAIN #2
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Plainuffs Bnbe
15
D '
0 10 20 30 4o 50 60 70 so 90 100
v. = Plaintiff's valuation
v. = Defendant's valuation
D = Damages for nonconsensual taking
FIGURE 1. Example of Plaintiff s Incentive To Bribe
Defendant Not To Take
Under the second Coasean bargain, the defendant buys the plaintiff's
entitlement. As shown in Figure 2, a defendant (with a $30 valuation) might
pay a plaintiff (with a $10 valuation) $25 for the entitlement. In the absence
of the bargain, the defendant would not take the entitlement, even though it
was the higher valuer, and the plaintiff's and the defendant's payoffs would be
$10 and $0, respectively. In response, the plaintiff might agree to "renegotiate"
the liability term downward, so as to induce the defendant to take. In this case,
a $25 Coasean agreement is again Pareto-superior to autarky, raising both the
plaintiff's and the defendant's payoffs to $25 and $5, respectively.
Defendant's Bribe
25
vD
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 b0 90 100
v, = Plaintiff's valuation
v. = Defendant's valuation
D = Damages for nonconsensual taking
FIGURE 2. Example of Defendant's Incentive To
Buy Plaintiff's Entitlement
This second Coasean bargain is analogous to the sale of an entitlement
protected by a property rule. Under a liability rule regime, however, the
contract price will never be more than the damage amount: Even if the plaintiff
knows that the defendant has a $90 valuation for the entitlement, the plaintiff
will never be able to extract a price higher than $50, because defendants will
never consent to pay more than $50 for what they can take nonconsensually
for $50.
It is important to note that the possibility of entering into two different
types of Coasean bargains generally does not mitigate the defendant's
incentives to misrepresent his valuation. High-valuing defendants, who will
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exercise their call option in the absence of bargaining, might feign a low
valuation in order to purchase the entitlement from plaintiffs for even less than
the $50 exercise price. Low-valuing defendants, on the other hand, who have
no intention of exercising the call option, might feign a high valuation so that
plaintiffs would bribe them not to exercise their option.
The possibility of entering into two different types of Coasean bargains,
however, does dramatically affect the plaintiff's incentives to reveal
information. Under liability rule protection, only plaintiffs who value the
entitlement more than the damage amount would have an incentive to express
interest in purchasing the defendant's call option (Coasean bargain #1). A low-
valuing plaintiff (with, say, a $40 valuation) would have no reason to pay a
defendant not to take the entitlement. Indeed, absent bargaining, the low-
valuing plaintiff stands to make a windfall should the defendant take
nonconsensually and pay the $50 damage.
An analogous argument illustrates that only plaintiffs who value the
entitlement less than the damage amount would have an incentive to express
interest in selling their entitlement (Coasean bargain #2). A high-valuing
plaintiff (with, say, a $65 valuation) would never agree to sell the entitlement
for less than $5C and would never be able to sell it for more than $50. Put
simply, a plaintiff's type of offer credibly signals whether her valuation is
above or below the liability amount: High-valuing plaintiffs will never offer
to sell their entitlement for less than $50, while low-valuing plaintiffs will
never offer to bribe the defendant not to take.
As a result of this incentive structure under a liability rule, high-valuing
and low-valuing plaintiffs willingly "partition" themselves into two sets. As
shown in Figure 2, only plaintiffs to the left of the damage amount would be
interested in selling their entitlement, and only plaintiffs to the right of the
damage amount would be interested in buying the defendant's call option.
FIGURE 3. The Damage Amount Partitions
Plaintiffs into Two Groups
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This partitioning is an example of self-selection, because the plaintiffs have
individual, private incentives to separate themselves into two groups. A
defendant can infer whether the plaintiff's valuation is greater or less than the
liability amount simply by inquiring which type of transaction the party
prefers.54
Liability rules have an "information-forcing" characteristic not shared by
property rules.55 With "property-like" damages (i.e., $100 or more), plaintiffs
are still willing to signal whether their private valuations are greater than or
less than the damage amount; however, because the damage amount is so high,
the plaintiffs cannot partition themselves into two groups. 6
The willingness of plaintiffs to self-select in this fashion is consistent with
the normal strategic incentives of sellers to overstate and buyers to understate
their respective valuations. Thus, the plaintiff at times will have a seller's
incentive to overstate her valuation and at other times will have a buyer's
incentive to understate her valuation. The plaintiff's normal incentive to
overstate as a seller or to understate as a buyer, however, is severely
constrained by the defendant's ownership of the liability rule call option,
because under a liability regime the plaintiff must choose between buying or
selling one of the divided entitlements.
As a potential seller of the entitlement, a plaintiff wishes to overstate her
private valuation. But a low-valuing plaintiff gains nothing from
misrepresenting her valuation as larger than the damage amount, because a
defendant would never buy for $60 what she could take nonconsensually for
$50. The defendant's ownership of the liability rule call option thus acts as an
upper bound on the ability of a low-valuing plaintiff to overstate her valuation:
Low-valuing plaintiffs will still attempt to overstate their valuations, but since
they have less "room to lie," their misrepresentations will never exceed the
damage amount.57
Similarly, as a potential buyer of the defendant's call option, the high-
valuing plaintiff wishes to understate her valuation, so as to reduce the size of
the bribe necessary to stop the defendant from taking nonconsensually.
Nonetheless, there is a natural limit to how much the plaintiff can understate
her valuation: A plaintiff offering to buy the defendant's option-that is,
offering to bribe the defendant not to take-cannot credibly claim that her
valuation is less than the damage amount, because defendants know that
54. Such a simple device is in fact what we use to model the bargaining game See infra text
accompanying notes 78-83.
55. Default rules can also be chosen to induce parties to reseal information to each other or to the
courts by penalizing silent parties with unwanted terms. See lan Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filhng Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic TheorY of Default Rules. 99 YAix, LJ. 87. 97-100 (1989)
56. Because plaintiffs' valuation never exceeds $100. no plaintiff would %%ant to bnbe the defendant
not to take.
57. The plaintiff would love to be able to extract some of the %aluation front a high-alumg defendant.
but the defendant's call option eliminates the plaintiff's abilit) to bargain for a higher selling price
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plaintiffs with such low valuations would have no reason to pay to stop a
nonconsensual taking. The defendant's ownership of the liability call option,
therefore, places a lower bound on the amount by which a high-valuing
plaintiff can understate her valuation.
The- damage amount under a liability rule thus serves as both a ceiling to
overstatements and afloor to understatements by the plaintiff choosing whether
to make offers to buy the defendant's call option or to sell her own
entitlement. 58 Property rule regimes cannot produce this type of partitioning,
because the plaintiff would only be interested in selling her entitlement, and
the high damage amount does not constrain the incentive of the plaintiff (qua
seller) to overstate her valuation.
The willingness of entitlement holders to engage in credible signaling
during Coasean bargaining is not a fragile result of a specific game-theoretic
model. It does not depend on particular bargaining rules. It does not depend
on particular assumptions about how the parties' valuations are distributed;
indeed, the plaintiff need not know the defendant's distribution of valuations.
And, most important, it generally does not depend on the plaintiff's beliefs
about the defendant's behavior: Regardless of the defendant's strategy,59 a
high-valuing plaintiff will not offer to sell the entitlement for less than the
damage amount, and a low-valuing plaintiff will not offer to buy the
defendant's call option. Self-selection of plaintiffs is an "iterated" dominant
strategy.
60
58. The defendant does not face the same upper and lower bounds on her misrepresentation. As a
potential seller of her call option, the defendant has an incentive to overstate her valuation (of the option),
and thus even low-valuing sellers might claim high valuations. As a potential buyer of the entitlement, the
defendant has an incentive to understate her valuation (of the entitlement), so that even high-valuing
defendants will have an incentive to claim low valuation.
59. One requirement that we do place on the defendant, however, is that he be somewhat rational and
avoid behaving in a way that is clearly not in his interests relative to his payoffs absent bargaining. For
instance, it cannot be the case that the defendant will offer the plaintiff $1 million for the entitlement when
the most the defendant could lose by taking nonconsensually is $50.
60. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 45-57 (1991) (defining iterated
dominance).
The only assumptions that are crucial to this "no misrepresentation" result are that (I) the damage
amount must be common knowledge, and (2) the defendant's own valuation of the entitlement must not
depend on his beliefs about the plaintiff's valuation. If either of these assumptions fails, a plaintiff may
affirmatively misrepresent whether her valuation is greater or less than the damage amount to manipulate
the defendant's choice about whether to take the entitlement nonconsensually. For example, in many
litigation contexts, both parties are trying to value an entitlement where the parties' valuations are both
uncertain and correlated. In this setting, a liability rule might not reveal information, because a high-valuing
plaintiff may not want to increase the chance that the defendant will want to take, and a low-valuing
plaintiff may not want to decrease the chance of a taking. See infra part IV.A.3.
In the precise parlance of game theory, partitioning is a rationalizable strategy. Essentially,
rationalizability builds on the assumption that it is common knowledge that no player will behave in a way
that is clearly against her interests. Such an assumption allows one to narrow down the number of
transactions that rational parties would make in an iterative way. Thus, as applied to our model, it is
common knowledge that no plaintiff would accept a settlement offer from a defendant that was lower than
what the plaintiff could expect through litigation. In turn, a defendant can deduce the types of offers that
the plaintiff might accept. Among these "acceptable" offers, we can be sure that no rational defendant
would make an acceptable offer that would, if accepted, make the defendant worse off. Finally, knowing
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Although our conclusion is robust that plaintiffs' type of offer credibly
signals whether their valuations are higher or lower than the damage amount,
several factors can mitigate the practical importance of this conclusion. First,
liability rules do not produce an incentive to produce precise information;
plaintiffs separate themselves into only two groups. Second, liability rules can
exacerbate defendants' incentive to misrepresent valuation,6 t so that liability
rules are most likely to mitigate informational inefficiencies when the
plaintiff's private information is the primary impediment to efficient trade.62
Third, various costs of contracting can deter entitlement holders from making
any Coasean offer. While those plaintiffs who do make serious Coasean offers
signal whether they are high-valuing or low-valuing, some subset of plaintiffs
may remain silent. Finally, although this partitioning result clearly holds for
all types of damages awards, it may fail to have efficiency-enhancing qualities
when the legal rules become more tailored.6'
B. A Formal Model of Untailored Liability and Propery Rules
To illustrate the implications of the intuition presented above, we now
show in an explicit model how the information-forcing effect of liability rules
can produce more efficient Coasean trade than a property rule regime. The
structure of the Coasean bargaining game is the following. There are two
players, a potential plaintiff (denoted "nt") and a potential defendant (denoted
"A"). Each of these parties places a privately known value on the right to
conduct her activities free from interference by the other's activities. For
instance, recall the example from the Introduction in which Smith and Jones
are bargaining over land development: Each party privately knows how much
she values developing the land, but only one of them can do it. While there are
numerous such hypothetical examples,64 assume for now that the competing
what types of serious offers she can expect, a plaintiff will have no incenti'c to lie about whether her
valuation is above or below the liability amount. RationalizabiIity is the Bayesian cousin of iterated
dominance. In fact, for strategic situations with two players, the notions of rationalizability and iterated
dominance coincide. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra, at 48-53 (explaining concept and noting that
rationalizability is "'weak" restriction on behavior).
61. For example, under a property rule, a S20 defendant might represent that he only has a SIO
valuation in an attempt to purchase the plaintiff's entitlement cheaply. Under a liability rule. however, the
same defendant might falsely claim to have a S70 entitlement in an attempt to sell his worthless call option
at an inflated price.
62. For example, if the plaintiff has a contractual entitlement as a buyer to the seller's manufacture
of a certain machine, it may be that the seller's valuation is more readily observable than the plaintiff's
valuation, for the simple reason that the seller's cost or resale option may be more accessible If the
defendant's private valuation is the more important cause of informational inefficiency, then a reverse
liability rule may be appropriate. See infra part II.B.4.
63. In a later section. we will show how various forms of tailoring can undermine the information-
forcing quality of liability rules. See infra part II.C.
64. To take a quintessential Coasan example, the potential plaintiff may represent a farmer who
wishes to grow corn free from the potential hazards of sparks from a passing train, and the potential
defendant may represent a railroad company that wishes to run its train across tracks that run alongside the
farmer's land. Alternatively, in a contracts setting, the potential plaintiff may represent a promisee ssho is
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uses are completely incompatible-if one party enjoys the entitlement, the
other cannot.65
1. Defining the Game
As before, to capture the essence of bargaining under incomplete
information, suppose that each party knows the value she places on the legal
entitlement, but is unsure of the other party's valuation. Explicitly, assume that
the plaintiff's privately known valuation, va, takes on a realization between $0
and $100 with equal probability-the so-called "uniform distribution. 66 The
defendant's private valuation, v., on the other hand, takes on only two equally
probable values, $40 and $60. Our assumption that plaintiffs have a wider
range of valuations than defendants makes the plaintiff's private information
an important cause of Coasean inefficiency and allows us to focus on the
potential benefits of inducing the plaintiff to reveal information.67
Absent agreement, the defendant may "take" from the plaintiff,68 but in
return he must pay the plaintiff a fixed damage amount of $D.69 As argued
above, the size of the damage amount determines whether the plaintiff's
entitlement is protected by a liability rule or a property rule.70 Damages of
$100 represent a property rule, because this damage amount would deter both
types of defendant from nonconsensual taking;7 damages of $50 represent a
liability rule-which, absent bargaining, allows nonconsensual takings.7
awaiting performance from the potential defendant, who in turn values breaching his duties under contract.
65. In Part III, we analyze the case in which an entitlement is divisible into activity levels, thus
allowing both parties to utilize the resource in part. To focus on the role of liability rules, however, this
Section assumes that the outcome is binary--only one party can receive the entitlement.
66. More explicitly, v. is a continuous random variable with probability density of 1/100 for each
value of v.. The term "probability" is used in the text only for stylistic reasons, since for a continuous
random variable the probability that it takes on an exact value is zero.
67. The plaintiff's revelation is more important because the variance of the defendant's valuation is
less than the variance of the plaintiff's valuation, so that the pooling of defendants is less significant than
the pooling of plaintiffs. As discussed infra part II.B.4, if the defendant's private information is the major
cause of inefficiency, then reverse liability rules may enhance allocational efficiency relative to a property
rule.
68. Assume for simplicity that there are only two possible activity levels: Either the defendant "takes"
(e.g., the rail company runs its train by the farmer's land), or the defendant does not take (e.g., the train
does not run, and the farmer conducts her activities unimpeded). For a discussion of settings where the
level of taking is a continuous variable, see infra part III.B.
69. We begin by assuming that plaintiffs are "observationally equivalent" to both the defendant and
the court, and the damage amount thus is not "tailored" to vary with a plaintiff's actual damages. Later in
this Section, we analyze the effects of awarding to the plaintiff a more "tailored" liability amount that
equals her actual damages v., see infra part II.C.I, and awarding damages to the plaintiff only if the court
determines that v. < X, where X is the negligence standard, see infra part 11.C.2.
70. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
71. For this particular specification, any damage amount greater than $60 would represent a property
rule, which would deter nonconsensual takings. See infra app. at pp. 1106-09.
72. Table 2 below describes the "noncooperative" expected payoffs for the defendant and the plaintiff
(i.e., the payoffs that the parties could expect absent bargaining) when damages equal $50 or $100. As
shown in the table, under the liability rule when D equals $50, only the high-valuing defendant takes absent
bargaining. In this situation, the plaintiff's expected payoff is the average of her private valuation v. (which
1048
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As discussed above, liability rules can give rise to two types of bargains.
When D = $50, a defendant whose valuation is $40 may be interested in
"buying" the right to take from a low-valuing plaintiff at a price less than the
judicially determined $50 exercise price. Conversely, a $60 defendant might
attempt to sell his option to take for $50.
To illustrate explicit bargaining under liability rules and property rules, we
adopt the following stylized bargaining procedure." In the first stage of the
game, the plaintiff tells the defendant whether she is interested in buying the
defendant's call option or in selling her entitlement. Thus, the plaintiff must
solicit one of two different types of offers from the defendant: She can say "I
would like to bribe you not to take my entitlement" (i.e., Coasean bargain #1),
or she can say "I would like to sell my entitlement" (i.e., Coasean bargain #2).
In the second stage of the game-after this proclamation by the plaintiff-the
defendant makes a single all-or-nothing offer: The defendant can either offer
to sell his call option (i.e., agree not to take nonconsensually) for some price,
or the defendant can offer to buy the plaintiff's entitlement." Thus, the
she would earn if the defendant were a low valuer) and the S50 damages (sshich shc ssould get if the
defendant were a high valuer).
DAMAGE AMOUNT D = $50 D = S100
TYPE OF EN-TnML-ENTr Liability Property
PROTECTION Rule Rule
DEFENDANT'S BEHAVIOR Only high-valuing Defendants
defendants take neser take
PLAINTIFF'S EXPECTED (50 + v)12 %.
NONCOOPERATIVE PAYOFF
DEFENDANT'S ExPECTED 0 if v = 40; 0
NONCOOPERATIVE PAYOFF 10 if v, = 60
TABLE 2. Expected Noncooperative Payoffs Under lDabaluv and Properts Rules
In the Appendix, we more generally analyze liability-like rules based on damage amounts ranging
between $40 and S60. See infra app. at pp. 1110-13. The Appendix also shosss that damage amounts less
than $40 effectively allocate the entitlement to the defendant, because all defendants will take absent
bargaining, though such amounts will mandate a small compensatory payment. See infra app at p 1109
73. This model assumes that the parties use a single bargaining procedure to govern their Coascan
negotiations, regardless of the legal environment that they face. Assuming a consistent bargamning procedure
allows us to extract conclusions that must be due to the change in legal envuionment rather than a change
in bargaining procedures. On the other hand. by clinging to a single bargaining game. %%e do not address
the prospect that the parties' procedure might be environment-dependent, and that as the legal rule changes.
so will the bargaining "game." Coauthor Talley has addressed this prospect in another paper and has found
that our results recur even when the parties choose bargaining procedures that are socially "optimal" for
every legal environment. See Talley. supra note 14. at 35-39.
74. Giving the defendant the power to make an all-or-nothing offer allocates a great amount of market
power to the defendant. See Ian Ayres & Robert Geriner. Strategic Contractual Inefficiencs and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729. 735-46 (1992) (explonng inefficiencies that arise from
strategic bargaining when one party to contract has private information and other side has some market
power). For example, if the defendant knew the plaintiff's type. the defendant could capture all the gains
from trade by simply demanding a price that was just lower than the plaintiff's saluation Gismg the
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defendant's offer, must specify what is being traded-the plaintiff's entitlement
or the defendant's option-and the price. In the third stage of the game, the
plaintiff, upon hearing the defendant's offer, accepts or rejects this offer, and
the trade occurs if the offer is accepted. 75 Because the defendant's offer,
however, is "take-it-or-leave-it," a rejection by the plaintiff ends the
bargaining, and in the final possible stage of the game,76 the defendant
chooses whether to take the entitlement nonconsensually and pay the damage
amount,77 or to abstain from taking and leave the entitlement with the
plaintiff.
2. Deriving the Equilibrium
The equilibrium bargaining strategies and outcomes of the above
bargaining game depend on the type of entitlement protection. Thus, we
analyze property rule damages (of D = $100) and liability rule damages (of
D = $50) separately. 8 Before proceeding, however, it is useful to derive as
benchmarks the expected payoffs both (1) when Coasean bargaining is
perfectly efficient, and (2) when bargaining is not allowed-a situation that we
shall call "legally mandated autarky."79 Under the first scenario, in which
Coasean negotiations succeeded in costlessly allocating the entitlement to the
highest valuer, the parties would have an expected surplus of $63 to divide."
Under the second benchmark of legally mandated autarky, the expected joint
defendant this all-or-nothing offer also reduces the relative importance of the defendant's private
information, thereby allowing the model to focus on the strategic inefficiency of the buyer's information.
Because liability rules can exacerbate misrepresentations by defendants, this type of divided entitlement is
likely to facilitate trade only when the plaintiff's private valuation is the impediment to efficient
negotiations.
75. Thus, if the plaintiff agrees to sell her entitlement, she transfers the entitlement to the defendant
in exchange for the agreed purchase price; if the plaintiff agrees to buy the defendant's option, the plaintiff
retains the entitlement, but pays the defendant the agreed bribe.
76. Of course, players only reach this stage of the game if the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer.
The explicit game tree is depicted in the Appendix. See infra text accompanying notes 246-47.
77. We assume that the plaintiff can costlessly sue and collect damages. Including litigation costs in
the model can result in even higher rates of Coasean trade, because the parties have a joint incentive to
avoid the costs of litigation. This incentive only holds true for liability rules, under which the parties still
have credible threats to take and/or sue. See Talley, supra note 14, at 32-35.
78. Thus, we examine only two "snapshots" of the value of the damage amount (D), which more
generally could take on any positive value.
79. The notion of "legally mandated autarky" is closely related to what Calabresi and Melamed called
"inalienability" rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1106. If one defines "autarky" as the
absence of trade, then legally mandated autarky is analogous to what Radin has called a rule of
"nonsalability." Radin, supra note 37, at 1854; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 37, at 933-37 (noting
that non-salability is but one manifestation of inalienability rules).
80. Even though the average valuation of each plaintiff and each defendant is $50, the average highest
valuation of a plaintiff and a defendant is $63, because, intuitively, there are two chances to draw a party
with a valuation greater than $50. In statistics terminology, the expected $63 is an "ordered statistic." See,
e.g., SHELDON Ross, A FIRST COURSE IN PROBABILTY 224-25 (3d ed. 1984). For an explanation of the
calculation of the $63, see infra app. at p. 1104.
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welfare in a property regime is $50," while the expected joint welfare in a
liability regime is $55.82 The ability of liability rules to increase the expected
social welfare when bargaining is impossible resonates with the insights of
Calabresi and Melamed: When transaction costs are prohibitively high, liability
rules can enhance allocational efficiency by allowing high-valuing defendants
to take and pay damages. It is a different question, however, whether this
result holds when Coasean bargains are made in the presence of asymmetric
information, which adds some (though not prohibitive) friction to bilateral
bargaining.83
a. Bargaining Under an Undivided Property Rule
Under an undivided property rule, the defendant would never want to
exercise his option to take and pay $100. Because the defendant has no
credible threat of taking, he has nothing to "sell" to the plaintiff. The plaintiff,
therefore, would never offer to bribe the defendant not to take the entitlement.
Accordingly, in the first stage of the game under a property rule, the plaintiff
signals only an interest in selling her entitlement to the defendant (i.e.,
Coasean bargain #2).
The defendant will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to purchase the
plaintiff's entitlement for a price that maximizes the defendant's expected
profits, given his uncertainty about the plaintiff's valuation. As usual, the
defendant as a buyer has an incentive to offer less than his valuation. A lower
offer benefits the defendant if the plaintiff accepts, but reduces the chance of
acceptance. In the Appendix, we show that the defendant whose valuation is
$40 will bid $20 and the defendant whose valuation is $60 will bid $30 to buy
the entitlement.8s Plaintiffs with valuations below the contract offers will
accept and those with valuations above the contract offers will reject.
This bargaining equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4.
81- Under this type of property regime, both consensual and nonconsrensual takings by defendants
would be deterred, so the entitlement would simply remain with the plaintiff, who 'sould have an expected
valuation of $50.
82. If contracting were prohibited but the defendant had an option to take the entitlement
nonconsensually for $50, only defendants with $60 valuations would take. so that 50% of the time a $60
valuer would own the entitlement and 50% of the time the entitlement ssould remain with a random
plaintiff who would have an expected valuation of $50. The expected value is thus ( 5)S60 + ( 5)550 =
$55.
83. As noted above, the folk wisdom on this point is that the existence of "some- transaction costs
will likely mean that property rules are more efficient, since such rules give parties the incentive to set their
own price for a taking; liability rules, on the other hand. usually are unable to osercome small transaction
costs, so the parties must use the court-determined pnce for exchange See supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text.
84. See infra pp. at p. 1108.
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FIGURE 4. Probability that Entitlement Will Be Transferred
from Different Plaintiff Types Under a Property Rule
The horizontal axis depicts the various plaintiff valuations and the vertical axis
depicts the probability that the entitlement will be transferred (by sale or
taking) to the defendant. As shown in Figure 4, 100% of plaintiffs with
valuations less than $20 will sell their entitlement, because these plaintiffs will
accept both the $20 and $30 offers from both types of defendants; there is a
50% chance that plaintiffs with valuations between $20 and $30 will sell their
entitlement, because these plaintiffs will reject the $20 offers (from $40
defendants) and accept the $30 offers (from $60 defendants). Plaintiffs with
valuations above $30 will never sell because they value the entitlement more
than either type of the defendants' take-it-or-leave-it offer. The figure also
illustrates the inefficiency of this equilibrium outcome by showing (with dotted
lines) the efficient level of trade. For example, 100% of plaintiffs with
valuations less than $40 should sell their entitlement to higher-valuing
defendants, yet in the figure only 50% of plaintiffs with valuations between
$20 and $30 sell and no plaintiffs with valuations between $30 and $40 are
willing to sell."
85. Efficient trade would also induce 50% of plaintiffs with valuations between $40 and $60 to sell
to those defendants with $60 valuations. Under a property rule, however, none of these transactions takes
place; the plaintiff's private information is a but-for cause of this inefficiency. If the seller knew the
plaintiff's valuation, the higher-valuing seller would offer to buy the entitlement at a price just below the
plaintiff's valuation, thereby inducing allocational efficiency.
3 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Plaintiff's Valuation
Transfer under a property rule
--- - Efficient trade
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Under a property rule, the parties' strategic interactions produce an
expected surplus of approximately $59.75.' Thus, Coasean bargaining with
imperfect information does not guarantee efficiency under a property rule; the
parties' expected payoffs are some $3.25 less than the "first-best" level of
$63.87 There are, however, significant gains from Coasean trade: As discussed
above, the parties' expected payoffs under a liability rule without Coasean
trade were only $55-so (as is well understood"5 ) protecting an entitlement
with a property rule and allowing the parties to bargain can enhance
allocational efficiency. If one were to assume that bargaining is infeasible
under a liability rule, the property protection would, after bargaining, produce
an expected surplus that is $4.75 higher than "autarky" under a liability rule.
The traditional analysis of liability and property rules is flawed, however, in
that (at least implicitly) it only compares the expected gains from a liability
rule without trade to the gains from a property rule with trade. In contrast to
this rather popular comparison, we show below that protecting an entitlement
with a liability rule-because of the information-forcing effect-can enhance
Coasean bargaining even more.
b. Bargaining Under a Liability Rule
When the damage amount D is equal to $50, in the absence of agreement
the $60 defendant will take, and the $40 defendant will abstain from taking.
Under a liability rule, then, the defendant's threat to take is credible if and only
if the defendant's private valuation is $60. At first blush, one might intuit that
the intermediate level of damages merely adds another dimension of private
information to bargaining-for only the defendant knows whether his
ostensible threat to take is credible-so that the bargaining outcome would be
more inefficient than bargaining under a property rule. It turns out, however,
that the information-forcing character of liability rules has a much stronger
efficiency-enhancing effect that can facilitate Coasean exchanges.
When the damage amount is $50, the bargaining game delineated above
has a number of potential equilibria. All of these equilibria, however, exhibit
the information-forcing characteristic that plaintiffs never have an incentive to
misrepresent their valuations. 89 Moreover, the most "plausible" of these
86. As one would suspect, plaintiffs endowed with an (undivided) entitlement protected by a property
rule gamer the bulk of this expected value. As shown below in Table 5. the plaintiffs on aserage garner
$53.25, and the defendant earns S6.50. See infra part l1.B.3. The $40 defendant's expected payoff is $4.
and the $60 defendant's is $9. The plaintiff's expected payoff will be v, if her valuation exceeds $30.
(v,/2 + $30) if her valuation is between $20 and $30, and S25 if her valuation is less than S20
87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
89. A number of plaintiffs with intermediate valuations, however, will be indifferent betseen
expressing interest in the two types of Coasean trade, because these plaintiffs know that in equilibrium the-
will not be able to reach agreement with defendants exploiting their take-it-or-leave-it market posver The
valuation of these plaintiffs is not sufficiently different from the damage amount to make trade ronhvhile
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equilibria produce expected payoffs that exceed the expected $59.75 surplus
produced by bargaining under a property rule. Table 3 reports the
representative strategies of just such an equilibrium:"
STAGES OF EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
THE GAME
PLAINTIFF'S • If a plaintiff's valuation v,, is less than $50,
REPORT OF she reports interest in selling her entitlement.
INTEREST: • If a plaintiff's valuation v. exceeds $50, she
reports interest in buying defendant's option to
take.
DEFENDANT'S • If plaintiff reported interest in selling her
OFFER: entitlement, both types of defendant offer to
buy the entitlement for $32.50.
If plaintiff reported interest in buying
defendant's option to take, both types of
defendant offer to sell their option to take for
$17.50.
PLAINTIFF'S A plaintiff, who has reported interest in selling
ACCEPTANCE her entitlement, will accept the defendant's
DECISION: $32.50 bid if and only if her valuation is less
than $15.
A plaintiff, who has reported interest in
buying defendant's option to take, will accept
the defendant's $17.50 demand if and only if
her valuation is greater than $85.
DEFENDANT'S * After a rejected offer, the defendant will take
TAKING the entitlement (and pay plaintiff $50) if and
DECISION: only if v. = $60.
TABLE 3. Representative Strategy Profiles in Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, 9' the plaintiff's willingness to reveal some informa-
These intermediate-valuing plaintiffs will drop out of any bargaining game if communication costs increase
even an infinitesimal amount. Thus, in many real-world settings, we would expect plaintiffs to partition
themselves into three groups: High valuers would seek to bribe defendants, low valuers would seek to be
bribed, and intermediate valuers would remain silent.
90. The Appendix contains a derivation of this equilibrium for liability rule values of D between $40
and $60. See infra app. at pp. 1110-13.
91. Unlike the D = $100 game, the D = $50 does not have a unique Bayesian perfect equilibrium.
There are a number of equilibrium "refinements," however, that allow one to dismiss certain equilibria as
"implausible" because they require threats of deviation by players who are unlikely to want to deviate.
Using one such refinement known as "divinity," we can narrow the plausible equilibrium outcomes of this
game precisely to those described in the text. For more on the notion of equilibrium refinements, see
Jeffrey S. Banks & Joel Sobel, Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games, 55 ECONOM-TRICA 647 (1987)
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tion about her valuation (by expressing an interest in purchasing the
defendant's option or selling her own entitlement) can facilitate Coasean trade:
Only plaintiffs with valuations greater than $50 will say, "I am interested in
bribing you not to take my entitlement," and only plaintiffs with valuations
less than $50 will say, "I am interested in selling you my entitlement." This
self-selection, or partitioning phenomenon, can increase the likelihood of an
efficient transaction, because it effectively gives the parties less "room" to
misrepresent their private valuations in bargaining.
As discussed above, however, liability rules can amplify defendants'
incentives to misrepresent their valuations: Even though liability rules induce
plaintiffs to act less strategically, they may induce defendants to act more
strategically. In particular, as shown in Table 3, the liability rule induces the
different types of defendants to formulate identical offers. In game-theoretic
terms, the liability rules cause the defendants to "pool. ' No matter whether
the plaintiff expresses interest in buying (the defendant's call option) or in
selling (her own entitlement), one "type" of defendant will always find it
optimal to mimic the behavior of the other type of defendant so as not to
reveal his true intention about taking.9'
Because of the defendant's mimicking behavior, the plaintiff will be unsure
whether a bid/offer has issued from a "contender" or a "pretender." For
(discussing divinity as such); In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. 102
QJ. ECON. 179 (1987) (discussing less restrictive refinements)
92. The existence of the "cheap talk" signaling phase in our model is. as one might expect. crucial
to our results. When we take away the ability of the plaintiff to signal. bargaining under liability rules no
longer leads to more efficient outcomes than under property rules Indeed. uhile liability rules create the
possibility for two types of bargaining, the signaling phase of the game is what allows the parties to
coordinate the type of transaction. Removing signaling lower- the probability of consensual trade to zero
Thus, a $50 liability rule without signaling by the plaintiff results in the equivalent of autarky, shich
produces an expected social welfare of $55. Conversely. a property rule does not suffer from such a
coordination failure, and it thereby produces consensual trade. resulting in an expected social surplus of
S59.75.
93. Recall that under the property rule. the different types of defendants did not pool because the)
offered to buy at different prices.
94. While the precise derivations of defendants' equilibnum bids are in the Appendix. %%e can sketch
some of the intuitions here. Consider the case where a plaintiff values her entitlement less than the $50 and
has so signaled to the defendant. The only possible transaction of interest to the plaintiff insolses selling
her entitlement to a $40 defendant who otherwise would not take. But the plaintiff shill only be able to
make such a transaction at a price less than $40. because low-valuing defendants will not offer to purchase
an entitlement for a price greater than $40.
At the same time, this brand of transaction is extremely attractive to Igh-saluing defendants Esen
though these defendants would take in the absence of successful bargaining. b) taking they %%ould ha,,e to
pay $50. If, however, the high-valuing defendant could convincingly "mask" herself as a lo%%-valuing
defendant, she might be able to buy the entitlement at an even lower price than the $50 damage amount.
As such, the high-valuing defendant will find it profitable to feign a low valuation so as to "fool" the
plaintiff into reducing the price of taking. Such a defendant, then. must mimic the bid of a low% -% aluing
defendant, for if she reveals herself to be a high-valuing defendant, the plaintiff will surely reject any bid.
knowing that a $50 damages payment is forthcoming. This is why both types of defendants "pool" to bid
$32.50 for the plaintiff's entitlement in Table 3.
A similar type of strategic mimicking occurs in the other situation. %%hen a plaintiff has signaled a
preference for the "bribe" transaction. Here, conversely, the low-valuing defendants mimic the behavior
of the high-valuing defendants.
1995] 1055
The Yale Law Journal
example, when a low-valuing plaintiff hears a defendant's $32.50 offer to buy
the entitlement, the plaintiff will know there is a 50% chance that the
defendant has a $60 valuation (and intends to take the entitlement for $50
should the plaintiff reject the offer). Accordingly, a low-valuing plaintiff will
be reluctant to sell her entitlement unless the sales price sufficiently exceeds
her valuation to compensate her for the (50%) possibility that she is facing a
$60 defendant who will pay $50 if she rejects the offer. Thus, even though the
low-valuing plaintiffs receive all-or-nothing offers to buy for $32.50, only
plaintiffs who value the entitlement at less than $15 choose to sell. A plaintiff
whose valuation is $15 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
defendant's $32.50 offer to sell because rejecting yields a 50% chance of $50
and a 50% chance of $15, which equals an expected value of $32.50.
The willingness of plaintiffs to accept only contractual offers that are
higher than their valuations can help discipline the $40 defendant to make a
more competitive offer. In choosing an offering price to purchase the plaintiff's
entitlement, the low-valuing ($40) defendant knows that the high-valuing ($60)
defendant will mimic his bid. The $40 defendant recognizes that because of
this mimicking, the plaintiff will be less willing to accept that bid ceteris
paribus. This heightened scrutiny can help to discipline the $40 defendant to
raise his bid closer to his actual valuation. The $32.50 offer to purchase thus
represents the price that maximizes the $40 defendant's expected payoff (given
the $60 defendant's mimicking and the plaintiff's reluctance that the
mimicking engenders). A similar analysis explains the defendants' $17.50
offers not to take.95
The plaintiffs' reluctance to trade with pooling defendants reduces the
information-forcing effect of liability rules. Plaintiffs with intermediate
valuations (between $15 and $85) know that they will not accept any pooled-
defendant offers and thus have a weaker incentive to signal their relative
valuations. Indeed, if reporting an interest in a particular type of Coasean trade
costs an arbitrarily small amount, then plaintiffs with these intermediate
valuations would remain silent and only the 30% of plaintiffs with relatively
extreme valuations (i.e., with valuations greater than $85 or less than $15)
would signal their types. Defendant pooling might therefore easily induce
silence among plaintiffs with intermediate valuations, but it does not give
plaintiffs with intermediate valuations an affirmative incentive to misrepresent
95. In both cases, the plaintiff demands a payoff that is at least $17.50 greater than the worst-case
outcome. A plaintiff with a valuation of $15 is worried that the defendant will not take in the absence of
bargaining, but still demands a payoff of $32.50 ($17.50 higher) to sell her entitlement. A plaintiff with
a valuation of $85 is worried that the defendant will take in the absence of bargaining (which would give
the plaintiff only $50), but this plaintiff still demands a net payoff of $67.50 (which again is $17.50 higher)
and accordingly is unwilling to pay a bribe of more than $17.50 (because $85 minus the $17.50 bribe not
to take produces the required net payoff of $67.50). The willingness of $40 defendants to mimic the $60
defendants' $17.50 offers not to take thus causes high-valuing plaintiffs to bribe only when their private
valuations are sufficiently high (greater than $85).
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that their valuation is above or below the damage amount. Moreover, this
example shows that liability rules induce affirmative disclosure among those
plaintiffs for whom Coasean trade has the highest return.
This equilibrium for bargaining under a $50 liability rule is depicted in
Figure 5. As in Figure 4, the horizontal axis depicts the various plaintiff
valuations, and the vertical axis depicts the probability that the entitlement will
ultimately be enjoyed by the defendant, through either a purchase or
nonconsensual taking.
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FIGURE 5. Probability. that Entitlement Will Be Transferred
from Different Plaintiff Types Under a Liability Rule
Under the $50 liability rule, there is a 100% chance that plaintiffs with
valuations of less than $15 will sell their entitlements because these plaintiffs
will accept the $32.50 offer that both types of defendants will make to buy the
entitlement. There is a 50% chance that plaintiffs with valuations between $15
and $85 will have their entitlements taken nonconsensually (by $60
defendants). Plaintiffs with valuations between $15 and $50 will reject
defendants' offers to buy for $32.50, and plaintiffs with valuations between
$50 and $85 will reject defendants' offers to sell their options to take for
$17.50. Finally, plaintiffs with valuations above $85 will acquire an undivided
ownership in the entitlement.
As before, Figure 5 shows why bargaining under a liability rule does not
eliminate strategic inefficiency. By comparing these equilibrium probabilities
of transfer under a liability rule to the efficient level of trade (indicated with
dotted lines), we can identify two areas of inefficiency: (1) plaintiffs with
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valuations between $15 and $40 should always sell their rights to higher-
valuing buyers, but these plaintiffs refuse to accept any pooled offers to buy
their entitlements-so that only 50% of the entitlements are taken
nonconsensually by defendants (with $60 valuations); and (2) plaintiffs with
valuations between $60 and $85 should always retain the entitlement, but these
plaintiffs refuse to accept the pooled offers to sell the liability call option-so
that 50% of the entitlements are taken nonconsensually by lower-valuing, $60
defendants.
3. Liability Rules Can Facilitate Coasean Trade
As is obvious from the above example, bargaining under a liability rule
does not necessarily result in a "first-best" outcome. Nevertheless, bargaining
under a liability rule may be more efficient than bargaining under a property
rule. Table 4 shows for both property and liability rules the equilibrium
proportion of defendants who will:
" enter into one of the two types of Coasean agreements;
" take nonconsensually; and
" refrain from contracting or taking.
PROPERTY RULES LIABILITY RULES
% EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION % EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION
JOINT TO TOTAL JOINT TO TOTAL
PAYOFFS INEFFICIENCY PAYOFFS INEFFICIENCY
COASEAN 25% $52.00 $0.00 30% $71.25 $0.00
TRADE I
NONCONSEN- 0% $0.00 $0.00 35% $60.00 $1.56
SUAL TAKING
NEITHER 75% $62.33 $3.25 35% $50.00 $1.56
TRADE NOR
TAKING
EXPECTED 100% $59.75 $3.25 100% $59.88 $3.12
TOTAL
TABLE 4. Equilibrium Trade and Taking Under Property and Liability Rules
Table 4 shows how liability rules facilitate Coasean trade. Under a property
rule only 25% of the bargainers reach Coasean agreement, but under a liability
rule this figure rises to 30%.96 The table also shows that expected payoffs for
96. As shown in Figure 4, under a property rule 25% of bargainers reach agreement, because all
plaintiffs with valuations under $20 trade (20% of all bargains) and half of plaintiffs with valuations
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those reaching a Coasean agreement are significantly higher under a liability
rule ($71.25) than under a property rule ($52.00).17 Even though liability
rules induce excessive nonconsensual takings by some defendants (giving rise
to an inefficiency of $1.56)," s bargaining under the liability rule is more
efficient because it raises the probability of Coasean trade (where the
entitlement always ends up in the hands of the highest valuer) and dramatically
reduces the failure of goods to pass to higher-valuing defendants due to the
defendants' failure to contract or take. Under a property rule, 75% of plaintiffs
fail to contract and no taking occurs; under a liability rule this figure is
reduced to 35%. The liability rule equilibrium reduces the inefficiency from
this autarkic category by more than half (from $3.25 to $1.56).
The net impact of these effects is that under a liability rule, the expected
joint payoffs ($59.88)" are higher than those produced by bargaining under
a property rule ($59.75)."0 Liability rules are more efficient because they
induce more trade. t0' By effectively forcing the plaintiffs to reveal
between $20 and $30 trade (5% of all bargainers). As shown in Figure 5. under a liability rule 30% of
bargainers reach agreement because all plaintiffs with valuations less than S15 trade (15% of all bargainers)
and all plaintiffs with valuations more than S85 trade (15% of all bargainers).
97. Under a liability rule, half of the trades will allow plaintiffs with an average value of $92 50
(between $85 and $100) to retain the entitlement, and half of the trades allow defendants with an average
value of $50 ($40 or S60) to acquire the entitlement-so the expected payoff will be ( 5)S92 50 + ( 5)S50 =
$71.25. Under a property rule, 40% of trades allow a $40 defendant to acquire the entitlement and 60%
of the trades allow a $60 defendant to acquire the entitlement-so the expected payoffs will be ( 4)40 +
(.6)S60 = $52.
98. In the liability rule equilibrium, this excessive taking was caused by $60 dollar defendants who
would inefficiently take from plaintiffs with valuations ranging from $60 to $85.
99. For the exact calculations, see infra app. at p. 1113.
100. Although in this example the liability rule only increases the expected surplus from the property
rule by $0.12, alternative assumptions about the distribution of plaintiff and defendant types could easily
produce a greater differential. For example, if the defendant's two valuation types were 320 and 380. then
an intermediate liability rule could produce an expected surplus 33.00 higher than what a property rule
would produce. In this case, the liability rule would mitigate 75% of the inefficiency that would otherwise
exist under a property rule.
The amount of improvement is of course capped by the size of the surplus available under first-best
trade, which in Table 5 equals $63, but the improvement is not limited to an amount less than "transaction
costs." First, in this model, transaction costs are not easily monetized because of the amount of pnvate
information that induces the inefficiency. Second, even when the dollar costs of contracting inhibit Coasean
bargaining, the amount of inefficiency may be greater than the contracting costs. See Ayres & Gertner.
supra note 74.
101. In the absence of bargaining (a situation that we have labeled "autarky"). a $50 liability rule
dominates a property rule in terms of expected joint payoff. Kaplow and Shavell have persuasively shown
that liability rules already have a "head start" on property rules under autarky because nonconscnsual
takings will tend to transfer the entitlement to a higher-valuing owner, and that it is not surprising that this
liability rule advantage persists in circumstances when bargaining is possible. Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) While
Kaplow and Shavell are clearly correct about the autarkic headstart of liability rules, the information-forcing
property of liability rules may provide an independent reason that liability rules can dominate property rules
when bargaining is possible. Two phenomena support this belief. First, as the next Section makes clear.
an attempt by the court to "tailor" its damages to the plaintiff's private valuation can actually decrease joint
welfare. See infra part II.C. I. If the persistence of the autarky advantage were the sole cause of the liability
rule advantage with bargaining, one would expect that bargaining under a tailored liability rule could do
no worse than bargaining under the untailored rule studied here (the opposite is in fact the case) Second,
coauthor Talley has found that introducing litigation costs into the model can induce "first best" bargaining
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information about their valuations, liability rules mitigate the inefficiencies of
bargaining under private information. I02
This efficiency-enhancing quality of liability rules stands at odds with the
law-and-economics "folk wisdom" on how to induce bargaining. Most scholars
have assumed that the law can best ensure efficient Coasean bargaining by
maximizing the size of the potential "bargaining pie"-i.e., the range of
under a liability rule (again because the parties bargain more forthrightly). See Talley, supra note 14. at
29-33. Property rules, on the other hand, are unable to induce first best bargaining, with or without
litigation costs. Once again, if the predominant value of liability rules were their ability to facilitate
nonconsensual transfer to higher-valuing owners, then we would expect that increasing the cost of
nonconsensual transfer (via litigation costs) would decrease (rather than increase) the expected payoffs.
Clearly, the benefit must be substantially driven by bargaining.
102. The distributional consequences of the various rules are also somewhat interesting. Table 5
compares the relative efficiency and distributional consequences of four different entitlement regimes.
LEGAL BARGAINING EXPECTED EXPECTED EXPECTED
REGIME JOINT PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
PAYOFF PAYOFF PAYOFF
"FIRST-BEST" $63.00
ALLOCATION
BARGAINING UNDER $59.875 $51.125 $8.75
LIABILITY RULE
BARGAINING UNDER $59.75 $53.25 $6.50
PROPERTY RULE
AUTARKY UNDER $55.00 $50.00 $5.00
LIABILITY RULE
AUTARKY UNDER $50.00 $50.00 $0.00
PROPERTY RULE
TABLE 5. Expected Payoffs Under Four Legal Regimes
The above table confirms that plaintiffs, on average, favor a property rule, while defendants, on average,
favor a liability rule. This result is consistent with the intuition about the distributional consequences of
these rules. Once both parties learn their respective valuations, however, neither plaintiffs nor defendants
are unanimous in their preference. Even though a property rule would seem to disfavor defendants in
general, low-valuing defendants actually prefer a property rule. Since a property rule does not induce
defendant "pooling" or "mimicking," plaintiffs do not scrutinize the bids they receive from low-valuing
defendants as closely. Indeed, low-valuing defendants receive a larger payoff from the property rule ($4.00)
than they do under the liability rule ($3.75), while high-valuing defendants do better under liability rules
($13.75) than under property rules ($9.00). Conversely, all plaintiffs whose private valuations are less than
$50 favor liability rules over property rules.
Because of this heterogeneous ordering of preferences both among and between litigants, it is unlikely
that the parties would be able to agree on one rule over another. If, however, the parties were able to
bargain about which rule to implement before they became aware of their private valuations, and if side
payments were allowed, then it is a straightforward Coasean proposition that the parties would settle on
a divided entitlement rather than a property rule. This Coasean conclusion is valid in such a situation
because the parties do not have any private information when they bargain over the legal rule. This
possibility may explain why contracting parties often wish to liquidate damages in a contractual term before
they learn their private information, for a liquidated damages term is nothing more than a simple liability
call option as modeled here. It might also explain why courts often invalidate stipulated terms that appear
penalty-like in nature. For a more extensive analysis of this point, see generally Talley, supra note 43.
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potential prices that might be agreed upon by the parties.'0 ' In contrast, our
model finds that liability rules can increase social welfare by forcing people
to bargain over smaller, discrete bargaining ranges. A $50 liability rule actually
bifurcates one large bargaining range (under a property rule between S0 and
$100) into two smaller bargaining ranges,"° yet increases expected social
welfare. This quality of liability rules exposes the fundamental flaw in the
"maximize the pie" recipe for characterizing efficient legal rules. Such a recipe
mistakenly assumes that the amount of strategic behavior remains constant
regardless of the size of the underlying bargaining pie. To the contrary, the
above model illustrates that even though liability rules force parties to agree
to a price within a narrower bargaining range, these rules can have an even
greater effect of stemming the amount of strategic behavior by inducing
entitlement holders to reveal some of their information.'0 5
103. See, e.g., Merges. supra note 39. at 22-28.
104. Under a property rule, the possible prices from a Coasean transaction can range from SO to SIO0
Under a liability rule, however, regardless of which Coasean transaction the entitlement holder signals. the
potential prices range only between SO and S50.
105. As noted earlier, our results are robust amid vanations in our assumptions about the structure of
information and the bargaining rules. See supra notes 57-60 For instance, the defendant's valuation need
not take on symmetric values around S50. nor need it have symmetric If2 probabilities. Moreover, our
results are robust even in environments where the parties vary their bargaining procedure when the legal
environment changes. See supra note 73.
In their text on game theory and the law. Baird. Gertner. and Picker explore a bargaining environment
similar to ours in analyzing the potential effects of a specific performance remedy in the classic case of
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963) (holding that when cost of specific
performance of contract calling for land restoration would substantially outweigh enhanced value of land
after reclamation, plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance). Their analysis underscores the
importance of "exit options" in determining the outcome of bilateral bargaining. See DOUOLAS BAIRD E"
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 224-32 (1991). In their example, a taking of sorts-breach of
contract-has already occurred. Garland has refused to perform its promise to restore the Peevyhouses' land
after strip mining. The Peevyhouses, as the aggrieved party, are conjectured to have a right to specific
performance should bargaining fail. and thus the) may "exit" from negotiations and force Garland to restore
the land at any time during negotiations. The authors examine a situation where there are two "types" of
plaintiffs: a high-valuing type who places a subjective value of S800.000 on land restoration, and a low-
valuing type who values such reclamation at only S200.000. The cost of restoration is commonly knowsn
in their model to be S1.000,000. Id. at 224-26.
The authors find that the existence of this specific performance option can lead to mcffictent outcomes
if the Peevyhouses have private information. High-valuing Pevyhouses will choose to exit the negotiations
since their offers (not to seek specific performance in exchange for compensation) are indistinguishable
from mimicking "bluffs" issued by low-valuing Pevyhouses. If the probability of a low-%alumg
Peevyhouse is sufficiently high, Garland will likely reject an), bids by the Peevyhouses of $800.000 or
more, thinking that the bid is more likely than not a bluff. As such. Garland is willing to let the high-
valuing Peevyhouses exit even though their exiting and exercising the specific performance remedy results
in inefficiency. Id. at 229-31.
Their results are consistent with our finding that an absolute property right %ested in one party can
often lead to allocational inefficiencies. Indeed. the specific performance entitlement is a t)pe of property
rule: The Peevyhouses have the ability to "take" from Garland for zero compensation Our discussion in
the Appendix of the case where D = SO conducts just such an analysis. See infra app at p 1109 Both our
model and theirs find that property rules can create inefficient failures to transfer the property right through
negotiations.
While Baird, Gertner. and Picker do not formally analyze bargaining with incomplete information
under a "liability rule," our model could easily incorporate such a rule. Consider. for instance, a rule that
allows the Peevyhouses to force restoration of their land. but only for an exercise price of S500.000 In
such a case, just as in our model, the low-valuing Peevyhouses would not exercise such an option. while
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4. Reverse Liability Rules and Compensated Injunctions
Throughout the above analysis, we have assumed that the defining
characteristic of a liability rule is that it gives the defendant a call option to
take. There are, however, other types of liability regimes that can be given
alternative option interpretations. Indeed, it is plausible to think of situations
in which the option on whether a taking occurs lies with the "aggrieved" party.
A reverse liability rule is just such a situation. This rule would give the
plaintiff the right to force a taking at the prescribed liability amount.
Effectively, then, while a "run-of-the-mill" liability rule places a call option
in the hands of the defendant, the reverse liability rule places a put option in
the hands of the plaintiff.' °6
As it turns out, reversing the option right produces a truth-telling result
similar to what an ordinary liability rule produces, but it affects the opposite
party. Consider, for example, a reverse liability rule that endows the plaintiff
with the right to force a sale to the defendant at a price of $50. Analogous to
the previous case, there are two types of Coasean bargains. In the first type,
the high-valuing Peevyhouses would.
To "map" our model onto theirs completely, however, we would need to relax the assumption that
"no restoration" is the efficient decision. Indeed, the assumption that the cost of restoration ($1,000,000)
exceeds any realistic valuation of the Peevyhouses ($200,000 or $800,000) ensures that the first-best
allocational decision is common knowledge in their model. Therefore, Garland always prefers the type of
Coasean bargain in which it bribes Peevyhouse not to take. Selling its liability entitlement for an amount
less than $500,000 is never attractive to such a high-valuing Garland, as this would only increase the
probability of a taking and increase Garland's net loss in the event of such a taking. The analogue of our
model, in contrast, allows for Peevyhouse's privately known valuation to vary between $0 and $1,000,000.
When Garland's valuation varies in this manner, it creates an incentive for the high- and low-valuing
Garlands to separate themselves through credible signaling, thus giving our "partitioning" result. This
example illustrates the notion that liability rules can increase efficiency when there is private information
on the non-optionholder's side (i.e., Garland).
106. The difference between a liability rule and a reverse liability rule can be illustrated by the facts
of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), which involved a cement plant's polluting
of neighboring homes. The court's decision implemented a traditional liability rule: The neighbors had a
right not to be exposed to pollution, but this right was subject to the cement plant's option to pollute and
pay court-determined damages. One could imagine a court, possibly on alternative facts, finding that it
would be so difficult to determine whether the cement plant was polluting that the court would give the
neighbors not only the right not to be exposed to pollution, but also the option to sell this right to the
cement plant for the same court-determined damage amount. This remedy would protect the neighbors from
surreptitious pollution that could not be legally proven to violate the neighbors' original entitlement. Giving
the neighbors the pollution entitlement plus this put option constitutes a reverse liability rule. Under
Boomer's liability holding, the cement plant has the right to decide whether to pay court-determined
damages for the right to pollute. Under a reverse liability rule, the neighbors have the right to decide
whether they will be paid court-determined damages to give the cement plant the right to pollute.
Madeline Morris was the first to use this put-call analogy to examine ordinary and reverse liability
rules. E.g., Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 851-56 (1993).
While reverse liability rules are much less common than ordinary rules, there are instances within American
law in which the plaintiff likely has a limited put option. A possible example of this notion is the so-called
"forced sale" doctrine in contract law. Under U.C.C. § 2-709, a seller aggrieved by a buyer's material
breach may have the option of forcing the buyer to purchase contracted goods at the specified price. Note,
however, that this remedy is limited to the case of unique or damaged goods-i.e., goods that cannot easily
be resold. See U.C.C. § 2-709 (1993). Examples of legally imposed liability rules include "[glun buy-out
offers by police departments and soft-drink container deposit redemption laws." See Morris, supra, at 855.
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a low-valuing defendant might bribe the plaintiff not to exercise her
option.' 7 In the second type, a high-valuing defendant might purchase the
plaintiff's entitlement.
08
Under a reverse liability rule, the possibility of these two transactions now
eliminates the defendant's incentive to misrepresent whether his valuation is
above or below the damage amount. While plaintiffs might have some
incentive to lie," a defendant's type of offer credibly signals his valuation:
Low-valuing defendants would never offer to purchase the entitlement for more
than $50, and high-valuing defendants would never want to bribe the plaintiff
to abstain from exercising the put option."'
Defendants can also be induced to partition themselves if they are given
the entitlement and plaintiffs are given the call option to take nonconsensually
and pay damages. This allocation corresponds to the famous "category 4" of
Calabresi and Melamed-which would permit the plaintiff to enjoin the
defendant's conduct, but only if she compensated the defendant for the
defendant's losses caused by the injunction."' Lawmakers and jurists largely
overlooked this form of "compensated injunction" until the Arizona Supreme
Court in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co. required, as a
condition for granting a nuisance injunction against a preexisting feedlot, that
107. For example, suppose the plaintiff's valuation is S30 and the defendant's valuation is $10- Absent
bargaining, the plaintiff will exercise the put option and will receive a payoff of S50. leaving the defendant
with a payoff of minus $40. This result is clearly inefficient, since the aggregate social surplus ($10) is
lower than what would emerge if the plaintiff abstained from exercising her option (630) One can imagine
a Coasean bargain in which the defendant pays (bribes) the plaintiff $25 to abstain from taking (i.e.. the
defendant purchases the plaintiff's put option). Such a bribe would reduce the defendant's loss from S40
to $25, and it would increase the plaintiff's payoff to $55.
108. This transaction might occur if the high-valuing defendant did not expect the plaintiff to force
a sale. For instance, going back to the situation where the exercise price on the plaintiff's option is $50.
suppose that the plaintiff valued the entitlement at $60 and the defendant valued it at $80 Absent
bargaining, the plaintiff clearly would not choose to exercise her option. This inaction would result in an
aggregate surplus of $60-again inefficient. If. however, the defendant offered to purchase the platntiff's
entitlement for, say, $65, the plaintiff, after accepting, would be better off (as would the defendant), and
aggregate welfare would increase to $80.
It is interesting to note here that, contrary to our example of regular liability rules, the two
transactions both entail the defendant's purchasing something from (i.e.. bribing) the plaintiff. The bribes,
however, are for two distinct actions that the plaintiff might take (exercising or not exercising). This
observation suggests that what is important under a liability rule is not the possibility that the parties might
be on either side of a transaction, but rather the possibility that a liability rule would create two
qualitatively distinct types of transactions that the parties might pursue.
109. Indeed, low-valuing plaintiffs would sometimes offer to sell for more than $50. and high-valuing
plaintiffs would sometimes propose a bribe not to exercise the put option.
110. As a worst-case scenario, the low-valuing defendant would be forced to purchase the entitlement
for $50, should the plaintiff exercise the put. Since this forced transaction would give the defendant a
negative payoff to begin with, it makes little sense for the low-valuing defendant to pay even more to
receive the entitlement. Since the low-valuing defendant would therefore never enter into such a transaction.
such a defendant is always willing to signal credibly that his valuation is less than $50
A high-valuing defendant, on the other hand, will receive a windfall if the plaintiff exercises the put
option and therefore has no incentive to purchase the put option from the plaintiff. Hence, the only
transaction that appeals to the high-valuing defendant involves purchasing the entitlement from the plaintiff
11. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1115-23.
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the plaintiff pay for the feedlot's costs "of moving or shutting down.""' 2 Our
earlier argument suggests that if the costs of the injunction are untailored-so
that the defendant feedlot's costs might be higher or lower than the court-
ordered compensation-then the defendant feedlot could credibly signal
whether its damages were higher or lower than the court award by offering
either to bribe the plaintiff not to seek an injunction or to agree to stop
polluting for a price less than the court award. Compensated injunctions induce
defendant partitioning by merely switching the roles of plaintiff and defendant.
The defendant is given the entitlement, but its ownership is subject to the
plaintiff's option to take the entitlement and pay compensating damages.
This analysis suggests that there are two liability rule methods of inducing
defendants to partition themselves: reverse liability rules and compensated
injunction rules. A fundamental equation from finance theory, called the "put-
call parity formula," shows the precise relationship between these two types
of liability rules: The put-call parity formula establishes the relative value of
put and call options written with identical exercise prices on the same
underlying entitlement as follows:
Value of entitlement + Value of put = Value of call + Value of exercise price."
3
This put-call parity formula can easily be restated in terms of the reverse
liability and compensated injunction rules. Under a reverse liability rule, the
plaintiff owns both the entitlement and a put option to sell the entitlement at
fixed exercise price-so that the value of the plaintiff's claims under a reverse
liability rule should equal the left-hand sum of the put-call parity formula.
Under a compensated injunction rule, the plaintiff owns only a call option to
take the entitlement and pay the fixed exercise price. Accordingly, it is
possible to rewrite the parity formula as follows:
Value of reverse liability rule = Value of compensated injunction rule + Value of exercise price.
Restated in this manner, it is easy to see that the plaintiff's payoffs under a
reverse liability rule will exceed her payoffs under a compensated injunction
by exactly the amount of the untailored damages. As a first approximation, the
only difference between the two types of liability rules is that a reverse
liability rule transfers the value of the exercise price from the defendant to the
plaintiff.114
112. 494 P.2d 700. 708 (Ariz. 1972). Ellickson originally coined the term "compensated injunction."
See Ellickson, supra note 50. at 738 & n.202.
113. For greater elaboration of the put-call parity formula, see JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND
OTHER DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 110-16 (1989).
114. In the absence of bargaining, the payoffs under the two rules differ by exactly the amount of this
transfer. In the presence of bargaining, the expected payoffs of all types differ by this amount.
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This discussion of reverse liability and compensated injunction rules
illustrates that various permutations of liability rule options will induce either
the plaintiff or the defendant to reveal information about her valuation. Just as
traditional liability rules can induce plaintiff partitioning, we have shown that
both reverse liability and compensated injunction rules can induce defendant
partitioning. Thus, these latter rules are more likely to be appropriate when the
defendant's private information about his valuation predominates in Coasean
negotiations.'' 5
C. The Perverse Effects of Tailoring Liabilit,
In the previous sections, we illustrated the information-forcing effect of
dividing the claims to an entitlement by giving a defendant (the potential taker)
an option to take nonconsensually and pay a fixed liability amount. Here, we
ask a slightly different but equally important question: How does the court's
ability to "tailor" a remedy to the specific litigants' characteristics affect this
result?
At first, we expected that greater accuracy by the court in tailoring either
its liability determinations or the amount of damages would produce more
efficient outcomes; i6 after all, by tailoring its decisions to the specific
circumstances of a legal dispute, the court would be able to induce more
efficient taking when bargaining failed." 7 We were wrong. Tailoring can
exacerbate strategic impediments to bargaining because tailoring gives the
parties private information about the legal consequences of nonconsensual
taking. For instance, if the court were to match the level of damages to the
precise magnitude of the plaintiff's injury (v. in our example), the plaintiff
would know more than the defendant about the legal consequences of a
nonconsensual taking. Though the defendant would still own a call option, he
would not know its exercise price.
115. It would also be possible to construct an alternative liability scheme that induced plaintiff
partitioning by endowing the defendant with both the entitlement and a put option to sell the entitlement
to the plaintiff for a fixed price. This scheme would be equivalent to a reverse liability rule. but the
identities of the plaintiff and the defendant would be switched so that in the pollution context. the polluter
would have a right to pollute and an option to sell its right to pollute to its downwind neighbor for a fixed
amount of money.
116. This belief, as a default proposition, seems almost axiomatic in the law-and-cconomics literature
See. e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT I-AW 127 (1987) ("It has been implicit
all along that if liable parties pay for the actual level of losses they cause, they will be led to act optimally
under liability rules."); see POSNER. supra note I. at 62 n.5 (noting that property rules are likely to
predominate over liability rules if courts cannot compute damages with reasonable accuracy); see also A
Mitchell Polinsky. Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of sinjuncrtve and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1112 (1980) (discussing optimality of property rules when court cannot
observe parties' valuations).
117. This rationale is consistent with what Cooter has referred to as the "Norrnatisc Hobbes rheorcm
Structure the law to minimize the harm caused by failures in pns ate agreements." Coor.R & ULLS. supra
note I, at 99.
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In this Section, we argue that the added dimension of private information
that tailoring introduces can seriously hamper the bargaining process. Exact
tailoring of damages gives the plaintiff a form of "perfect insurance" against
bargaining breakdown because the plaintiff's noncooperative payoff is
unaffected by the defendant's decision to take nonconsensually. Conversely,
if the court were to fix its liability determination in a contingent fashion,
making the defendant liable (under a negligence-like standard) if his private
valuation was subsequently found to be insufficient to justify the taking, the
defendant would have private information about whether the court would
eventually find him liable. As such, if the defendant knew that he would
satisfy the negligence standard, he would now have perfect insurance against
bargaining breakdown. In this Section, we consider each of these possibilities
within the bargaining framework defined above to show that tailoring can
reduce the incentives for plaintiffs under a liability rule to partition themselves
affirmatively into high- and low-valuing groups. We stress, however, that even
with tailored legal rules, we would never expect to see a low-valuing plaintiff
make (or accept) an offer to bribe a defendant not to take the entitlement, and
we would never expect to see a high-valuing plaintiff make (or accept) an offer
to sell her entitlement for less than the damage amount. Therefore, while
tailoring may induce a larger range of plaintiffs to refrain from trade, it is still
true that any observed offers by a plaintiff credibly signal information about
her relative valuation.
1. Tailored Damages
Suppose that instead of awarding the plaintiff an untailored damage
amount as in our analysis above, the court was able to "pierce" the plaintiff's
private information at trial, awarding her actual damages of v,""' As
mentioned above, tailoring the amount of damages gives the plaintiff private
information about the consequences of a taking. The defendant has an option
to take, but is unsure of the exercise price. This type of uncertainty often exists
in contractual settings. For example, a consumer who has promised to purchase
a new automobile from a dealership may know that the dealership will be
liable for lost profits if she breaches the contract and thus takes the seller's
contractual entitlement, but the consumer as a potential defendant usually does
not know the size of the dealer's profits." 9
118. This is still the case with strict liability. We briefly discuss a "tailored" damages award under a
negligence regime below. See infra part II.C.2.
When bargaining is not allowed, such a tailored damages award yields an expected social surplus of
$55. just as would intermediate fixed damages with no bargaining. The expected damages award E(v,) =
$50. Hence, in the absence of bargaining, the defendant will take only if v. > $50, and thus the $60
defendant will be the only type to take.
119. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL.
L. REV. 283, 295-96 (1984); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
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Tailoring the amount of liability reduces plaintiffs' incentive to reveal
information. A plaintiff can no longer credibly signal whether her valuation is
greater or less than the damage amount because tailoring makes the damage
amount equal each plaintiff's valuation. This kind of tailoring thus decreases
plaintiffs' incentives to engage in Coasean negotiations. In particular, because
the tailored damages perfectly compensate a plaintiff for a nonconsensual
taking, the plaintiff has nothing to gain from discouraging such a taking.
Plaintiffs with valuations greater than $60 know that they will never be
able to sell their entitlements to defendants (whose highest value is $60), and
because tailoring provides "taking insurance" they never have an incentive to
pay defendants not to take. Accordingly, there is a large class of plaintiffs with
relatively high valuations who are indifferent between expressing interest in the
two types of bargaining because they know that they will never come to terms
with a defendant.
As shown in the Appendix, this model of tailored damages produces a
unique equilibrium outcome in which there is much less Coasean trade.''
Under an untailored liability rule, 30% of plaintiffs succeed in reaching a pre-
taking agreement, but under a tailored liability rule only 10% of the plaintiffs
trade. In this equilibrium the $60 defendants abstain from bargaining and take
nonconsensually, and the $40 defendants buy the entitlement (for $20) from
plaintiffs with valuations less than $20. In equilibrium, plaintiffs with
valuations of less than $20 have an affirmative incentive to express an interest
in selling their entitlement, but tailoring destroys the incentive of all other
plaintiffs to bargain because they know ex ante that they will not come to
terms with either type of defendant. Accordingly, plaintiffs with valuations
greater than $20 simply refrain from bargaining if expressing an interest costs
even an infinitesimal amount.
Since tailoring eliminates plaintiffs' incentives to bribe defendants not to
take, it exacerbates the number of inefficient nonconsensual takings. As shown
in Figure 6, under an untailored liability rule, plaintiffs with valuations greater
than $85 deterred inefficient takings by bribing defendants not to take. Under
a tailored liability rule, however, high-valuing plaintiffs have no incentive to
stop these inefficient takings, and the $60 defendants rationally choose not to
make serious offers.1
2
'
Figure 6 also shows that tailoring the liability rule induces more
entitlement sales from low-valuing plaintiffs to $40 defendants. Under an
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817. 818 (1991) (showing that market competition did not eliminate
racial and gender discrimination in retail car market).
120. See infra app. at pp. 1114-15. Because a large class of plaintiffs is indifferent bct,.%ccn expressing
interest in a particular kind of Coasean bargain, there are many equtlibnum strategies that can produce this
unique outcome.
121. The Appendix shows that $60 defendants would rather simply take and pay an expected damage
amount of $50 than bargain. See id.
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untailored rule, low-valuing plaintiffs are reluctant to accept offers to sell their
entitlements because they know that half of the offers come from $60
defendants who will take nonconsensually and pay $50. This reluctance causes
only plaintiffs with valuations of less than $15 to accept offers from plaintiffs
to buy at $32.50. In contrast, under a tailored rule, the plaintiffs know that
only $40 defendants will make offers to buy and that these defendants will not
take nonconsensually if bargaining fails. Hence, under a tailored rule, the $20
offer (made by a $40 defendant) will be accepted by any plaintiffs with lower
valuations.
FIGURE 6. Effect of Tailoring Damages on the Probability
of Transfer
Tailoring thus encourages plaintiffs to engage in one type of Coasean
bargain (selling their entitlement), but eliminates their opportunity to engage
in the other type of bargain (bribing the defendant not to take). These two
effects are not merely offsetting. The expected surplus under a tailored liability
rule ($58)122 is less than that produced under either a property rule ($59.75)
or the untailored liability rule ($59.88). Moreover, tailoring induces more
nonconsensual takings. Under untailored liability regimes, 35% of the
negotiations end with nonconsensual takings, as opposed to 50% under tailored
liability regimes. Thus, untailored rules are likely to save on court costs both
122. $60 with probability 1/2 (i.e., when the $60 plaintiff obtains); if the $40 plaintiff emerges (again
with probability 1/2), there is a $40 social surplus 20% of the time and a $60 surplus the other 80% of the
time. The $60 comes from the expected value of v. given v.>20. See supra note 102, tbl. 5.
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by reducing the number of decisions and by reducing the costs per
decision. 23 In sum, tailoring decreases trade, increases nonconsensual taking,
and decreases welfare. These findings highlight the unique benefits of
untailored liability rules. Scholars arguing in favor of property rules have seen
that the equitable impulse to tailor damages ex post may impede efficient
negotiation124-after all, property damages are typically not tailored to make
the plaintiff whole-but the academy has failed to see that untailored liability
rules can predominate over both property rules or tailored forms of liability
protection.125
2. Tailored Liability (a.k.a. The Negligence Standard)
Another way that courts can institute tailored awards is not by tailoring the
damage amount, but by tailoring the determination of liability. The most
common manifestation of such an approach is the familiar negligence standard
that Judge Hand articulated in the classic United States 1. Carroll Towing
Co. 26 Under such a standard, the defendant must pay damages to the
plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant acted "unreasonably." An
important indication of reasonableness is whether the defendant's benefit from
taking outweighs the plaintiff's expected cost. Accordingly, we consider a
permutation of the model in which the defendant is liable only if the value he
gains through taking (vA) is less than the plaintiff's expected damages at the
time of the taking. 27 In the current example, since the plaintiff's damages
are distributed uniformly between $0 and $ 100, the negligence standard is $50.
Thus, under this standard, the $40 defendant will be judged negligent when he
takes, but the $60 defendant who takes will be judged to have acted reasonably
and hence will incur no liability. To concentrate on the element of tailored
liability rather than tailored damages, let us assume for now that the court
imposes fixed damages of $50 if it finds the defendant negligent."'2 In our
earlier discussions, the defendant was strictly liable for any nonconsensual
taking; here, however, the court conditions-i.e., tailors-the determination of
123. Talley has shown in a formal model that with litigation costs. untailored rules can produce esen
more negotiations. Talley, supra note 43, at 1229-33. The intuition behind this argument is that vhcn
litigation costs are a "credible threat." they can act as an effective "tax" on strategic behavior The prospect
of bearing this tax reduces each party's marginal incentive to misrepresent her saluation
124. Haddock et al., supra note 18. at 8-9.
125, But see Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards. 10 J L
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 84, 85 (1994) (finding that untailored rules produce more bargaining than tailored
rules and can be more efficient when litigation costs are small)
126. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
127. Note that this efficiency criterion is a manifestation of Judge Hand's no%% famous PL 2- B
criterion for negligence, where here P = I, L = E(v,). and B = v. See POSNER. supra note 1. at 147-49
128. As it turns out, even if the court tailored the damage amount to equal the plaintiff's actual
damages, v, the outcome would be exactly the same from an efficiency standpoint See infra app at pp
1114-15. Moreover, the results presented below do not change qualitatis ely when the lixed liability amount
takes on other values.
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liability to the facts of the case. The negligence standard gives the defendants
private information about who owns the entitlement. The $60 defendants know
that they own the property, and the $40 defendants know that they have no
legal claim to the property. Crucially, however, a plaintiff, in bargaining with
a particular defendant, does not know whether she has a legal claim in the
entitlement.
There are, once again, two potential types of transactions that might occur
under a negligence standard: First, a high-valuing plaintiff might bribe the non-
negligent $60 defendant to abstain from taking; second, a low-valuing plaintiff
might sell her entitlement to a $40 defendant, who, absent negotiation, would
never take. As it turns out, however, using a negligence standard to tailor the
issue of liability destroys the parties' ability to engage in the first type of
transaction. Even though a high-valuing plaintiff would want to bribe $60
defendants, the plaintiff cannot determine whether it is bribing a $40 or $60
defendant. Indeed, the $40 defendant will pretend to be a $60 defendant in an
attempt to sell what he does not have-a credible threat to take. The plaintiff's
uncertainty about whether she is bribing a low-valuing or high-valuing
defendant reduces the amount that the plaintiff is willing to pay as a bribe. For
example, even the highest-valuing plaintiff would only be willing to pay a $50
bribe. 29 Because a $60 defendant is never liable, however, such a defendant
would not offer to sell his right to take for less than $60. As with tailored
damage amounts, the tailored negligence standard eliminates plaintiffs' ability
to bribe defendants not to take.
In fact, the Appendix shows that tailoring the issue of liability in this
negligence model produces the same unique equilibrium outcome as the
tailored damages model in the previous Section: Because plaintiffs will never
bribe defendants not to take, the $60 defendants will abstain from serious
bargaining and simply take nonconsensually; $40 defendants buy the
entitlement for $20 from those plaintiffs whose valuations are less than $20.
Tailoring once again decreases a plaintiff's incentive to reveal her type.
Although plaintiffs with valuations less than $20 still have an affirmative
incentive to express an interest in selling their entitlement, those 80% of
plaintiffs with valuations higher than $20 know that in equilibrium they will
not be able to engage in either type of Coasean trade. The tailoring of legal
consequences under the negligence standard accordingly makes high-valuing
plaintiffs indifferent between expressing an interest in the two types of trade.
As with tailored damages, high-valuing plaintiffs do not have an affirmative
incentive to express an interest in selling their entitlement, but they become
indifferent to making this implicit misrepresentation. And if there were any
cost to expressing an initial interest, 80% of plaintiffs would remain silent.
129. The plaintiff whose valuation is v. will accept that offer if and only if her net gain from the bribe
(v,-a) exceeds his expected payoff absent negotiation (v,/2).
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Both tailoring damages and tailoring liability give one of the bargainers
private information about the consequences of nonconsensual taking: When the
amount of damages is tailored, the plaintiff has private information about the
exercise price of defendant's call option. When the class of defendants who are
liable is tailored under a negligence standard, the defendant has private
information about who owns the entitlement. Bargainers with private
information have a strong incentive to extract an "informational rent" by
demanding more favorable terms. In this context, tailoring the consequences
of nonconsensual taking causes the parties to change their demands concerning
Coasean bribes not to take: Tailored damages rules give the high-valuing
plaintiffs additional information and therefore reduce their willingness to pay
a bribe (to $0 because the plaintiff would be made whole by any
nonconsensual taking); tailored liability rules give the $60 defendants
additional information and therefore increase the bribe that they demand,
because these defendants incur no liability if they take. In both cases, tailoring
amplifies the informational asymmetry and undermines plaintiffs' ability to
make efficient Coasean bribes. 3
Many commentators have suggested that, as a normative issue,
" liability rules are preferable only when transaction costs make
contracting prohibitively expensive; and,
" when invoked, liability rules should be tailored to replicate the
transactions that parties would have made.'
This Section has cast doubt on both of these assertions. We have shown that
liability rules can induce more Coasean agreements than property rules and
thus might be used even when transaction costs are not prohibitively high. But
we have also shown that tailoring legal rules to be contingent on private
information can exacerbate bargaining inefficiency. This Section thus not only
130. A rule that tailors both liability and damages---incorporating both a S50 negligence standard and
imposing liability in the amount of v.-produces the same equilibrnum outcome, Under this doubly tailored
scheme, the $60 defendant, as before, is never negligent and values his position at 60 The $40 defendant
is always negligent and expects to pay E(v,) = S50 if he takes noncooperatsely Thus. his reservation
utility is 0. Finally, the plaintiff's reservation value reflects an uncompensated taking half of the time and
no taking the other half of the time, thus giving v,/2. As discussed in the Appendix. esen though there are
a number of equilibrium strategy profiles under this legal rule, the only differences in strategy occur with
plaintiff types who are never destined to make a bargain; thus. the bargaining outcorne will be the same
for all these equilibria. See infra app. at pp. 1114-15.
131. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note I. at 107 (supporting first proposition). POSNER. supra
note 1, at 55-57, 62 n.5. Judge Posner also argues that transaction costs are much more likely to be large
with numerous parties. Id. at 55. The implication of thts position is that property nghts are more likely to
be socially optimal in the case of bilateral monopolies (as long as the bilateral monopolies themss.es do
not have a large number of parties involved). In this Article. we argue that this view oerlooks the
problems of information costs, which can cut the other way: When markets are "thin." information costs
are often an extremely pernicious form of transaction costs. In such situations, liability rules have
efficiency-enhancing qualities.
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expands the classes of cases where liability rules might be appropriate, but also
challenges the accepted notion that liability rules should be tailored to replicate
the transactions that the parties would otherwise make.
3 2
III. "FRACTIONAL" PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS AND
COASEAN IDENTITY CRISES
Up to this point, we have shown that dividing an entitlement by protecting
it with a liability rule may be more efficient because entitlement holders may
have an incentive to signal whether they value the entitlement more or less
than the damage amount. Varying the degree of protection, however, is not the
only theoretical axis for Solomonic division. This Part focuses on how specific
ownership structures can also facilitate Coasean bargaining through four
different types of fractional divisions along probabilistic, temporal, physical,
and activity-level dimensions. We argue that these fractional ownership
structures can also curb or even eliminate the strategic inefficiencies attributed
to bargaining under private information.
The intuition behind the efficiency of fractional property rights is similar
to the rationale for dividing ownership in a traditional partnership buy-sell
agreement. Partnerships (and close corporations) with two owners often have
dissolution provisions that force the instigating owner to name a firm value and
then let the other owner choose whether to buy (the other owner's share) or
sell (its own share of the firm). Because the party naming the value does not
know whether it is the seller or the buyer, it is less likely to misrepresent its
valuation. In fact, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbon, and Paul Klemperer have
shown that as long as the ownership shares of the firm are divided fairly
evenly, the buy-sell agreement can induce efficient dissolution.'33
132. This result is similar to the finding that contractual default rules that fail to replicate the
provisions that the parties would have made can induce the parties to reveal information and bargain more
efficiently. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 55, at 91.
133. See Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615 (1987).
This result depends, inter alia, on sufficient liquidity among the partners, so that all can choose whether
to buy if the named price is too low.
This kind of identity crisis is also present in one traditional method of dividing a dessert between two
children: One child cuts, and the other child chooses which piece to take. Because the cutting child knows
that the choosing child will pick the larger piece, the dominant cutting strategy is to divide the cake evenly.
See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WiTtiowr GIVING
IN 86-87 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991). Notice that in this cake-cutting example, however, the identity
crisis is used to ensure an equitable division and not an efficient allocation: Even if the one child values
the entire cake more than the other, this decision rule will lead to an even division of the cake.
(Allocational efficiency only results if the children have identical diminishing marginal utilities for cake).
Another common example of how the identity crisis ensures allocational efficiency arises in informal
gambling arrangements: Two friends who want to bet on a sporting event agree that one person will choose
the point spread, and the other person will then choose which side of the bet to take. Again, because the
person choosing the point spread does not know whether she is offering to buy or to sell, she has a strong
incentive to state her actual expectation.
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As discussed in Part II, academics have long recognized that private
valuations can significantly inhibit efficient trade as sellers "shade up" and
buyers "shade down" their private valuations.' This Part shows that, just
as in a buy-sell agreement, the mere existence of private information need not
always result in inefficient behavior, and the consequent loss of potential gains
to trade, when bargaining occurs in the shadow of "fractional" property rights.
In particular, we show that partial entitlements tend to mitigate the adverse
incentive for individuals to bargain deceptively, because the attendant
ownership structure creates ambiguity a priori about who ultimately will be the
buyer and the seller. 35 As a consequence of this ambiguity, the players are
uncertain about whether they should overstate or understate their valuations
during bargaining. The parties' respective "identity crisis"-not knowing
whether they will end up as buyers or sellers-can induce them to distort their
true valuations less than they would if one party owned an undivided, or fee
simple, property interest in the underlying asset. The identity crisis that these
partial property rights create, we argue, can result in substantial efficiency
gains, and even in "first best" outcomes.
A. Probabilistic Divisions
We first examine the effect of allocating property rights probabilistically.
A probabilistic property rule randomly awards one of the litigants an undivided
property right according to some publicly known probability distribution. Such
a situation might occur when there is underlying uncertainty about the court's
opinion in a case of first impression, or when a legal rule reflects contingent
134. See Kalyan Chatteijee & William Samuelson. Bargauning Under Incomplete In'ornarwn. 31
OPERATIONS REs. 835 (1983); Roger Myerson & Mark Saiterthwaite. Efficilent A htanstnts for Bilateral
Trading, 29 J. ECON. THiEORY 265 (1983).
135. The results in this Section are presaged by the seminal work of Johnston. supra note 29. see
Cramton et al.. supra note 133; see also Talley. supra note 43 (applying vanation of this notion csplhcit,
to renegotiation of liquidated damages clauses). Johnston's work on this topic uses a model of one-sided
incomplete information (with the plaintiff), and a two-penod skimming model that is dened from Drew
Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Inforatoan. 50 Rv Ec % Sit t 221
(1983). Johnston compares three types of property rules: one in which the propert) rule is clcarl) assigned
ex ante; another in which the property right assignment depends on a judicial balancing test ex post, and
a final one in which the judicial balancing test is "imprecise" (in a rather precise way). He linds that the
last entitlement system is the only one (under certain conditions) that supports equilibna entailing efficient
Coasean transactions (e.g., the defendant "buys" the entitlement only when it is efficient for him to do so)
See Johnston, supra note 29.
Johnston clearly identifies the "countervailing incentives*" effect that di'. ided entitlements might hasc.
which produces the possibility that either party can be a buyer or a seller. Id. at 6-7 Yet while his model
partially illustrates this fundamental insight, it allows only for "buy offers" from the defendant, the rules
of his game do not allow offers to sell. Our model diverges from his in allowing either party to "'purchase"
the other party's share of the underlying legal asset.
Our model also differs from Johnston's approach in one other major way While he concentrates on
the beneficial role of "ex post balancing" as a source of efficiency enhancing, we broaden the application
of this analysis to include legal entitlements that are "partial" in nature, but that need not be reduced to "c-
post balancing." In fact, the rules we analyze here are completely clear from the e.t ante stage
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"standards" rather than rules.136 Litigation, as is well recognized, can also
involve significant uncertainty about court outcomes.137 We show in this
Section that such probabilistic entitlements can create a "countervailing effect"
upon bargainers' respective incentives to lie: The bargainers still would like
to shade their representations of value, 3 ' but uncertain ownership dampens
the degree of misrepresentation that occurs.
139
As in the canonical example given earlier, we suppose that both parties'
private valuations (v, and vA) vary between $0 and $100 with uniform
probability density. Absent a negotiated agreement, the court randomly awards
undivided ownership of the entitlement; this assignment is injunctive in nature.
For simplicity, suppose the court flips the analogue of a "loaded coin"'40 to
determine ownership: The plaintiff receives the entitlement with probability q,
and the defendant receives the entitlement with probability (I-q), where q is
some number between 0 and 1.'4' Note that when q = 0, it is common
knowledge that the court will award the defendant an undivided interest in the
entitlement, and when q = 1, the plaintiff has clear ownership. This loaded
coin analogy has a natural legal interpretation: Increasingly large values of q
correspond to greater degrees of "pro-plaintiff' bias among the courts
determining property entitlements42
Before moving on, it is important to note that the probability distribution
that the court uses is common knowledge to both parties. The negligence
136. Johnston explicitly discusses the differences in bargaining behavior under rules versus standards.
Johnston, supra note 29, at 9-28. For a description of his results in relation to ours, see supra note 135.
137. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note I, at 490-91.
138. With liability rules, the parties knew which way to shade, but the existence of the liability call
option created a ceiling to the plaintiff's overstatement of her valuation of the entitlement and a floor to
the plaintiff's understatement of her valuation of the call option.
139. See Brown & Ayres, supra note 15, at 347 (showing that commitment to break off bargaining
creates countervailing incentive in "solicit offer" mediation game); Johnston, supra note 29, at 8; see also
Merges, supra note 39, at 25-28 (arguing that probabilistic use of "reverse doctrine of equivalents" in
patent law can induce settlement).
140. The exact nature of the coin's bias-i.e., that we get "heads" with probability q and "tails" with
probability (l-q)---must be common knowledge.
141. Jon Elster has similarly suggested that courts might use a coin toss to resolve child custody
disputes between divorcing parents who are both found to be fit. ELSTER, supra note 6, at 163. In contrast
to our theory, Elster's proposal of probabilistic custody awards is not made to promote bargaining, but
because the divorcing couple cannot reach consensual agreement, and because the court cannot rationally
divine which parent would better serve the interests of the children. Id. at 134-50. Indeed, Elster argues
that even when an optimal procedure for awarding custody exists, divorcing couples are unlikely to agree
to use it:
[The optimal procedure] could be derived on the basis of (a) the threat point, (b) the utilities
associated with the pure outcomes and (c) the particular solution concept adopted. Each of
these, however, would lend itself to strategic or nonstrategic posturing or misrepresentation....
[The parties] might exaggerate the extent to which they would suffer if their preferred outcome
were not chosen.
Id. at 169. Elster does not explore, however, the possibility that probabilistic court determination might
induce more consensual resolution prior to trial.
142. Also, note that we can think of q as a long-run frequency that the parties view as a probability.
Thus, q might simply refer to a lack of uniformity among jurisdictions, or, more appropriately, among
judges within one jurisdiction. In general, then, this type of probabilistic entitlement gives the plaintiff an
"inside" option of qv, and the defendant an exit option of (I-q)v,.
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standard also created uncertainty about who owned the legal entitlement, but
under a tailored liability rule, the defendant had private information about
whether its taking would give rise to any liability. Here, by contrast, the
court's probabilistic division of the underlying asset is publicly known."'
Given this probabilistic legal "shadow," we can stylize a bargaining game
that will illustrate how probabilistic entitlements can induce more truthful
representations. The bargaining game is a type of "double auction" that is
fairly familiar in the bargaining literature.' " It begins with each party
simultaneously submitting a "report" of her valuation (which need not be
truthful 45), which the court will use-along with the report of the other
party-to determine (1) who ultimately receives absolute ownership, and (2)
the price of purchasing the other party's probabilistic share in the underlying
asset. Each of the parties' reports thus represents an offer to be bound by
certain terms of trade if the other side submits a mirror-image offer: Each of
the offerors agrees to sell all claims to the entitlement if her reported valuation
is lower, and she agrees to buy if her reported offer is higher.4 6 Crucial to
this analysis is that when the parties submit their bids, each is uncertain about
whether her report will ultimately represent an offer to buy or to sell.'4 7 The
party submitting the highest bid becomes the "buyer" of the entitlement and
receives the entitlement in full, but in return she must pay the "seller" a
purchase price for the entitlement. We assume that the price is calculated by
"splitting the difference" between the two reports (i.e., averaging them), and
then discounting that amount by the seller's initial probabilistic share in the
143. This conclusion is consistent with Johnston's finding that "'ex post balancing" becomes more
efficient when judicial error is introduced. See Johnston. supra note 29. at 8.
Our assumption that the bargainers' assessment of adjudication is the same also diverges from many
litigation models that predict settlement unless the litigants are overly optimistic about their prospects in
court. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note I, at 436; John P. Gould, 77 Economics of Legal Conlicts. 2 J
LEGAL STUD. 279, 285-88 (1973). In those models, the likelihood of agreement turns only on the degree
of agreement about the plaintiff's prospect of winning at trial. not on the agreed probability level Thus.
in a world where the parties have private assessments about the likely amount of damages, the optimism
model predicts that if the parties agree on the probability of a plaintiff trial sictor), the likelihood of
settlement should not depend on whether this agreed probability is 50% or 100% Allowing the parties to
negotiate before a taking, however, changes this result. This Section shows that a 50% probability might
increase the likelihood of a consensual resolution, compared to non-probabilistic allocation
144. See Chattedee & Samuelson, supra note 134. at 837-38; Kennan & Wilson. supra note 47. at
88.
145. This procedure is closely related to examples of "bargaining mechanisms" anal) zed elsewhere
See, e.g., Myerson & Satterthwaite, supra note 134: Talley, supra note 43; Kathryn Spier. Optimal
Mechanisms for Pretrial Bargaining (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
146. The use of an analogous simultaneous-offers mechanism can be found in Brown & Ayres. supra
note 15. While the exchange of these simultaneous incomplete offers restricts the paries to a highly stylized
form of bargaining, the beneficial countervailing effect of obscunng the buyer's and seller's identities
carries over to other bargaining games. For example, Cramton. Gibbons. and Klemperer note that the
efficiency results of our stylized game carry over to more generalized rules, such as not "splitting the
difference" between the parties' bids, but rather using a weighted average with weight k between 0 and I
(often called a "k + I price auction"). Cramton et al.. supra note 133. at 624-25
147. Note that this uncertainty is not always present, such as when q = 0 or I. or when v, or ', is on
an extreme. The presence of this uncertainty for at least some player types. however. is what generates our
identity crisis result.
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property right. Thus, assume for example that q = 1/2 (thus giving each party
an equal chance at winning in court), and that the plaintiff submits a report of
$50 while the defendant bids $30; the above rules mandate that the plaintiff
shall receive an undivided ownership interest, but that she must compensate the
defendant with $20 in return.148
Calculating the equilibrium strategies of this game is somewhat technical,
and we therefore relegate it to the Appendix.149 The core result is that the
plaintiff will buy the defendant's probabilistic claim to the entitlement if and
only if:
v vA + 25 - 50q.
In all other cases, the defendant will buy the plaintiff's probabilistic claim.
From the above expression, it is possible to "describe" the extent of
inefficiency for any probabilistic division (i.e., any value of q). First, notice
that when the plaintiff has no chance of winning in court (q = 0), she will
"purchase" the entitlement from the defendant only when v,, exceeds v. by 25.
Symmetrically, when q = 1-corresponding to absolute plaintiff bias-the
defendant will purchase only when v. exceeds v. by $25."' In both cases,
this $25 bid-ask spread prevents plaintiffs and defendants from consummating
transactions that could improve social efficiency. The total social surplus in
this case is equal to $64.06. When the plaintiff and the defendant each have
a 50% chance of winning in court (q = 1/2), however, the plaintiff purchases
the defendant's probabilistic claim if and only if the plaintiff has a high
valuation (v,, > vA); this is precisely the condition for efficiency-i.e., that the
party valuing the legal entitlement the most should possess it. As Figure 7
illustrates, the probabilistic division of q = 1/2 maximizes expected social
welfare, which in this case is equal to its first-best level of $66.67.'
148. This $20 amount is simply the average of the bids ($40) multiplied by the probability of the
defendant prevailing in court (or 1/2).
149. See infra app. at pp. 1116-17. The equilibrium derived in the Appendix is the unique symmetric
and monotone equilibrium. By "symmetric," we mean the equilibria that entail identical strategies for the
two same-type players when they are in similar positions. For instance, a symmetric equilibrium mandates
that a plaintiff with valuation of $25 when q = 1/4 should have the same strategy as a defendant with
valuation of $25 when q = 3/4. By monotone, we mean that the equilibrium strategies imply that both
players' reports should increase (weakly) as their private valuations increase. There are a number of
asymmetric and nonmonotonic equilibria of this game, but the intuitive appeal of the symmetric equilibrium
leads us to believe that it is the most plausible. See Chattejee & Samuelson, supra note 134, at 849-50.
150. This result is well recognized in Brown & Ayres, supra note 15, at 342; Chatterjee & Samuelson.
supra note 134, at 839-42.
151. The equations from which these figures are calculated are provided infra app. at pp. 1116-17.
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FIGuRE 7. Effect of Varying the Plaintiff's Fractional
Entitlement on Expected Joint Payoffs
The identity-crisis intuition for the efficiency effect of probabilistic
divisions is different from the information-forcing intuition for liability rules
discussed in Part II. Under a liability rule regime, even though there are two
types of Coasean bargains, each plaintiff is interested in only one of the two
types. We showed in Part II that plaintiffs credibly signal whether their
valuation is above or below the damage amount by expressing an interest in
one of the two types of trade. The willingness of plaintiffs to so signal
enhances efficiency by (1) eliminating some of the private information, and (2)
bounding the range of offers and bids that the defendant can propose, thereby
decreasing the defendant's "room to lie" (even though he still has the incentive
to lie). In contrast, probabilistic entitlements, along with other forms of
fractional entitlements, do not necessarily induce either party to "self-select"
into discrete groups, nor does such an entitlement system constrain either
party's "room" to exaggerate her valuation. Rather, the identity
crisis-uncertainty about whether a bargainer will ultimately become a buyer
or a seller-reduces both parties' incentives to lie.' 52
152. This assertion does not imply that the parties do not distort their valuations at all Indeed. whcn
q = 1/2, low-valuing parties will perceive themselves as hkelN sellers and thus %%ill slightl) oserstate their
private valuations. Conversely. high-valuing parties will pereiee thcmselves as likely sellers and ill
slightly understate their valuations.
For instance, consider the optimal report of the plaintiff n in this game
, '(v) ,v
When q = 1/2, it is easy to confirm that v, < r,'(v,) whenexer v, < 50. and ,, > r,'(,) shtleneser V, > 50
When v. = 50, the plaintiff tells the truth. Even with some lying, first-best efficiency is possible Sete
Cramton et al.. supra note 133, at 624.
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Although probabilistic entitlements have a strong efficiency advantage,
they bring a number of significant procedural and philosophical disadvantages.
While we discuss most of these at length later, one disadvantage stands out in
particular. Sustaining a probabilistic property rights system forces the courts
to eschew rulelike decision making so as to preserve the random outcomes that
induce Coasean efficiency. As many have noted, however, legal standards
often evolve inexorably toward rules. 53 Indeed, the legal system's use of
analogy and precedent is inconsistent with a decision-making process that
ultimately resembles a flip of a coin. On the other hand, the committing of
legal decision making to juries operating under vague instructions, or even
unarticulated demands for equity, might be seen as an existing mechanism that
resists the pull toward predictability.
B. Activity-Level Divisions
54
Thus far, we have assumed for simplicity that the defendant's act of taking
is binary, or "all-or-nothing," in nature. Either the defendant breaches, or he
does not; either the factory pollutes, or it does not; either the product infringes,
or it does not. In many real-world applications, however, the defendant may
be able to appropriate only a portion of the plaintiff's enjoyment of the
underlying legal asset.
Examples of such "activity-level" rules abound. In a tort context, for
example, a factory that wishes to dump one ton of waste into a river may be
endowed with a property right to dump up to one-half a ton. This reduced
activity level may rule out certain uses of the river by the surrounding
community, such as drinking, but it may not be so damaging as to rule out
other uses, such as fishing or lawn watering. Thus, the factory dumping
hampers, but does not destroy, the community's enjoyment of the river. In a
criminal law environment, speed limits endow drivers with a property right to
drive up to sixty-five miles per hour on the highway, but those who drive too
fast above the limit may be subject to punitive fines that serve injunctive
purposes.155
These activity-level limitations that give another user the right to enjoin
represent another manifestation of divided entitlements. In the pollution
example, the factory owns a property interest in the first one-half ton of
153. E.g., Johnston, supra note 29; Louis Kaplow, Rules vs. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 578-79 (1992). But see Rose, supra note 27, at 580-90 (illustrating how several laws of
property oscillate back and forth between rules and standards).
154. This Section is inspired by Mitchell Polinsky's early insights into Coasean negotiations. See, e.g..
Polinsky, supra note 19; Polinsky, supra note 116.
155. While not all states impose punitive sanctions on speeders, coauthor Talley's empirical
observations while driving between California and New Mexico indicate that this phenomenon is prevalent
in Arizona. Note, however, that for ordinary speeding fines, the entitlement system is more like the liability
rule system analyzed above.
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pollution rights, and the residents own the right to enjoin all pollution beyond
this amount. This entitlement division once again gives rise to two different
types of bargains: The factory may purchase the right to increase the amount
of pollution, or the residents may bribe the factory to produce less.'
It turns out that we can analyze activity-level limitations by using the
previous Section's model of probabilistic assignments. To adopt the tort
example as an illustrative device, consider a factory that needs to dispose of
one ton of industrial waste. Suppose that the factory would pay up to Sv, to
be able to dump its ton of waste into a local river, 7 and that this valuation
is privately known, distributed uniformly between $0 and $100. Suppose a
downstream landowner values the unpolluted river at $v , again privately
known and identically distributed.'58 For simplicity, we assume that payoffs
to the factory and downstream landowner will be proportional to the
percentage of a ton that is released-e.g., if the factory were to dump one-
fourth of a ton into the river, the factory's payoff would be $v,/4 and the
landowner's payoff would be $3v4.59
An undivided property entitlement would endow either the factory or the
landowner with unperturbed use of the stream. Under a limited activity-level
rule, however, courts might only allow the factory to dump some fraction of
the ton of its waste material into the river free of charge and unimpeded by the
downstream landowner; beyond that fraction, the landowner is protected by
injunctive relief. This limited activity-level rule would allow the factory to
bargain for the right to pollute more or allow the downstream landowner to
bargain to restrict the factory's right to pollute.
Under these assumptions, activity-level limitations are isomorphic to the
probabilistic allocations described above. If we interpret q as the fraction of the
ton that the community can enjoin absent a negotiated outcome (rather than a
probability), then a double auction procedure will produce the same
156. The speed limit example is less clearly a divided entitlement because (except in Chicago) it is
difficult to negotiate with representatives of the state for the right to drive faster.
157. One might interpret vA in this case to represent the amount that the factory knows it would have
to pay to dispose of the waste outside the locality.
158. We assume that pollution affects only a single downstream landowner or that the residents of the
downstream community have devised a procedural mechanism to overcome free-nder problems. Recall from
the Introduction that the division of entitlements among parties is not the focus of this Article- Rather. we
are concerned with the division of entitlements bemeen parties. A number of economists. however. have
proposed "pivot mechanisms" that allow for efficient decisions regarding public-good provision. See. e.g..
DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 704-14 (1991).
159. Implicit in these figures is the assumption of a constant marginal effect of pollution on both
parties' payoffs. Hence, for each infinitesimal amount of pollution in the lake. dq. the factory benefits by
v ,dq and the community is injured by vdq. In this formulation, the optimal level of pollution is 0 if
v, < v, I if v, > v, and indeterminate if vs = v,. This example is limited in its generality, since it implies
that the optimal outcome is generically binary. In fact. such a constant-returns utility structure is not often
likely to hold in practice. We conjecture that it is possible to use a slightly different model in which the
first-best level of pollution is somewhere on the interior. and that such a model would have the same
properties as that discussed in the text.
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equilibrium strategies.' 60 As before, if either party held an undivided interest
in the control of the stream, there would be a $25 bid-ask spread between the
buyer and the seller of the right, a spread that would confound efficient
Coasean exchanges. Consequently, the best that the legal system can do in this
bargaining scheme is to endow the factory with a property right to dump up
to one-half ton of waste into the river, and to allow the community to enjoin
the dumping of any more than that half ton.
The above example of an activity-level division underscores our assertion
that the "identity crisis" phenomenon studied above can occur in non-
probabilistic contexts. Indeed, it is possible for an activity-level division to
crystalize into a rulelike form through time without adversely affecting the
"identity crisis" phenomenon that promotes Coasean efficiency. At least for
legal rights that can be taken in part, a system of partial property rights is
feasible and exists in various legal contexts.
C. Temporal and Physical Divisions
Some entitlements can also be divided temporally or physically. In
property and contract law, for example, title to land or a piece of capital
equipment is often divided into a term of years held by one party and a
remainder interest held by another.' 6' Another example is the relationship
between an original patentee and an inventor of a "new use" for the patentee's
invention, in which the original patentee has monopoly rights over her original
invention until expiration, upon which the new use entrant can pursue the
distribution, use, and sale of her innovative addition unimpeded.' 62 Physical
partitions of complementary parcels of land are even more easily accomplished
and any joint tenant or tenant in common has a legal right to seek such a
partition.
The model used above to examine probabilistic and activity-level divisions
maps directly into this situation as well, with only minor alterations. We
illustrate this possibility with an example of temporally divided claims to a
piece of property. Suppose that the parties' respective entitlement valuations
(denoted before as v. and vA) represent their payoffs per period (rather than
their aggregate payoff), and that these valuations are distributed uniformly and
160. Given q (which we note must be between 0 and 1), the community's reservation payoff is equal
to q times its private valuation, and the factory's payoff equals (I-q) times its private valuation. Since these
reservation payoffs are identical to those corresponding to a q-probability assignment of the entitlement to
the plaintiff (and a probability assignment of (l-q) to the defendant), the equilibrium strategies must be the
same as in the previous Section.
161. Consider, for instance, a fee simple determinable held by A until B reaches her 25th birthday,
with the remainder to B.
162. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 39, at 5-10 (describing how patent entitlements are divided between
original "pioneer" and subsequent "improver" of invention); infra part iV.C.I. Note that in the pre-
expiration period, the original patentee cannot extend the use of the invention to the entrant's new use if
the entrant has patent protection over such a use.
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independently between $0 and $10 (rather than between SO and $100 as
before). Absent bargaining, the plaintiff has title to the asset for a certain
period of time (call this number t), with the remainder going to the defendant
in perpetuity. 63 At an illustrative discount rate of 10%, it is straightforward
to show that in present value, each party's privately known payoff from
permanent ownership lies uniformly between $0 and $100, just as in our
previous example. 64
The length of the plaintiff's claim to the asset determines, in a sense, what
proportion of the asset the plaintiff owns. For example, because of discounting,
either the plaintiff or the defendant should be indifferent between receiving a
claim to the first 6.93 years or receiving a claim to all subsequent years (in
perpetuity). 65  Thus, this temporal division effectively divides the asset
between them equally and is analogous to the optimal division of setting q =
1/2 in the probabilistic entitlement model. By varying the term of years from
zero to infinity, the entitlement may be partitioned in the same way that
probabilistic and activity limitations allowed the entitlement proportions to
vary. If the plaintiff and the defendant have different per period valuations,
then it will be efficient for the higher valuer to buy the other side's claim to
the asset. As in the earlier examples, it turns out that with a 6.93-year
partition, the bargaining game outlined in the probabilistic entitlement section
will again produce first-best efficiency.
This Part has illustrated numerous ways for efficiency-minded lawmakers
to divide an entitlement "fractionally": Probabilistic, activity-level, physical,
163. The order or exact partitioning of the terms of ownership are not particularly relc ant so long as
they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive through time. and so long as the parties' enjo)ment is not
rivalrous through time. For instance, it would be unwise to award a lumber company a term-of-years
property interest over an old-growth forest, with the remainder to the spotted owl. The lumber company's
initial exploitation of the natural resources would have a profound effect on the enjoyment that the spotted
owl might receive after the term expires.
164. The present discounted value of permanent ownership for a party with valuation s2 is equal to
PDV,(v,.r) f ve "dt
,.0
where rdenotes the interest rate. Substituting r= 1/10 into the above expression and integrating, the above
expression becomes:
PDV,(v,,r) = fsve"'1 dr = lO1v.
'-0
Since v, is assumed to be between SO and $10 with equal probability, the party's present value of permanent
ownership must lie between SO and SOO, again with equal probability.
165. Consider a division set at t*years. The entitlement holder will value her term-of-years entitlement
at exactly half of a fee simple entitlement when and only when-
fs e ' nid t = 1fv, eiodg
0 0
which occurs at t" = (10)ln(2) = 6.93.
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and temporal divisions can create an identity crisis that enhances bargaining
efficiency. While liability rules channel high- and low-valuing plaintiffs to
different types of Coasean bargains, and thereby constrain their "room" to lie,
fractional property rights make it difficult for the parties to choose between the
different types of Coasean trade, and thereby constrain their incentives to lie.
The next Part draws out the implications of these results and also points to
limiting principles.
IV. CHOOSING AMONG ENTITLEMENT FORMS
The previous two Parts have illustrated that divided entitlements can
enhance welfare by promoting greater revelation of information during
bargaining. The ability of liability rules to induce self-selection among
entitlement holders and the ability of fractional property rights to create a
valuable countervailing incentive for both parties can promote more efficient
trade than undivided property protection. Nevertheless, these illustrations alone
are of limited guidance to legal policymakers who not only must decide which
type of entitlement structure to implement, but also must consider the panoply
of other factors that a stylized model inevitably fails to consider. Below, we
respond to this shortcoming by adding some relational "flesh" to our
theoretical observations.
This Part begins by analyzing the choice between divided and undivided
entitlement allocations. In particular, we identify four factors that militate
against the efficiency of divided entitlements and suggest that the presence of
any one of these factors might undermine the efficiency of divided entitlements
in promoting pre-taking trade. Then, assuming that the conditions are ripe for
entitlement division, this Part proceeds to examine which type of division is
most likely to promote efficient trade.
Before proceeding, however, we remind the reader of an important caveat:
Our analysis is restricted to how "efficiency-minded" lawmakers might pursue
the narrow goal of maximizing gains from trade. Lawmakers might respond to
a myriad of other legitimate policy goals that we do not address explicitly in
this Part. 16 6 Nevertheless, while there is often a conflict between efficiency
and equity, 167 divided entitlements can actually further both goals. In addition
to enhancing efficiency, Solomonic entitlements also tend to equalize, at least
among the bargainers, the distribution of wealth (in comparison with undivided
entitlements allocated to individuals).
166. For instance, we have assumed throughout that underlying legal rights are "commodifiable" and
"commensurable." See supra note 37. If they are not, the notion of efficient trade tends to lose its meaning.
167. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Essay: The Efficiency and the Efficacy of 7itle VII, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 513, 515-16 (1987) (dismissing argument that Title ViI is efficient and pointing to its equity
objectives).
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A. Divided vs. Undivided Entitlements: Four Factors Militating
Against the Use of Entitlement Division
While the earlier analysis illustrates how divided entitlements might
facilitate Coasean trade, we do not conclude that efficiency-minded lawmakers
should uniformly reject the "undivided" species of property rules approximated
by "fee simple" ownership and forms of strong legal protection. While
promoting Coasean trade can be determinative in the choice of entitlement
form, this Section identifies other aspects of efficiency that Solomonic
allocations might impair. As an initial matter, the structural impediments to
pre-taking negotiations might be so great that the facilitating effects of liability
rules or partial property rules are not sufficient to induce any bargaining. For
example, the class of potential automobile tortfeasors is so large and
amorphous that it would be impractical to imagine any sort of legal reform
inducing pre-taking negotiation. Thus, dividing entitlements to facilitate
Coasean trade will only be appropriate when the transactional barriers to trade
can at least be surmounted.' 68
Yet even when this condition is satisfied, so that divided entitlements
could potentially mitigate the inefficiencies of bargainers' private valuations,
other factors might still make undivided entitlements more efficient. In
particular, this Section explores how a Solomonic entitlement can itself
exacerbate these alternative forms of transaction costs. We also show how
variations on the information structure underlying bargaining and tailored
divisions can undermine the incentives that Solomonic bargainers might
otherwise have to reveal information. Explicitly, we consider three such
exceptions:
(1) Soloinonic entitlements can induce underinvestment. Divided
entitlements can undermine the incentives of any individual to
develop an entitlement. For example, under a liability rule regime,
the nominal owner might have an inefficiently weak incentive to
make asset-specific investments, if she is only likely to recoup a
proportion of the benefits in later bargaining.'
(2) Solomonic entitlements can exacerbate the hold-up problem. If
lawmakers misidentify those parties who might have the highest
168. Even if it is inadvisable to use divided entitlements to promote trade. %%e might still have
independent reasons for using them. Insurmountable transaction costs also undermine one of the primary
rationales for property rules (i.e.. the contractual channeling of goods to the highest-%aluing owner) Thus.
one of the central insights of Calabresi and Mclamed is that when such transaction costs are prohibitively
high, liability rules or activity-level limitations might be appropriate. Calabresi & Melamed. supra note 12
169. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration. Appropnable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 307-24 (1978) (discussing lack of mccntie to invest in firm-
specific assets when contracting, instead of vertical integration, is employed to secure such assets)
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valuations-by (a) allocating Solomonic claims to people who are
commonly known to have low valuations, or (b) failing to allocate
claims to people who are commonly known to have potentially the
highest valuations-then this entitlement division can induce
collective-action inefficiency."0  The holdout problem of
multiple parties selling parcels to a single large user, discussed
above, is a classic example of this inefficiency.1
7
'
(3) Solomonic entitlements can impede competition. When a potential
seller owns an undivided interest in an entitlement, competition
among several potential buyers can mitigate the strategic
inefficiencies created by the seller's and buyers' private
information. Dividing Solomonic claims among the potential
buyers can impede this competitive effect. For example, we will
show that if each buyer has an option to take the entitlement, a
high-valuing seller may be unwilling to bribe all of the potential
buyers not to take. Accordingly, divided entitlements are most
likely to facilitate trade when the two Solomonic claim holders are
bargaining to capture gains of trade that are idiosyncratic to their
relationship. 72 Idiosyncratic gains from trade are often present,
for example, when people try to renegotiate a contractual
obligation 73 or when merchants have made relation-specific
investments.' 74 More prosaically, Solomonic entitlements might
facilitate capturing these "idiosyncratic gains of trade" whenever
it is clear that two people are the most efficient trading partners,
but it is not clear whether gains from trade exist.
71
1. The Underinvestment Trade-Off
This Article has shown that dividing an entitlement between two
bargainers can mitigate the inefficiency caused by the bargainers' private
170. For instance, the FCC traditionally utilized random lotteries-a form of divided entitlement-to
allocate rights to new bandwidths in the broadcast spectrum. Because FCC regulations allowed all
applicants to enter the lottery, the FCC was bombarded with hundreds of thousands of applications, many
from parties that intended only to speculate in the market. The FCC's inability to discriminate between
speculators and bona fide prospective owners forced it to spread the ownership shares so thinly that
Coasean bargaining was virtually impossible. The FCC has now adopted an auction system to allocate these
rights. See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1994, at 145.
171. See supra note I and accompanying text.
172. In economics terminology, the two negotiators have a "bilateral monopoly" over the creation of
these potential gains from trade. POSNER, supra note I, at 55-58.
173. When covering is unavailable, the buyer and seller often can enhance gains of trade by
renegotiating an original contract's terms of performance.
174. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 41, at 54-56.
175. For example, it might be clear that only one of two neighboring landowners is the most valuable
owner on a particular easement, but it might not be clear who has the higher valuation.
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valuations. The contractual inefficiency caused by such private information is
often called "adverse selection."' 7 6 Although adverse selection represents an
important cause of inefficiency in bargaining, it is not the only cause. Indeed,
contracts often cannot specify types of behavior that increase the expected
gains from trade. If courts are unable to observe certain types of hidden
behavior, a contractual provision will not be able to mandate efficient
performance. In economic terms, these aspects of performance that contract
law cannot regulate are often termed "'non-contractible,"'" and the failure to
regulate these aspects gives rise to "moral hazard."' 78 Moral hazard-i.e., the
inability to control individual behavior contractually-can lead to dramatic
departures from efficiency.
79
Attempts to remedy adverse selection often exacerbate moral hazard.' "
This Article's findings provide no exception. In particular, Solomonic
entitlements may give bargainers suboptimal prebargaining incentives to make
value-enhancing investments. For example, the nominal owner of land is less
likely to make efficient improvements on her land if her ownership is protected
by an untailored liability rule or a fractional property rule. Divided claims to
a single resource can thus lead to a tragedy of the commons, as the multiple
claimants engage in the moral hazard of overuse, in not accounting for the
effect of their use on other claimants."' Even though it would be in the
parties' joint interest to develop the asset efficiently, in many contexts the
parties do not have a realistic opportunity to bargain before important
investment decisions are made, and individual investors cannot be confident
that they will receive adequate compensation in subsequent bargaining for prior
(marginal) investments.8 2 Thus, policymakers often face a trade-off in
choosing legal rules to constrain the twin evils. This fundamental tension
between adverse selection and moral hazard limits the applicability of
Solomonic entitlements, because in many contexts Solomonic entitlements will
176. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND M'IA% X.WNi 1491 1992
Adverse selection is often referred to as the problem of "hidden type" or "hidden preference- " See Bros n
& Ayres, supra note 15, at 327-28. The term was inspired by the disproportionate tendcnci> for ,ick
persons to obtain insurance. Id. at 328 n.14.
177. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 74. at 741
178. The term "moral hazard" originated in the insurance context from the tendency of insurcd people
to take more risk. See Brown & Ayres, supra note 15. at 328 n 14
179. Id. at 328.
180. See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller. Settlement Escrosss 14-33 (Chicago Las &
Economics Working Paper No. 25 (2d Series)) (The University of Chicago las School. 1994) (arguing
that settlement escrow may mitigate adverse selection inefficiency but exacerbate moral hazard in claiming
activity).
181. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note I, at 63-66; Garrett Hardin. The Trageds of the Common. 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
182. Tailored liability rules have similar drawbacks. Interestingly, hosseser. their shonicomings stem
from inefficient overinvestmen rather than undennvestment. Under tailored liability rules , for instance, the
plaintiff is always insured against a taking by the defendant. As such. the plaintiff may hasc an exccstvc
incentive to make reliance expenditures. See. e.g.. Steven Shavell. Damage Me.Ie sures for Breach of
Contract, II BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980).
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produce moral hazard inefficiencies that dwarf any reduction in adverse-
selection inefficiency. Allocating an undivided property right to the resource
is often the optimal solution.
183
Nevertheless, the potential for moral-hazard inefficiency is not ubiquitous
in equally virulent forms. Divided entitlements are less likely to be efficient
when moral-hazard inefficiency is a primary concern, but may still be
appropriate when adverse selection is the primary impediment to efficiency.
Moreover, to the extent that Solomonic allocations encourage the migration of
assets to the highest-valuing user, these allocations can enhance the investment
decisions that take place after Coasean trade. By producing less efficient
bargaining, undivided property rules can lead to less efficient postbargaining
investments, because if bargaining fails to transfer an asset to the highest
valuer, the lower-valuing owner is likely to have a suboptimal incentive to
develop the asset after the negotiation. Accordingly, the tension between moral
hazard and adverse selection in this context represents a tension between
inducing efficient precontractual and postcontractual investment choices.'
2. The Hold-Up Problem
Lawmakers attempting to implement a Solomonic regime also face a
serious "identification" problem. Solomonic negotiations can help a defined set
of participating bargainers discover who among them has the highest valuation,
but lawmakers may have difficulty determining who the appropriate
participants are in this negotiation. This identification problem can give rise to
problems of both over- and underinclusiveness. Overinclusiveness arises when
Solomonic claims are given to individuals who clearly are not the highest
valuers; this can exacerbate bargaining inefficiency, because these claimants
have a strong incentive to hold up the negotiations of the serious contenders.
When a partial entitlement is given to a person who is not the efficient owner,
she will only be a seller, and her traditional incentive to seek an inflated price
can impede negotiation among the class of potential ultimate owners. This
hold-up problem is exemplified by the difficulty of consensually purchasing
a group of adjoining properties to build a stadium or other public projects. An
analogous problem of underinclusion results when potentially efficient owners
183. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 711, 720-21 (1986). To take the fact pattern from Spur v. Del Webb as an
illustration, it is conceivable to think that the feedlot owner, knowing that its entitlement was subject to a
liability option of the growing retirement village, failed to make certain land improvements that would have
increased the profitability of the land. Interestingly, however, the investment decision may go the other way
if the landowner was protected by a tailored liability right awarding him "expectation-like" damages. In
such a case, it is well documented that parties have the incentive to incur too many reliance expenditures.
See Shavell, supra note 182, at 472. These forgone profits, incurred until the point at which Del Webb is
clearly identified as the competing user, represent a bona fide and significant economic cost.
184. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 176, at 143-47 (describing adverse selection and moral
hazard).
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are not given Solomonic claims. These excluded bargainers have the traditional
incentives to understate their offers. Thus, inartful (over- or underinclusive)
conferral of divided entitlements to people who are clearly inefficient owners
induces costly transactions as those with low valuations are forced to sell their
claims. The potential Coasean benefits of divided entitlements only occur if the
partial owners have something real to negotiate about-i.e., if there is
uncertainty about who should be the ultimate owner.'85
Restricting the class of partial owners to the set of potentially highest
valuers will be impossible in some contexts. Nevertheless, lawmakers or
private parties themselves may be able to identify parties who ultimately may
become the highest valuers. For example, the partial ownership interests of
partners often coincide with the class of persons who, because of their
idiosyncratic knowledge of the business, are most likely to be the highest
valuers of the firm. It is instructive that the partners often choose to adopt buy-
sell agreements that are strikingly analogous to the bidding mechanism outlined
above in our fractional property rights model. I"
Moreover, even if a divided entitlement scheme "misses" the highest
valuer when casting its endowment net, this errant assignment may not,
compared to undivided entitlement schemes, create onerous efficiency losses.
First, even if the partial property claimants do not include the highest valuer,
the Solomonic negotiation will at least facilitate allocating the entitlement to
the highest valuer in the Solomonic group. Under an undivided scheme, an
errant assignment would frequently entail greater inefficiencies. Second, some
contexts naturally suggest a well-defined set of potential owners that may help
lawmakers mitigate the problems of over- and underinclusion. A limited set of
adjoining landowners, for example, might sufficiently define the set of
potentially highest valuers with regard to local omissions or easements for a
view.1
87
185. When this uncertainty is not present. lawmakers could do at least as wecll by simply allocating
the property to the higher valuer. See. e.g.. Polinsky. supra note 116. at Il 11-12
186. See supra part IIl.
187. At least in some circumstances, allocating partial ownership to a part) ho is commonly known
to have a low valuation, and who would thus be a sellcr. can still facilitate Coasean trade For example,
consider a house owned by "Low" but subject to an untailored liability rule so that A has an option to buy
nonconsensually for S100,000. This liability rule division might facilitate A's negotiations with another
potential purchaser, B, because the liability rule allows A to signal credibly a high cost. thereby reducing
the amount of Coasean inefficiency from this third-party transaction
On the other hand, various scholars have explored the proposition that such liability amounts, when
high, represent a mechanism for exacting anticompetitive monopoly rents from B. the third party See. e g.
Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton. Contracts as a Barier to Entrs. 77 Am ECo% Rhv 388 (1987)
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3. The Disabling Effects of Correlated Valuations
and Tailored Rules
Besides giving rise to underinvestment and hold-up problems, divided
entitlements may sometimes be incapable of inducing bargainers to reveal their
private valuations. In this Subsection, we briefly address how structural
variations on this model-correlated valuations of the bargainers or tailored
legal rules--can undermine the information-inducing quality of Solomonic
entitlements.
Both of our earlier models showed that Solomonic entitlement facilitated
Coasean trade when the bargainers had "independent valuations." The
valuations were independent because one side's knowledge of her own
valuation gave her no information about the other side's valuation. In many
real-world contexts, however, the bargainers' valuations are often correlated,
and one party frequently has better information about her valuation than does
the other. For example, in litigation over a taking that has occurred, the
plaintiff and the defendant are both trying to estimate the likely monetary
outcome at trial. Litigants' valuations are usually correlated, because if one
side believes the case is "worth a lot," the other side, at least after discovery,
is likely to come to the same conclusion.
Correlated valuations with asymmetric information can create an additional
impediment to inducing the revelation of information, because credibly
revealing that one has a high valuation will often lead the other side to
increase her own valuation and thus narrow the bargaining range. 8' For
example, a buyer's revelation of value always tells the seller the maximum that
she might demand. When their valuations are correlated, however, a buyer's
revelation may also raise the minimum price that the seller is willing to accept.
With correlated valuations, then, a buyer may be even more reluctant to reveal
her valuation. With correlated valuations, each party has an additional strategic
reason to misrepresent her respective valuation: to mislead the other side about
her own valuation.
For example, consider again our analysis of bargaining under a liability
rule regime. If we instead assume that the plaintiff's and the defendant's
valuations are correlated, but that defendants have only an imprecise, initial
signal about their valuation, then defendants would rationally try to infer their
valuation more precisely from the bargaining behavior of the plaintiff. In this
circumstance, plaintiffs might strategically try to misrepresent their valuation,
to mislead defendants about the defendants' own valuation. In the earlier
188. While economic models can easily capture the process of updating one's own valuation based
on rational inferences of the other side's valuation, psychologists have also explored more extreme
adjustments referred to as "reactive devaluations." Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO THE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (Kenneth Arrow et al.
eds., forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS TO RESOLUTION].
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liability model, we asserted that low-valuing plaintiffs would never have an
incentive to make a serious offer to bribe defendants not to take."5 9 It is
possible, however, that if defendants have imprecise but correlated valuations,
a low-valuing plaintiff might cleverly try to bribe the defendant not to exercise
her liability call option. The plaintiff would hope that the defendant would
reject the offer, wrongly believing that she (the plaintiff, and thus the
defendant as well) had a high valuation, then exercise the option."'o' In the
future, we hope to explore this conjecture formally, since it represents the only
instance when a plaintiff might have an affirmative strategic incentive to
misrepresent whether her valuation was above or below the liability
amount.' 9' For now, it is sufficient to see that correlated valuations and one-
sided information can make the bargainers reluctant to reveal information and
thus reduce the potential benefit of Solomonic bargaining."2
Correlated valuations, however, are not the only factor that can increase
the disincentives to reveal information. As argued above, tailoring legal
consequences so that they are contingent on private information can deter
parties from revealing the information. For example, giving the plaintiff private
information about the size of the liability rule's exercise price by making the
damages payment relate to the plaintiff's actual loss in value undermines the
plaintiff's otherwise strong incentive to reveal whether her valuation is high
or low.'
To the extent that equity constrains lawmakers to tailor legal rules to make
ex post consequences turn on ex ante privately held information, divided
tailored entitlements are likely to produce relatively less efficient pre-taking
negotiations. For example, it may be difficult for a judge to implement an
untailored rule such as a $50 liability amount when, by the time of trial,
sufficient information has revealed that the defendant actually valued
189. See supra part 11. Similarly, we asserted that high-valuing plaintiffs would neer make a senou,
offer to sell their entitlement for less than the liability amount.
190. Similarly, a high-valuing plaintiff might strategically offer to sell the cntitlemcnt for a los pnce.
again hoping that the defendant would reject the offer but mistakenly choose not to take
191. Though we do not rule out the possibility that information structures such as the one descnbed
in the text can render property rules more efficient than liability rules, we conjecture that the more likely
result from this information structure is of the type obtained in the so-called "no-trade" papers in tinance
See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey. Information. Trade and Common Knowledge. 26 J ECo,
THEORY 17 (1982). Essentially, when one party has superior information about the value of the undcri)ing
asset, her willingness either to purchase or to sell that asset is a signal to the other, uninformed party that
such a transaction would be unwise. Thus, in such environments, we conjecture that autarky might reign
regardless of the underlying rule. Interestingly, then, because autarky under liability rules tends to dominate
autarky under property rules, see supra part I1, the existence of correlated information need not prose fatal
to the relative wisdom of liability rules.
192. Note, however, that when the players' types are correlated, but each knows her oun valuation
with precision, both liability rules and property rules are likely to tend toward efficiency as the amount of
correlation increases. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & Philip J. Reny. Correhted Informatin and
Mechanism Design, 60 ECONOMETRICA 395 (1992) (discussing ability of correlated information to induce
first-best bargaining).
193. Similarly, giving the defendant private information about who owns the entitlement deterred
plaintiffs from partitioning themselves into high- and low-valuing groups.
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ownership at $75, and that the plaintiff's lost value was $100. While our
theory predicts that courts would adjudicate fewer cases under an untailored
liability rule than under a tailored liability rule, it is neither practically nor
theoretically possible to continue seeing a limited number of such cases in
litigation. 19
4
B. Choosing Among Divided Entitlements
While the last Section identified conditions under which divided
entitlements might induce additional inefficiencies, these potential pitfalls still
may not outweigh the Coasean benefits of Solomonic entitlements. At least
theoretically, we have shown that a number of different types of divided
entitlements can enhance pre-taking negotiations, each for different reasons.
Assuming arguendo, then, that divided entitlements are beneficial overall, this
Section explores which of the various divisions is most likely to be efficient.
A striking result of Part III was that bargaining under fractional property
rights could achieve first-best efficiency. The expected payoffs in these models
were higher than those in Solomonic bargaining under liability rules (even
though liability rule divisions still produced higher gains than undivided
property rules). As an initial matter, it seems that fractional property divisions
would dominate liability rules as a mechanism for facilitating Coasean trade.
The information-forcing quality of untailored liability rules, however, is
much more robust than the beneficial identity crisis that fractional property
rules create. We were only able to demonstrate first-best efficiency in an
extremely stylized bargaining game with simultaneous offers. While some of
the Solomonic benefits of fractional property rules undoubtedly are present in
related procedures, the information-forcing quality of liability rules depends on
fewer assumptions. Most important, we showed that a plaintiff owning an
entitlement protected by a property rule would never offer the
"misrepresentative" type of Coasean bargain, regardless of the defendant's
expected strategy.' 95 Our showing that liability rules make truth telling an
194. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEo. L.. 583 (1992)
(noting that judges often make decisions that are optimal for the particular case in front of thcm but not
for the population in general).
Our models also have implications for the "rules" versus "standards" debate. For these purposes we
adopt Louis Kaplow's cogent definition that: "[T]he only distinction between rules and standards is the
extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act," Kaplow,
supra note 153, at 560. Under this definition, all of our untailored laws are rulelike; even the probabilistic
allocations are rulelike in that there is nothing for the parties to leam about the law before the court's
application. Our focus on tailored rules, which make legal consequences contingent on parties' private
information, suggests that under Kaplow's scheme a law might be "rulelike" from the perspective of the
informed party, but it may be "standardlike" from the perspective of the uninformed party, who will try
to infer its content prior to trial. Our assertion is that this asymmetry creates impediments to Coasean trade
in particular.
195. As noted above, we need to limit the parties from certain types of extremely irrational play. See
supra note 59-60 and accompanying text.
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iterated dominant strategy suggests that the benefits of liability rules may be
much less fragile than fractional property rules equilibria.
Moreover, certain types of partial property divisions may be difficult to
implement. Activity-level divisions may not be possible where the competing
uses are qualitatively incompatible. For instance, it may be impossible to
divide the right to various trees in the Oregon old-growth forests between
Union Pacific and the Rocky Mountain spotted owl. Temporal divisions may
not be possible either, especially when the activity of the first user of the
entitlement is likely to render the resource useless for the next in right.'"
The feasibility of probabilistic property divisions raises particularly
interesting legal issues. For example, the common law process itself may make
it difficult to sustain the beneficial effects of probabilistic determinations, since
precedents tend to further define the consequences of nonconsensual taking.
Although we traditionally conceive of the process of announcing precedent as
a public good redounding to the benefit of others, our model perversely
suggests that reducing uncertainty may, at least with regard to its effect on pre-
taking negotiations, be a public bad.' 97 While it is not our goal to apologize
for the diverse types of legal uncertainty, the probabilistic entitlement model
might force us to reexamine a host of procedures that may have this
unintended benefit. For example, cloaking decisions in the opinionless
determination of idiosyncratic juries or the unarticulated demands of equity
may produce unintended benefits in pretrial bargaining.'98
In general, the optimal way to divide an entitlement will turn on how the
particular divisions interact with the various limiting factors outlined above.
For example, Solomonic entitlements may be particularly effective when legal
rules respond to the "identification" problem by excluding inefficient owners
from the bargaining process. Liability rule divisions tend to do just this: If the
state mistakenly grants a probabilistic property right to an individual who is
clearly not one of the efficient owners, that individual may inhibit efficient
trade by holding up the efficient owner for an inefficient sale price. If,
however, the state mistakenly grants a liability call option to someone who
196. Consider a situation in which each of the competing uses leaves the property unusable for
anything else for a long time. The underlying legal enutlement might be the ownership of a plot of land
in the desert, while the two potential owners are a farmer, who plans to excavate imgation ditches to grow
alfalfa, and a scientific R&D venture that wishes to study the effects of toxic chemical spills in "pristine"
desert climates. If one attempted to divide the title to the land temporally, it would be difficult to find a
split such that use by the first party would not render the plot useless to the remainderpcrson
197. This perspective contrasts with the argument put forth in Owen M Fiss' much-cited article.
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-78 (1984), that litigants might inefficiently ignore the postive
externality of precedent when deciding to settle. Our probabilistic property model, in contrast. suggests that
precedent may also produce a negative externality that litigants may ignore in failing to settle
198. This list is far from exhaustive. Indeed, the probabilistic entitlement model might provide an
unwitting efficiency rationale for various "abstention" doctines (such as Pullman and Colorado Rtver
abstentions) that avoid resolution by federal courts of ambiguities in state law See. r g. PETER W LOw
& JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE LAN, OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATOss 554-63, 574-83
(3d ed. 1994).
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clearly values the property less than the option's exercise price-i.e., the
damage amount-then the class of potentially efficient owners can simply
ignore any demands from this inefficient owner, because her threat to take
nonconsensually is not credible. Thus, liability rule divisions may better allow
private parties to limit the problem of overinclusiveness that results from
mistaken allocations.
The choice of entitlement division might also reflect appropriate responses
to other limiting factors analyzed above. For example, while probabilistic
divisions might be hard to sustain over time, liability rules may be less
susceptible to ex post tailoring: Even if courts feel compelled to tailor the
amount of liability to plaintiff's actual loss, the prospect of a probabilistic
determination of whether the defendant will be liable may be sufficient to
induce more efficient pre-taking negotiation.'99
C. Specific Legal Applications
This Section analyzes some potential legal applications of our theoretical
findings. We focus first on intellectual property law, and then more briefly on
impossibility and mistake doctrines and legal "dissolutions" of concurrent
ownership.
1. Intellectual Property and Compulsory Licenses
An area of modem legal practice where entitlement allocation is of
paramount importance is the law of intellectual property. Indeed, this field is
one of the few in which new property rights emerge on a daily basis,
especially within the patent and copyright process. Moreover, the prevalence
of patent and copyright licensing is testimony to the pervasiveness of
bargaining in the shadow of the extant legal entitlement schemes.
Intellectual property often entails a significant amount of thin-market
bargaining. In patent law, a nontrivial amount of bargaining occurs between
parties possessing "blocking" patents.2 ° For instance, consider the case
where an individual has patented a pioneering invention, and a second
individual then patents a "new use" that incorporates the pioneering
technology. It may be quite profitable for the second individual to market
199. As noted above, the choice between liability and reverse liability rules could turn in part on
which party's private information is the greatest impediment to Coasean trade. The party with the least
amount of private information should receive a liability call or put option so as to exploit maximally the
"partitioning" of the opposite party. Thus, reverse liability rules are appropriate when inducing defendant
partitioning is the primary concern, while liability rules are appropriate when inducing plaintiff partitioning
is the primary concern. For example, in a competitive market, a seller's cost of performance may be readily
inferred from the market price, so endowing the seller as promisor/defendant with a liability call option (to
breach and pay damages) may induce better Coasean trade.
200. This Subsection draws heavily upon Merges, supra note 39.
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products that use this improvement patent, but because U.S. patent law grants
property protection to the pioneer patent,201 the improver cannot market her
invention without first negotiating a licensing agreement with the incumbent.
This situation, though seemingly stylized, is not uncommon. An oft-cited
example is the stalemate in the early-twentieth-century negotiations between
the Marconi Wireless & Telegraph Company and AT&T over patents in radio
technology.2 2 Marconi, the pioneer, owned a series of patents disclosing an
oscillating radio diode, which was then a fundamental component of
transmission technology. AT&T, on the other hand, was a licensee to a radical
improvement, disclosed in the "de Forest" patents for an oscillating triode,
which incorporated Marconi's pioneering technology. After a court had
established Marconi's dominant status, thus giving it a property right over its
diode technology,203 the parties attempted to negotiate a licensing agreement
to merge their respective technologies. Their bargaining efforts, replete with
strategic behavior, were largely unsuccessful. In fact, the parties did not reach
an agreement for nearly ten years, and even then it was largely motivated by
the government's creation of RCA. Many have estimated that the impasse
squandered an annual surplus in the tens of millions of dollars and delayed
numerous other advances in radio technology.
The property-like protection that patent law gives to innovators may well
have contributed to the deadlock in the Marconi-de Forest negotiations. Our
analysis suggests that, at least in analogous circumstances, a liability-like
regime might induce more efficient allocations by facilitating truthful
revelation more rapidly, thereby minimizing costly delay. Such a system would
likely take the form of a "compulsory licensing" scheme, giving the improver
an option to infringe the pioneer's patent in exchange for a fee determined by
a licensing tribunal. Current U.S. patent law generally eschews such
approaches, except for sui generis patents in nuclear power and environmental
engineering technologies. In various Asian and European nations, however,
compulsory licensing exists for just such a pioneer/improver circumstance.2'
A number of groups have long opposed compulsory patent licensing in the
United States, the most vocal of which is (perhaps not surprisingly) patent
attorneys. Among academics, however, common objections to such schemes
include arguments that licensing tribunals are notoriously bad at correctly
201. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988).
202. For an extensive analysis of the radio history. see GEORGE H. DOUGLAS. TilE EARLY DAYS OF
RADIO BROADCASTING (1987).
203. See Marconi Wireless & Tel. Co. v. DeForest Am. Co.. 236 F 942 (S.D N Y 1916). aff'd. 243
F. 560 (2d Cir. 1917).
204. See Gianna Julian-Amold, Internatonal Compulsor. icensing: The Ranonales and the Reahty.
33 IDEA 349 (1987) (noting that blocking patents are one of three most common condiltions for compulsory
licensing abroad). Countries that have compulsory licensing provisions in such instances include Australia.
China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand. and Switzerland See Merges. supra note 39. at 34-36
& nn.57-59.
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"pricing" the licensing fees.205 As our arguments illustrate, however, these
arguments may lose their force when one allows for bargaining in the shadow
of the compulsory licensing regime. Indeed, the inability of a court to tailor a
damages award and the existence of litigation costs can often improve the
ability of the parties to reach a consensual, efficient agreement on their own
terms, not those dictated by the underlying liability rule.2°6 Moreover,
restricting the compulsory licensing to the pioneer/improver context might be
a rational way for government to respond to the identification
problem-because the two parties involved in the initial innovation may, at
least as a first approximation, be the most efficient developers as well.
2. Mistake, Impossibility, Frustration, and Bargaining over
Efficient Breach
Another set of potential applications for our results arises in the contract
doctrines of mutual mistake, impossibility, and frustration. While formally
distinct, all of these doctrines address situations in which the "state of the
world" at the time of contractual performance differs vastly from what the
parties had anticipated during their initial contract bargaining. In such
instances, it is often no longer clear whether continued performance of the
contract would be efficient, as the promisor may value breaching more than the
promisee values performance. Moreover, in the absence of any excuse
doctrines, should an adversely affected party breach, the typical damages
measures may be wholly out of phase with the underlying state of the world,
thereby giving one party an "effective" property right.2" Thus, when such
an unanticipated contingency occurs, there is a strong argument for inducing
the parties to reconsider jointly, through renegotiation, the prudence of
continued performance. Private information can often impede this renegotiation
process, however, so structuring the law to lubricate the bargaining-via
Solomonic divisions-may be one mechanism for encouraging efficient
breach.2"'
205. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 39, at 30-32.
206. There is some soft empirical support for this proposition as well. Despite the compulsory
licensing schemes in these countries, Merges reports an unusually low incidence of royalty proceedings,
suggesting that the parties are largely successful at bargaining around the default liability rule. See Id. at
35.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49 (discussing how misaligned or "extreme" damage
amount can give rise to property-like rule). One can see how such a situation might come about in, say,
the classic frustration case of Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (C.A. 1903), in which the frustration doctrine was
used to nullify a subletting agreement for property overlooking the planned route of a royal processional.
Reliance or expectation damages may well have given the lessor an effective property right over
performance.
208. That efficient breach of contract is an important goal of contract law is virtually indisputable. See
COOTER & ULEN, supra note I. at 290.
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Consider, for instance, the doctrine of mutual mistake first articulated in
the classic and still-popular case of Shenvood v. Walker.2' The dispute in
Walker centered on whether a contract for the sale of a cow should be nullified
upon the discovery by the parties that the cow-which was mutually thought
to be infertile-was in fact pregnant. Reversing the trial court's enforcement
of the contract, the Michigan Supreme Court found that when the "nature" of
the contracted exchange changes dramatically, either party has a legitimate
right to refuse performance and seek nullification. Interestingly, however, both
the Walker court and many courts since have applied the mistake doctrine
somewhat randomly.210 The Restatement does not substantially help to
resolve the line-drawing ambiguities. Section 152 states that nullification under
the mistake doctrine is warranted so long as there is a failure of a "basic
assumption," and so long as the adversely affected party does not "bear[] the
risk" of mistake. 2t' Both of these standards are decidedly unclear, as is the
notion of what types of mistake are mutual. 2 These ambiguities have led
a number of commentators to conclude that the standards governing the
mistake doctrine are "confused beyond reconciliation."2 ' 3
The current legal standards for excuse are suggestive of our analysis in
two ways. First, given the lack of clear standards governing the mistake
doctrine, the legal landscape arguably gives rise to a particular type of
Solomonic division studied above: probabilistic property rights. Indeed, if
courts must operate within a hazy set of irreconcilable legal standards when
applying the mistake doctrine, then their ultimate decisions may fall victim to
arbitrariness and randomness. To the extent that this randomness approximates
a legal "coin flip" over the entitlement, the parties may see themselves each
as owning a probabilistic or fractional share of the respective rights over
breach or performance. This muddy default legal rule may thereby engender
more efficient renegotiation of the contract than would occur if the
impossibility doctrine were more crystalline.
Second, the failure of a "basic assumption" requirement may help to solve
the identification problem of overinclusiveness by limiting the court's effective
coin flipping to circumstances in which it is no longer clear whether the
promisee values performance more than the promisor. The legal rule may
prohibit promisors-whose ex ante assent signals that they value their
performance less than the promisee-from opportunistically holding up
209. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
210. See Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual Mistake and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law. 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 312 (1993) (noting that "courts are left puzzled about when to %oid for mistake." and
citing continued puzzlement in current casebooks). Even Judge Morse in Walker noted the difficulty in line
drawing: "I know that this is a close question, and the dividing line between the adjudicated cases is not
easily discerned." Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. at 923.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).
212. Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 210. at 311-12.
213. E.g., ARTHUR RosETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 669 (5th ed. 1994)_
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promisees. The occurrence of some unexpected event, however, may so
undermine the court's confidence that there are gains of trade at any price, that
the legal system may wish to use probabilistic discharge to encourage more
efficient renegotiations. A similar analysis may apply to the doctrines of
impossibility and frustration, where the unanticipated state of the world was
not caused by mistaken impressions during contracting, but by dramatic and
unanticipated changes in the world after execution of the contract. In these
situations as well, a probabilistic application of excuse doctrine may facilitate
efficient renegotiation. 14
The current legal standards, however, may not effectively respond to the
identification problem of underinclusiveness 5 While the "basic assumption"
requirement may be sufficient to establish that either the promisor or the
promisee may have the higher valuation, this requirement is not sufficient to
establish that one of the two bargainers has the highest valuation among a
larger class of potential owners. For example, in Sherwood v. Walker, a third
party might have been the efficient owner of the pregnant cow. Inducing
Solomonic bargaining between the two litigants is less likely to be efficient if
potentially efficient owners are not given a Solomonic share. This reasoning
suggests that the probabilistic rescission might only be appropriate when there
are idiosyncratic gains from trade-say, because of deal-specific
investments-that create conditions of "bilateral monopoly. 216
3. Concurrent Ownership and Dissolutions
The legal rules governing concurrent ownership27 of property may also
promote Solomonic bargaining. While concurrent ownership normally arises
in ongoing, cooperative relationships (especially tenancy by the entirety, which
is an artifact of marriage), the law by necessity must respond to rivalrous
claims of use by concurrent owners. Solomonic entitlements may be especially
appropriate in these contexts because the intimate relationship that gave rise
to the concurrent ownership may also cause the concurrent owners to place an
idiosyncratic, above-market value on the property. For example, two spouses
may subjectively value their summer home, where they reared their children,
much more than potential third-party buyers, and yet it might be unclear which
214. See Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 210, at 310-14. This list of renegotiation-faeilitating
contractual doctrines is not exhaustive. See, e.g., Talley, supra note 43 (discussing rule against penalty
enforcement as another form of bargain-inducing device).
215. This paragraph incorporates a probing question by Richard Epstein and thoughtful comments by
Richard Craswell.
216. When there is a competitive market for the promised performance, certain rescission will not lead
to inefficiency if the original seller after rescission can simply sell to the highest bidder.
217. There are three traditional forms of concurrent ownership of property: tenancy in common, joint
tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety. See A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY 251-55 (3d ed. 1984).
1096 [Vol. 104: 1027
1995] Solomonic Bargaining 1097
spouse values the home more, since at all prior times their use of the house
was nonrivalrous.
The common law has developed a number of ways of resolving conflicting
claims of concurrent owners. Most basically, a tenant in common or a joint
tenant often can obtain a physical partition of the property. We have already
shown that a physical division of property can create an identity crisis, because
at the outset of negotiations a claimant would not know whether she would
ultimately sell her share or buy the other party's share. The mere option of
obtaining a physical partition can have the same effect as an actual physical
division, because each party would know that in the absence of an agreement
on buying or selling this partition option, an actual physical partition would be
the ultimate result. Indeed, the prospect of judicial partitioning may induce
even more bargaining than an existing partition, since the parties will be
uncertain, ex ante, about who will get what parts. If the court might
benightedly divide the land in a way that reduces its use to each of the
claimants, then the parties would have even more incentives to resolve the
dispute themselves.
Courts have also forced a tenant in common to compensate her co-owners
for disproportionate use of concurrently owned property.2S Such rulings
effectively create liability rule options: A tenant may take the benefit of certain
uses, but only if she compensates her cotenant. To the extent that the court's
determination of the damages deviates from the cotenant's valuation, our
analysis in Part II suggests that this legal rule will induce cotenants to disclose
whether their valuation is above or below the damage amount. Accordingly,
this legal rule may effectuate Solomonic negotiations.
The analysis in this Part is far from exhaustive. Its primary purpose is to
illustrate that Solomonic allocations should neither predominate in all legal
categories nor define a null set. Nonetheless, the fact that there are many
divisions that may promote more efficient Coasean bargaining than clear
property rules calls into question many "settled" notions about the
218. McKnight v. Basilides. 143 P.2d 307. 315 (Wash. 1943) CNo practical or reasonable argumcnt
can be advanced for allowing one in possession to reap a financial benefit by occupying property owned
in common without paying for his personal use of that part of the property owned by his cotenants -)
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law2'9 -including blanket condemnation of entitlement allocations that are
indeterminate or weakly protected.
V. CONCLUSION
Emerging academic disciplines frequently use "extreme cases" as
instructional benchmarks. Law and economics is no exception. Over the last
thirty-five years, law and economics has produced two fundamental insights
about the relationship between legal entitlements and consensual trade, each
stemming from diametric assumptions about the world.22' First, Coase
showed that when transacting is costless, the choice between property and
liability rules does not affect the attainment of efficiency.22" ' Second,
Calabresi and Melamed followed by showing that when transaction costs make
consensual transfer prohibitively expensive, liability rules, which allow for
nonnegotiated transfer, are likely to dominate property rules.222
This Article has ventured further into the economic purgatory between the
findings of Coase and of Calabresi and Melamed. 22 In this intermediate
region, where transaction costs are positive but not prohibitive, law-and-
219. For example, it is possible that the current departures from the absolute priority rule represent
a move toward a divided entitlement scheme for a firm's assets, which can lead to more efficient taking
negotiations. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988) (documenting this movement).
Our analysis might also provide an additional rationale for Easterbrook and Fischel's argument that
courts should require target managers to be passive in response to hostile takeover attempts. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Haddock, Macey, and McChesney persuasively criticized this target
passivity requirement by explicitly arguing that the entitlements of target shareholders should be protected
by a property rule instead of the Easterbrook-Fischel liability rule (which in essence would give raiders a
call option to take over the firm). David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987). Our analysis suggests that analogizing the passivity proposal
to a liability rule does not doom its application. To the contrary, target passivity might induce target
managers to reveal whether they believe the company is worth more than the tender offer-at least if the
targets were allowed to bribe the hostile bidder to cease and desist. See Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S.
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
220. Interestingly, the evolution of the economics of competition follows a similar track, with initial
concentration on the polar environments of perfect competition and monopoly. Only recently have models
of oligopoly and monopolistic competition breached the more realistic middle ground between these polar
benchmarks.
221. See Coase, supra note 5. Though Coase never articulated this proposition verbatim in that article,
most scholars have attributed it to him since. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 105 & n.15;
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1094 (attributing to Coase the notion that "[in] the absence of
transaction costs, Pareto optimality or economic efficiency will occur regardless of the initial entitlement").
222. Just as Coase did not explicitly articulate the Coase theorem, see supra note 221, Calabresi and
Melamed left it to others to state explicitly this fundamental implication of their analysis. See POSNER,
supra note 1; Haddock et al., supra note 18; Kronman, supra note 19.
223. The insights of this Article fit nicely with the seminal insights of Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, II J. LEGAL STUD. I (1982). Cooter hypothesized that the normative task of the law was to find
an optimal trade-off between "Coasean" concerns about lubricating consensual trade, and "Hobbesian"
concerns about allocating legal entitlements when trade collapses. See id. at 19-20. Liability rules have
often been perceived as serving the second of these goals quite well but generally failing to serve the first.
Our analysis, however, illustrates that these two concerns need not conflict. Liability rules can, at least in
dealing with private information, serve both objectives better than property rules.
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economics scholars have firmly favored the use of undivided entitlements-i.e.,
clear, fee simple allocations protected by property rules-to "force" parties to
negotiate.224 But the near-universal acceptance of this proposition by academics
(including ourselves until recently) is a little puzzling. If liability rules can
promote efficient contracting in a world without transaction costs, why was it
clear that property rules should dominate when transaction costs increase
slightly? 22 At a minimum, this Article shows that the preference for
undivided property rules in low-transaction-cost settings should no longer rest
on the naive notion that property rules are superior at channeling people
toward efficient Coasean trade. We have shown that a host of Solomonic
entitlement divisions-including liability rules and fractional property
entitlements-can induce pre-taking negotiations superior to those of undivided
property rules.226
Two distinct families of entitlement division can engender more truthful
bargaining. Fractional ownership structures might induce honest bargaining by
obscuring the titular boundary between buyer and seller during a negotiation.
For example, if a court is equally likely to rule that either a factory or a
neighboring laundry is entitled to control the amount of factory pollution, then
the factory may be unsure whether it should try to buy the laundry's right to
224. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
225. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell ask the same question, but focus on a different
margin-decreases in transaction costs from a prohibitively high level. In their discussion of harmful
externalities, they assert:
ITihe liability rule is superior when there is no bargaining. That is. before an) bargaining
occurs, at the beginning of the "race" between the types of rule. the liability rule is ahead of
the property rules. Hence, we would expect that after imperfect bargaining occurs, the hability
rule should remain ahead of the property rules. This would be true unless bargaining w'ere for
some reason to result in mutually beneficial agreements substantially more often under the
property rules than under the liability rule.
Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 101. at 25-26. This explanation correctly identifies hoss. ceteris panbus.
liability rules can mitigate the consequences of failed bargaining. Following Coter. this might be
characterized as a "Hobbesian" rationale for liability rules. See supra note 223 In this Article. %%c hase
tried to expose a "Coasean" rationale for liability rules as well- By inducing bargainers to reveal
information, liability rules may "result in mutually beneficial agreements substantially more often" than
property rules. Thus, liability rules may be more able than property rules to serve the joint purpose of
lubricating bilateral negotiations and mitigating the consequences of failed bargaining
The failure of the academy to ask the question in the text may lie, in part. in the fact that Calabresa
and Melamed succeeded too well in showing that liability rules were appropriate for high transaction cost
contexts, and also because most Coasean bargaining examples were explained in terms of property rights
But cf SCOTT-r & LESLiE. supra note 43, at 101-03 (discussing Coasean bargaining around gap-filling legal
rules). While the law-and-economics community knows the Coase theorem b) heart, legal scholars have
largely ignored how the Coasean impulse to internalize externalities would affect habilty rules and other
forms of entitlement divisions. See generally John J. Donohue Ill. Opting for tie Bnnsh Rule. or If Posner
and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem. Whio illP. 104 HARV L REV 1093 (1991) (arguing
that Coasean implications have been overlooked in other areas as well).
226. Ellickson has cogently shown why the law has placed immutable constraints on the "excessive
decomposition" of bundles. See Ellickson. supra note 4. at 1374 ("A landowner can recal incapacity not
just by swinging an axe at an antique armoire but also by splintering rights in a fee simple bundle into bits
that are far less valuable than the pre-splintered whole."). Our Article. however, suggests that the laws might
also worry about excessive composition of entitlement claims.
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stop the pollution, or to sell its own right to pollute. 27 A similar
characterization holds for the laundry. Because of this "identity crisis," the
bargainers will not know whether they should strategically inflate their offers
(qua sellers) or deflate their offers (qua buyers). As a consequence, the parties
may distort their offers less, so more efficient trade can occur.
Additionally, liability rules have an information-forcing quality that has
heretofore gone unnoticed: They can induce entitlement holders to signal
credible information about their valuation. Under a liability rule, high-valuing
owners never offer to sell their entitlement, and low-valuing owners never
offer to bribe potential appropriators not to take. Consequently, the type of
transaction that the owner willingly offers credibly signals her relative
valuation. 28 Liability rules thus can cause entitlement holders to partition
themselves into two valuation groups, 229 thereby reducing the aggregate
amount of private information and increasing Coasean efficiency. We showed
that this result is remarkably robust, in that the owner's incentive to reveal her
relative valuation is independent of either side's behavior 30 or specific
assumptions about the form of the bargaining game.
The academy's failure to view liability rules as catalysts (rather than
substitutes) for bargaining has led it not only to misprescribe when such rules
are appropriate, but also to misprescribe what type of liability rules are
optimal. Numerous scholars have argued that liability rules should be tailored
to replicate the transaction the individual litigants might have made had they
bargained. 3' We have demonstrated, however, that when private information
is the dominant transaction cost, tailored rules can actually impede efficient
bargaining by making bargainers more reluctant to reveal information. Tailored
damages give the plaintiff added information about the default "price" for a
taking, while tailored liability gives the defendant added information about
whether such damages will ever be assessed. This additional dimension of
private information actually forecloses the possibility that both species of
227. See Johnston, supra note 29, at 6-7.
228. For instance, if an entitlement-holding plaintiff makes the statement, "I am interested in selling
you my entitlement," the defendant knows that only a low-valuing plaintiff could have made such a
statement. Conversely, if the plaintiff makes the statement: "I am interested in buying your option to take,"
the defendant knows that only a high-valuing plaintiff could have made such a statement. See supra part
lI.B.3.
In Part II, we also showed that reverse liability rules can analogously induce potential takers
("defendants" model) to reveal whether their valuations are greater than or less than the damage amount.
See supra part II.B.4.
229. If it is costly to make Coasean offers, entitlement holders will often partition themselves into
three groups: high-valuing owners, who will offer defendants a bribe not to take; low-valuing owners, who
will offer to sell their entitlement for a price below the damage amount; and intermediate-valuing owners,
who will refrain from either type of bargaining. For a more thorough description of intermediate-valuing
owners, see supra note 89.
230. For a slight caveat to this assertion, see supra note 60.
231. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note I, at 62 n.5 (noting that when courts assess damages inaccurately,
liability rules may not be beneficial vis-h-vis property rules); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1125
(pointing out that liability rules "approximatlel ... the value of the object to its original owner").
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Coasean bargains will occur under liability rules. "- - Thus, while tailored
liability rules may be appropriate when transaction costs make bargaining
impracticable, lawmakers choosing liability rules to facilitate trade should be
careful not to make the legal rule contingent on the parties' private
information.
The ability of Solomonic entitlements such as untailored liability rules to
facilitate Coasean trade is starkly at odds with the accepted wisdom that
property rules are "market-encouraging" when transaction costs are low.211
Property rules and liability rules may thus run neck and neck in a Coasean
horse race, even when transaction costs are low;23 and when private
information is the major source of inefficiency, liability rules and other divided
entitlement forms may hold the lead. 35
While our arguments favoring divided entitlements arise from an economic
concern about the ways that private information can impede negotiation.2 '
these arguments also dovetail nicely with theories of psychological barriers to
negotiation. Several experiments have shown that people tend to value an
object more once they identify the property as their own, and that this
"endowment" or "framing" effect is independent of any attachments that might
develop over time.2 37  For example, in an oft-cited experiment, Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler explored subjects' willingness
to buy or sell a coffee mug. The authors gave one group (the "'buyers") the
opportunity to "buy" a mug instead of giving them monetary compensation for
participating in the experiment. They gave the other group (the "'sellers") an
initial "endowment" of the mug as a gift at the beginning of the experiment,
then gave them the chance to sell their newly acquired property.- The
authors found that the sellers' valuations were more than double the buyers'
232. Indeed, as we showed in Part II. tailoring of either damages or liability in our model reduces to
zero the probability that the plaintiff would buy the defendant's call option See supra text accompanying
notes 116-3 1.
233. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 17. at 83-84.
234. We demonstrated these results in models with a precise definition of transaction costs Instead
of artificially assuming a fixed cost of contracting, see. e.g.. Ayres & Gertner. supra note 74. at 732-33.
the models in this Article highlight the real-world inefficiencies caused by bargainers" pn' ate information
235. Even when transaction costs are low, the choice of the efficient entitlement form may be
significant. The amounts of social inefficiency are not bounded above by the costs of contracting See id
236. For an analogous exploration of the adverse selection inefficiency in bargaining, see Bro%,n &
Ayres, supra note 15, at 331-35.
237. See, e.g., David Kahneman & Amos Tversky. Advances in Prospect 1-ieor Cumulative
Uncertainty, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY (forthcoming 1994); David Kahneman & Amos Tscrsky, Conflut
Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective. in BARRIERS TO RESOLUTION, supra note 188
238. Daniel Kahneman et al.. Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Cralase Theorem.
98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) [hereinafter Kahneman et al.. Experimental Testsl. see also Daniel
Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect. Loss Aversion. and Status Quo Bias. J Eco% PERSP. Winter
1991, at 193, 194-97 (1991) (describing this and similar experiments): George Loeenstein & Samuel
Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects. 7 J BEIAVIORAL. DE"IStO. MAKIG 157
(1994) (finding that means by which people obtain objects impacts valuation of their property). Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference Dependent Model. 106 QJ
ECON. 1039 (1991).
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valuations, even though the experiment presented the subjects with an identical
economic choice.2 39 This type of framing effect can impede trade by
narrowing the set of mutually acceptable prices.240 But divided entitlements
may mitigate such cognitive barriers: As emphasized above, probabilistic
entitlements obscure the identity of the buyer and the seller, so we might
predict that this entitlement division would reduce, or even eliminate,
ownership bias. Similarly, if the parties understood that in a liability rule
regime, the nominal owner's claim was subject to another's call option, then
the adverse cognitive effects might be less severe.24'
Our conclusion that uncertain and weakly protected entitlements might
produce more efficient trade than undivided property rights runs counter to
deeply held but possibly unexamined beliefs. For a large range of applications,
undivided property rules remain the most efficient scheme; yet our analysis
suggests that the justification for undivided property rules cannot reside in the
simple (a priori) assertion that undivided entitlements promote more efficient
trade. Undivided entitlements sometimes may be preferable for a number of
traditional reasons: As many commentators have seen, property regimes may
produce superior incentives to create and develop wealth. Or, as suggested
above, undivided claims may be appropriate because Solomonic regimes
cannot adequately identify and exclude low-valuing claimants who would hold
up beneficial trade. 2  Our earlier list of contraindicators is not
exhaustive. 3 Nevertheless, the ubiquitous claim that strong property regimes
promote trade, and are therefore most effective at eliciting the parties' revealed
239. See Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests, supra note 238, at 1338.
240. The endowment effect as a barrier to trade may not be inconsistent with efficiency if the
divergent preferences of the endowed and unendowed bargainers are taken at face value. See Daniel S.
Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods?: Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic
Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI, L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994) (describing circumstances in
which endowment bias may be consistent with rational decision making).
241. Divided entitlements, however, are unlikely to facilitate value-enhancing trade if the costs of
negotiation, or "toll costs," are the sole impediment to Coasean efficiency. Divided entitlements, such as
liability rules, may be efficient if toll costs are sufficiently high, but divided entitlements are not likely to
produce more consensual trade than property rules when there is no informational or psychological barrier
to trade.
242. Solomonic regimes may be particularly difficult to sustain over time. The teleological rationale
for Solomonic entitlements is reunification of the entitlement in the hands of the highest valuer. Solomonic
divisions therefore are intended to be transitory allocations. After Solomonic negotiations produce undivided
entitlements, subsequent events may create uncertainty about who is the highest valuer. It may be difficult
for a Solomonic regime to divide an entitlement repeatedly among ensuing generations of potential owners.
and the prospect of continual reallocations may undermine initial bargainers' incentives to purchase.
243. Undivided property rule allocations might foster competition among multiple sellers or buyers.
For example, technical economic models have explored the effects on bargaining outcomes of an increase
in the number of parties. See, e.g., Thomas A. Gresik & Mark A. Satterthwaite, The Rate at Which a Simple
Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal
Trading Mechanisms, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 304 (1989); Robert Wilson, Incentive Efficiency of Double
Auctions, 53 ECONOMErRICA 1101 (1985). But there are many contexts in which two (or a small set of)
parties have bilateral (or multilateral) control over the allocation of idiosyncratic gains from trade.
Moreover, divided entitlement allocations may not be inconsistent with competition. For example, giving
a buyer call options on multiple sellers may facilitate competition, in part by destabilizing seller collusion.
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preference, does not withstand close analysis. The Coasean impulse to bargain
transcends many entitlement structures and may even be strongest when claims
are divided among the class of potentially efficient owners.
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APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Liability Rule Results
This portion of the Appendix derives the equilibrium outcomes of the
stylized bargaining game considered in Part II. Recalling our notation, let v,
denote the plaintiff's valuation, and let vA denote the defendant's valuation. v,
is assumed to be distributed uniformly on [0,100], while v. is a discrete and
independent random variable, distributed on [40,60] with equal (1/2)
probabilities. As an evaluative measuring stick, consider the expected social
welfare associated with a "first-best" allocation (ESW '), in which the highest
valuer always receives the entitlement:244
ESWb = 2 [$40"Prv,<$401 + Elvjlv $40)'Prlv2$40)]
2
+ _[$60.Prv,<$60} + Ely Iv,, 2$60}.Prlv,$60}].
2
Given the assumed distributions, it is straightforward to calculate the value of
ESWJZ to be $63.00.
We consider a game of bargaining under incomplete information that has
the following rules. In the first stage of the game, the plaintiff is allowed to
send a "signal" to the defendant indicating which type of transaction she would
like to enter. The plaintiff can either signal "M3" (or "make me a buy offer
for my entitlement"), or she can send the signal "Ma" (or "make me a sell
offer on your call option"). After hearing the signal, the defendant makes the
requested type of offer: Either he offers to buy the plaintiff's entitlement for
some amount 3, or he offers to sell the plaintiff his option position for some
demanded amount a. 245 This is a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Upon hearing either offer, the plaintiff may either accept it (Al) or reject
it (R,), where i = 3,a. If the plaintiff who signaled M3 accepts the defendant's
buy offer 3, then the plaintiff receives a payoff of 03 (she sells her entitlement
but gets the offered price $3), and the defendant gets a payoff of vA- 3 (he
enjoys undivided interest in the entitlement, but must pay $3). Conversely, if
the M3 signaling plaintiff rejects, then the players enter the "noncooperative"
litigation game that they would play in the absence of bargaining: The
defendant can play "Take" or "No Take," corresponding to a decision whether
244. Note that since v. - U[0,100], the density of v. must be 1/100 over that interval.
245. Though we constrain the defendant to make the requested type of offer, the truth of the plaintiff's
signal would actually be enough to induce the defendant to make that type of offer even if the rules did
not constrain him. It is therefore quite simple to transform this game into a true "cheap talk" model. In their
recent manuscript, Kaplow and Shavell assert a model where such pre-bid signaling is not permitted. Their
model therefore does not detect any bargaining-facilitating effects of liability rules, stressing instead the
"Hobbesian"-or autarkic-rationale for liability rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 101, at 28 n.31
("[Wie expect the liability rule to be superior to property rules because, under a liability rule there is a
lessor need for the parties to engage in bargaining.").
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or not, upon bargaining breakdown, he will induce a nonconsensual transfer
of the entitlement. If the defendant decides not to take, then the plaintiff enjoys
her private valuation v, while the defendant gets nothing. Conversely, if the
defendant does take, the plaintiff can play either "Suit" or "No Suit." If the
plaintiff files suit, she is assumed to win with probability one (i.e., there is no
judicial "error" as such) and collect the SD in damages. A similar description
follows the path subsequent to a plaintiff signal of "Mo."
As Harsanyi has shown, 46 because this is a game of incomplete
information, it can be modeled as a game of imperfect information through the
introduction of a "nature" player (player number 0 in the text) who initially
chooses the player types (v,, v,). A course representation of the extensive form
of the bargaining game is contained in Figure Al.
A A 
'D I D,
I A 
% ' 
'
<R T S
0-a) 0) 0.0
FIGURE Al. Extensive Fonn Representation of Bargaining Gamie
for Liability and Propery Rules
Note that this representation is "course" because it shows only a representative
branch of the "continuation game" after nature has chosen the player types.
There is in actuality a continuum of those branches. Moreover, because each
player is aware only of her type, neither is completely certain which branch
she is in (though each can rule out certain branches). This means that this
246. See John C. Harsanyi. Games with Incompleie Infonnatwa Plaved by "tnssanu" Ph 'r e. 1-111.
14 MGMT. SCI. 159 (1967).
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game has no singleton information sets, as is usually the case in signaling
games.247
Upon inspection of this game, it is immediately clear that, should the game
progress to the right-most decision node, a rational plaintiff will always file
suit no matter what the size of the liability amount, so long as D > 0, which
we henceforth assume. Thus, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) must call
for the plaintiff to play "Suit" on or off the equilibrium path. Working
backward, it becomes apparent that the defendant's decision whether to "take"
depends on whether his valuation is above or below the liability amount D.
There are thus three relevant intervals for D: D < $40, $40 < D < $60, and
D > $60. Although the text compares only damage amounts of $100 and $50,
for clarity we analyze all the relevant cases below ad seriatim. Before
proceeding, however, the reader should note that when D > $60, the liability
rule effectively reproduces a pro-plaintiff property right, since no defendant
would take absent a consensual transaction. Conversely, when D < $40, the
law gives a theoretical equivalent of a property right to the defendant (albeit
combined with a type of lump-sum transfer to the plaintiff).248
In each case, we will establish our main assertion: that rational plaintiffs
for whom v_ < D never have an incentive to play Ma (which would signal a
desire to bribe the defendant not to take), and plaintiffs for whom v, > D never
have an incentive to play M3 (which would signal a desire to transfer
entitlement to the defendant consensually). We use the notion of
"rationalizability"-the Bayesian cousin of iterated strict dominance-to make
this point. We will then calculate the equilibrium strategies under each case.
Case (a): D > $60
PROPOSITION IA: When D > $60, all perfect Bayesian outcomes of the
above signaling game are supported by a "partitioning" strategy of the
plaintiff types, where the plaintiff signals M3 if v. 5 D and signals
Ma if v, > D.
The proof of this proposition is as follows. We first note that any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium must involve "rationalizable" strategies-i.e., strategies
that survive iterated removal of irrational actions."' (Note that for two-player
247. Because of the technical difficulty in doing so, we have not attempted to represent the players'
information sets in the above diagram. Nevertheless, they must be considered as a component of any
signaling equilibrium.
248. Noting this point again is important, since it exposes the fact that a "true" liability rule (in a
strategic sense) depends on the defendant's value as well as the plaintiff's. It is therefore somewhat
uninstructive to think of liability rules and bargaining solely in terms of damage amounts that depend only
on plaintiffs' valuations.
249. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1007, 1016
(1984); David G. Pearce, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection, 52
ECONOMMrRICA 1029, 1035 (1984).
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games like this one, rationalizability is equivalent to iterated strict dominance).
We therefore consider the set of rationalizable strategies in the game depicted
above for D > $60.
When D exceeds $60, no rational defendant would ever play "Take"
should the game proceed that far. Indeed, so doing would induce the plaintiff
to sue with probability one (as we noted above), thereby giving the defendant
a negative payoff. Thus, the parties know that absent a negotiated solution, the
plaintiff's payoff must be v, and the defendant's payoff will be 0 (regardless
of his type).
Given this structure of "reservation utilities," we now work back to the
bargaining stages. Consider first the branches of the game where the defendant
offers to buy the plaintiff's entitlement for $13. A plaintiff will accept this bid
only if it exceeds her reservation utility v,. Since the plaintiff's valuation,
however, can take on any value between $0 and $100, acceptance is always a
rationalizable action with positive probability. Iterating back, the defendant
realizes that the plaintiff could rationally accept any positive bid with at least
some probability. But under no circumstances will the defendant be willing to
bid more than $60 for the plaintiff's entitlement (the largest valuation the
defendant could have). Thus, the interval between $0 and $60 represents the
range of rationalizable defendant buy offers 13. Iterating back once more, it is
clear that plaintiffs for whom v, > $60 will never receive an acceptable bid by
the defendant (and they thus will receive only their reservation value v , since
no bargains are possible). Plaintiffs whose valuations are less than $60,
however, stand to increase their payoffs above their reservation value of v, by
reporting M3.
Now consider branches in the game where the defendant offers to sell his
call option to the plaintiff for an amount a. Notice that when D > S60 the
plaintiff knows that the defendant will never exercise the call option in
equilibrium. Thus, the defendant really has nothing to sell, and acceptance of
the defendant's demand is rationalizable only when a = $0. This leaves the
defendant in this branch indifferent between selling for $0 and making a
frivolous offer (anything greater than zero). Thus, all offers by the defendant
are equally rationalizable here, and all have the same outcome-the plaintiff
gets her reservation utility v,, and the defendant gets a zero payoff.
Finally, consider the plaintiff's choice whether to play M3 or Mo. As we
have stated above, plaintiffs for whom v_ < $60 stand to increase their payoffs
(above vo) by reporting M3. Thus, for these plaintiffs this strategy is the only
rationalizable strategy and must be part of any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
On the other hand, all plaintiffs for whom v,. > $60 know that reaching
nontrivial consensual transactions of either kind is impossible. They therefore
resign themselves to receiving v, in equilibrium. As such, these "high"
plaintiffs are indifferent between reporting M3 and Mo. Moreover, the
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defendant is unaffected by their ultimate decision, since he knows that his
market consists only of plaintiffs for whom v, 5 $60.
This establishes our assertion from the text (at least for D > $60) that
plaintiffs whose valuation is less than the liability amount D have no
affirmative incentive to signal anything other than M3, and those whose
valuation exceeds the damage amount have no affirmative incentive to signal
anything other than Ma. It also completes the proof of the proposition. To
determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of this game, one can
concentrate solely on equilibria where the plaintiff signals MP3 if and only if
v_ < D and Ma if and only if v, > D. Although this constraint truncates the set
of equilibrium strategy profiles of the game, it prunes only those strategy
profiles that are "outcome irrelevant," in that it coerces a particular signal only
from indifferent players who were destined not to consummate any Coasean
bargains in the first place. Similar reasoning applies to the other two relevant
intervals of D.
Imposing this behavior on the plaintiff types, then, it is extremely
straightforward to calculate the equilibrium strategies and outcomes for
D > $60. It turns out that in this case there is a unique perfect Bayesian
outcome (albeit supported by a number of strategy profiles). A representative
profile looks like the following. Any defendant who receives the signal Ma
replies with a "nonserious" bid of a = a* > $0, which the plaintiff rejects,
giving the players respective payoffs of v, and 0. Conversely, when the
defendant receives a signal of M3, he sets his buy offer 03 at the point that
maximizes his continuation payoff. Noting that a plaintiff will accept any bid
3 that is greater than her reservation value v,, the defendant maximizes the
following:
MaxE[0v, Pr{,v P Iv D } [vA - t3] + Prv, > P3 jv,, D } O.
Using the fact that v, - U[0,100], the first-order conditions of this maximiza-
tion problem imply that the optimal bid function, 0V(v,), is given by
13 (vA) = 2
for v, = $40, $60, which is the typical result obtained in a panoply of take-it-
or-leave-it games with a distinct buyer and seller. In fact, this result is what
we would expect for D > $60, since such an entitlement is effectively a pro-
plaintiff property rule. The above equation immediately produces the result
given in Part II of the text for a "property rule" protection for the plaintiff; i.e.,
a $60 defendant bids $30 for the plaintiff's entitlement, while a $40 defendant
bids $20. As one can see, this is a partially "separating" equilibrium in which
defendants completely reveal their private information through their bid. The
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expected social welfare (ESW" '>) associated with this strategy profile, as well
as all other perfect Bayesian profiles, is $59.75.
Case (b): D < $40
Just as in the previous case, this case supports our partitioning hypothesis.
Because of the similarity in the approach to the case of D > $60, however, we
state the following proposition without proof.
PROPOSITION 1B: When D < $40, all perfect Bayesian outcomes of the
above signaling game are supported by a "partitioning" strategy of the
plaintiff types, where the plaintiff signals M3 if vT < D and signals
Mo if v, > D.
In contrast to the previous example, when D < $40 it is common
knowledge that, absent a negotiated agreement, the defendant will take with
probability one. Thus, the reservation utilities for the plaintiff and defendant
are $D and $(v,-D), respectively. Once again assuming this partitioning
behavior on behalf of the plaintiff, it is straightforward to calculate the
equilibrium outcomes of this game. A representative strategy profile looks like
the following. Any defendant who receives a signal of MP replies with a
"nonserious" buy offer of 3 = 0*" < $D, which the plaintiff promptly rejects
(since she knows that she can get $D through litigation), and the parties each
receive their respective reservation values. If the defendant receives the signal
of Ma, however, he sets his sell offer a at the point that maximizes his
continuation payoff. Noting that a plaintiff will accept any offer a that ensures
that her postpurchase payoff (v,-o) is greater than her reservation value $D,
the defendant maximizes the following:
Max.,,V Pr{v -ao D Iv,.) D"o + Prlv.-o<Dv D.[v -D].
The first-order conditions of this maximization problem imply that the optimal
ask function, &*-(v,), is given by
o"*(v, )  = , D,
for vA = $40, $60. The above equation immediately produces the result given
in Part H of the text for "property rule" protection for the defendant, a case not
discussed explicitly in the text. Note that this equilibrium is also separating,
since the different types of defendants make different sell offers. The expected
social welfare (ESW ° -'4°) associated with this strategy profile, as well as all
other perfect Bayesian profiles, is $59.75, just like the earlier case.
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Case (c): $40 < D < $60.
As in the previous two cases, this interval also supports our partitioning
hypothesis. And once again, because of the similarity in the approach to the
case of D > $60, we state the following proposition without proof:
PROPOSITION lc: When $40 < D < $60, all perfect Bayesian outcomes
of the above signaling game are supported by a "partitioning" strategy
of the plaintiff types, where the plaintiff signals M03 if v. < D and
signals Ma if v, > D.
This is probably the most interesting of the three cases, since absent
negotiation, the defendant types are destined to take different actions. Low-
valuing defendants will not take while high-valuing defendants will take and
pay the liability amount. This gives $40 defendants and $60 defendants
reservation utilities of $0 and $(60-D), respectively. The plaintiff's reservation
value, as given in Part II of the text, is $(v,/2 + D/2).
We can now calculate the equilibrium outcome for this intermediate range
of damage amounts. Since this game has no equilibria involving mixed
strategies by the defendant in making buy offers I0 or sell offers a,10 we
concentrate on characterizing a possible pure strategy equilibrium.
Unlike the previous two cases, there are now two nontrivial types of
transactions that can occur. These transactions, labeled Coasean bargains #1
and #2 in the text, take the following forms. In the first, the defendant offers
to sell his call option to the plaintiff at a price of a. The plaintiff is interested
in such a transaction, however, only if she thinks she is buying out the position
of a $60 defendant; for the $40 defendant does not present a threat to take, and
therefore has nothing to sell. Consequently, if the defendant ever submits a sell
offer that reveals him to be a $40 defendant, the plaintiff will surely reject that
offer. Note further, however, that the $40 defendant would like to have his sell
offer accepted by the plaintiff, as acceptance would give him a payoff of Y
rather than a sure payoff of $0 should no agreement be reached.
In a similar vein, the second type of Coasean bargain entails the defendant
offering to buy the plaintiff's entitlement for a price of 03, which is less than
the liability amount of $D. The plaintiff is interested in such a transaction,
however, only if she thinks she is selling to a $40 defendant, who otherwise
would not take; the $60 defendant is not an attractive trading partner for this
type of transaction, since negotiation failure would result in a nonconsensual
taking by this defendant, but would garner the plaintiff a payoff of $D-more
than any rationalizable value of 3. Consequently, if the defendant ever submits
250. We do not attempt to prove this here. A more rigorous analysis appears in a separate piece by
coauthor Talley that also takes a more general approach to bargaining in the shadow of default entitlements.
See Talley, supra note 14, at 7-13.
[Vol. 104: 10271110
Solomonic Bargaining
a buy offer that reveals him to be a $60 defendant, the plaintiff will surely
reject that offer. Once again, however, the $60 defendant would like to have
his bid accepted by the plaintiff, as acceptance would lower the price that he
would otherwise have to pay for a nonconsensual taking (since 13 < D). Given
the above reasoning, we immediately arrive at the following corollary:
COROLLARY 1: For D E (40,60], all pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibria of bargaining game F involve complete pooling among the
defendant types in choosing 3 and (Y.
The above corollary allows us to limit our attention to equilibria of I in which
the optimal bidding strategies for each defendant type are equal (i.e.,
13(40) = 1P'(60) = P*") and the optimal sell offers of each defendant type are
equal (i.e., o"(40) = c7"(60) -- a").
While the above results allow us to parse down significantly the various
types of equilibria in this game, it turns out that the concept of Bayesian
perfection is not capable of narrowing down the class of equilibria beyond the
reach of Proposition la and Corollary 1. Indeed, for every hypothetical PBE
involving pooled strategies r'" and r", the sustainability of that equilibrium
depends on the reaction of the plaintiff to deviations from the pooled offering
strategies. 5' In the previous two cases, the plaintiff's reactions were easy to
gauge, since she did not care which type of defendant issued a bid or ask;
beliefs were irrelevant. In this case, however, the plaintiff has a vested interest
in knowing whether a deviating offer was issued by a high- or low-valuing
defendant. Because the concept of PBE does not specify an off-equilibrium
belief structure, one cannot pin down a unique PBE. Thus, we have:
COROLLARY 2: For D E (40,60], there is a continuum of pure strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibria of bargaining game F involving pooled
offers of a" and 3"'.
Unfortunately, even some of the immediately obvious refinements to the PBE
concept do not yield unique equilibria. The belief restrictions of sequential
equilibrium252 and even the added restriction of equilibrium domination"
are insufficient to establish unique equilibrium.
The stronger refinement notion of "divinity,"2' however, is immensely
helpful, and it turns out that imposing the requirements of divinity allows us
to pin down a single equilibrium outcome. In fact, this equilibrium outcome
has an intuitively appealing form:
251. Clearly, along the equilibrium path, the plaintiff places a 1/2 probability that P-" or 0-'is sent
by a $40 defendant.
252. See David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson. Sequential Equilibria, 50 EcONOMETRICA 863 (1982)
253. See generally Cho & Kreps, supra note 91.
254. See generally Banks & Sobel. supra note 91.
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PROPOSITION 2: For D E (40,60], there is a unique divine equilibrium
outcome involving pooled pure strategy offers, a'" and 03° , that
correspond to the most-preferred PBE strategy of the high- and low-
valuing defendants, respectively
55
Proposition 2 provides a convenient recipe for calculating the equilibrium
offers of the defendant types. More important, Proposition 2 is extremely
intuitive. As noted above, each of the two possible Coasean transactions will
entail one bona fide offeror type (the $60 defendant in the case of sell offers
u, and the $40 defendant in the case of buy offers 03), and one "pretender" who
mimics the bona fide type's behavior. Proposition 2 states that the unique
divine equilibrium of this game allows the $60 defendant to make his most-
preferred sell offer a, given that the $40 defendant will mimic that offer; and
it allows the $40 defendant to make his most-preferred buy offer P3, given that
the $60 defendant will mimic that offer. This equilibrium coincides with a
slightly different strategic situation in which the bona fide offeror in each case
specifies his price first, and is then copied by the "pretender."'
'26
Thus, consider the "optimal" offers for the bona fide type under each
branch of the game r. Suppose first that the plaintiff signals M3, indicating
that her valuation is below D, and that she is interested in perhaps selling her
entitlement for 3 < D. By Corollaries 1 and 2, we know that the equilibrium
must involve a pooled bid 13 from both types of defendants. Upon receiving
this bid, the plaintiff knows that rejecting it will give her an expected payoff
of (v. + D)/2, and thus the probability that she accepts this bid is given by
Pr{ 7t accepts 31 m Pri P Iv- D) = 2P-D
2 '~D
Accordingly, the pooled bid that maximizes the expected return of the "bona
fide" bidder type (v, = $40) is the value of 13 that solves
Maxo,1t0.40][ 21 D ]'[40 - ]
As is easily confirmed, the first-order conditions of this maximization problem
imply that the equilibrium pooled bid of the defendant is
= 20 + -,4'
which is equal to $32.50 when D = $50, the result given in the text.
A similar analysis applies to deriving the pooled equilibrium sell offer a
Here, we find that the optimal offer for the "bona fide" $60 defendant is
255. The proof of this Proposition is omitted.
256. The driving force behind this equilibrium is the fact that off-equilibrium beliefs are such that any
rationalizable deviation from the equilibrium behavior induces a belief that it came from either type with
a 1/2 probability.
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which is equal to $17.50 when D = $50, as given in the text.
Piecing the three regions together, we can plot the relationship between
expected social welfare and information costs.
Soc. Surplus
FIGURE A2. Expected Social Welfare for Different Damage Amounts
From Figure A2, one can see that social welfare has a "single-peaked" quality,
in which welfare does not depend on D for all values of D that are less than
$40 or greater than $60. These all represent "property-like" protections, since
they ensure, respectively, that the defendant will always take, or that the
defendant will never take absent a consensual transfer. For damage amounts
that are more intermediate in nature, however (i.e., between S40 and $60), the
welfare function is parabolic in shape, and its global maximum occurs at
D = $50. Here, expected social welfare is equal to $59.875. Thus, expected
social welfare increases continuously from the same value as property-like
rights to a maximum at the mean valuation for the parties ($50).
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B. The Perverse Effects of Tailoring
Below, we briefly show how the above model can be used to derive the
results from the Section on "tailored" liability rules. 7 We consider tailored
negligence and liability separately.
1. Tailored Damages
Suppose that instead of a fixed liability amount, the court awarded the
plaintiff her valuation v. The defendant, on the other hand, will take only if
his valuation v. exceeds the expectation of the plaintiff's damages (or $50).
Thus, the $40 defendant expects a payoff of $0 absent bargaining, while the
$60 defendant expects a payoff of $10 ( = $60-$50) absent bargaining.
Tailored damages effectively give the plaintiff a form of "perfect
insurance" against a taking by the defendant. As such, the plaintiff will never
wish to pay a positive amount to discourage a taking by the defendant. Indeed,
paying the defendant not to take could only earn the plaintiff her private
valuation less the cost of the bribe. Thus, it is rationalizable for all types of
plaintiff to play M3 in the first stage of the game.
Assuming, then, that all plaintiffs play M3, let us construct the (unique)
perfect Bayesian outcome of the bargaining game within this legal
environment. Because the plaintiff is guaranteed her private valuation, she is
unconcerned whether the defendant's bid, 3, reveals that the defendant is high-
or low-valuing. The only factor influencing ir's decision is whether the bid
exceeds her private valuation v .
The $40 defendant (who as noted receives nothing absent bargaining) will
set his bid so as to maximize his expected net revenue:
Maxp 0  "[40-1P],
100
which is maximized at f3 = $20.
The $60 defendant, on the other hand, faces a more complex decision. As
mentioned above, absent bargaining, the $60 defendant will take, willingly
bearing the expected $50 liability payment. If the $60 defendant makes a bid
to buy the plaintiff's entitlement, however, then the defendant ultimately might
decide not to take for one of two reasons. Either (1) the plaintiff will have
accepted the defendant's bid 3, or (2) the plaintiff will have rejected his bid,
but his "updated" assessment of the type of plaintiff he faces induces him to
abstain from taking. Thus, the $60 defendant chooses 3 to maximize the
following:
257. See supra part II.C.
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Max 0 -L-[60-0P] + I00P[MaxlO,60-E~vv,>P11],02:0 100100
or, equivalently,
Max D -- [60-03] + ' [Maxl0,10-1/2 ].
100 100
Analyzing the cases of [3 < $20 and J3 > $40 separately, we find that there are
two local maxima of this objective function, but that the global maximum
occurs at P = 0-a nonserious bid. We thus have the result outlined in the text
for tailored damages. The expected social surplus in this case is $58
(= (.5)$60 + .5[(.2)$40 + (.8)$60]).
2. Tailored Liabiliry
Consider now the case of tailored liability, in which the court imposes
damages of $50 on a defendant whenever he is found to be negligent (i.e.,
VA < E{vJ). In such a situation, the $60 defendant is never found to be
negligent, and therefore always takes absent bargaining, paying no damages.
The $40 defendant, on the other hand, is always found to be negligent, and
thus never takes absent bargaining. Consequently, the plaintiff's expectedpayoff absent bargaining is v,/2 (i.e., 0 and v., each with probability 1/2).
When the plaintiff plays MP in the first round, she may expect serious
offers only from the $40 defendant. Indeed, the $60 defendant is in a similar
situation to the plaintiff in the previous Section: He receives his valuation
regardless of whether a transaction is made. Upon playing M3, then the
plaintiff proceeds as if she is facing a $40 defendant. Thus, the $40 defendant
will enter a bid of $20 (just as before), with the $60 defendant once again
entering a frivolous bid of $0.
On the other hand, should the plaintiff play Ma, then the $60 defendant
might be interested in such a transaction. The $60 defendant, however, will
offer to sell his right to take for no less than $60. Clearly, there is a potential
here for a Coasean improvement. Unfortunately, when the plaintiff plays Ma,
the $40 defendant has the incentive to mimic the behavior of the $60
defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff hearing a sale offer of a will only accept
it if her postcontractual payoff, v,-a, exceeds her expected reservation utility,
v I2. Equivalently, it is easily verified that no plaintiff whose valuation is at
most $100 is willing to accept any sell demand in excess of $50. Since the
only bona fide seller in this situation is the $60 defendant, then no such
transactions are ever made. We can thus conclude that the only types of
plaintiffs who are not indifferent between MP and MaY are those for whom
v_ <$20. We therefore have the same equilibrium outcome we had in the case
of tailored damages. Once again, the expected social surplus is $58.
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C. Derivation of Fractional Property Rule Results258
This Section derives the results from the fraction model of Part In. Recall
from the text that the reservation utilities of the two players are qv, for the
plaintiff and (1-q)v, for the defendant. Further, recall that the allocation and
pricing rule associated with reports of r5 and r, as described in the text is as
follows: If ra > ra, then 7t receives the injunctive right, but must pay A a price
of
(Il-q).(.r)
2
Conversely, if rA > ra, then A receives the injunctive right, but must pay 7t an
price of
(q) ,-( r,
2
In equilibrium, suppose that the players adopt a reporting strategy r3(v1), where
i = 7t,A. Let g.(.) and gA(.) represent the density of r, and r,, respectively, with
G.(.) and GA(.) representing the respective cumulative distribution functions,
and r-upper bar and r-lower bar representing the supremum and infimum of the
equilibrium bids. The plaintiff's net gain in making his report r5 is given by
R (r~Iv)= f[(r+r,) - qv ]dG,(r) + f[(1-q)v - (I (r +r")]dGA(r,).
Similarly, the defendant's net gain in making her report rA is given by
R,(rAlv,) = ffqvA +A ]dG,(r,,) + f'q(,,,-(-)Ad,(,)
r. rA
The first-order conditions associated with maximizing the above functions are,
respectively:
258. The analysis below follows Chatterjee & Samuelson, supra note 134, and Cramton et al., supra
note 133.
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(v,.-r ,)g1(r,.) - !G,(r,.) = 0,
(v A -r,)g.(r,) + -G,(r ) = 0.2 2
It is possible to solve these differential equations, though not uniquely,-" and
arrive at the following equilibrium strategies:
r V = + +
3' 3 3
r "(v,) V + 25 -50
3 3
Using these optimal reports for the parties, we can conclude that it receives the
entitlement if and only if
r Cv.) z r,(v,)
,
or, equivalently, when
v > vA + 25 - 50q.
This is the equation given in the text.
259. See Chatterjee & Samuelson, supra note 134, at 842.
